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What Was Restored
A Decentralized International Financial SystemCHAPTER 17
The 'Technical Instability Inherent in the Partial Trans-
fer of International Money Market Functions from
London to New York
'The treatment that has now been given of the return to gold
of countries outside the central nucleus and of France, and of
the efforts to consolidate the gold standard in Germany, com-
pletes our separate examination of two of the three lines of
development taking place simultaneously from 1925 to 1929
(ci. p. 393). The third, the attempt to operate a widespread
international gold standard system with New York and Lon-
don as major centers was profundly modified by the addition
of France to the nucleus of center countries in 1927. This,
however, served only to clarify and define the main features
of the experimentation of 1925—3 i, and in the end proved to
be in some respects a passing episode. For from 1925 to 1927
and again after 1934 Great Britain and the United States
alone were center countries.1 Both before and after the French
stabilization the transfer of certain international money mar-
ket functions from London to New York is basic in our analy-
s is
•2
Two questions of importance for the interpretation off gold
standard history after 1925 arise from this transfer. One is
whether the assumption by New York of international money
market functions on a large scale, under a particular set of
circumstances, caused a loss of stability in international fi-
Cf. Ch. 29, The Major Characteristics of the Central Foreign Exchange Tri-
angle, 1q31—1934, and Ch.The Great American Gold Magnet.
2 Cf. Ch.'TheRelease of Forces leading to the Rise of art International
Money Market in New York' and 'Sharing with London during the War,' and
C:h. ii, ljkfl-jO is Leader?
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nancial relations. The other is whether such a loss of stability
was inherent in the replacement of the pre-war London-
centered system by a decentralized world credit system. The
examination of the first question requires an estimate of the
capacity of the New York market to shoulder its new respon-
sibilities after the return to gold, and carries our historical
narrative forward. In contrast, the answer to the second ques-
tion is best obtained by an accounting analysis of the effect
of such a transfer of functions upon the distribution of bank
deposits, the character of bank assets, and the conduct of the
world's foreign exchange markets. Such an analysis interrupts
the historical narrative, but supports conclusions drawn or
suggested in other parts of the discussion, and contributes to
the general interpretation in Chapter 21. In particular the
concluding paragraph on the Conflict between Technique
and Capacity is essential to our argument. It is not, how-
ever, necessary for all readers to follow through the details of
the accounting treatment here given to support the conclu-
sions stated in this paragraph, and those who are not espe-
cially interested in this type of exposition are advised to pass
at once to Chapter i8.
A Divided Market Place for International Transactions
in General
The rise of New York as an international money market,
when looked upon from a world point off view, meant a re-
versal of that process of concentration of transactions, of loans
and of deposits which before the war was characteristic of the
growth of an international hierarchy of money markets (cf.
Ch. 7). As a development in banking technique this was a
backward step.
Ten Typical Transactions
To bring out this point we examine first the clearance of
certain purchases and sales of goods and services in a given
international financial center (e.g., London) and then con-A DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 495
sider the effects of the transfer of these transactions in whole
or in part to another center (e.g., New York). In order to
include situations in which each center is assumed to be ren-
dering all the typical services of an international market
place1 we use examples that represent purchases and sales be-
tween Englishmen and other foreigners including Americans,
purchases and sales between Americans and other foreigners
including Englishmen, purchases and sales between citizens
of countries other than England and America, and purchases
and saLes between Englishmen and Americans and their own
nationals.
Specifically we analyze what happens when goods are
sold by
i)Americansto Englishmen 7) Argentinians to Swedes
2)Englishmento Americans 8) Swedes to Argentinians
Argentiniansto Englishmen9) Englishmen to other Eng-
4) Englishmen to Argentinians lishmen
5) Argentinians to Americansio) Americans to other Amen-
6) Americans to Argentinians cans
Concerning these ten transactions we assume that (i) Ar-
gentina and Sweden represent all countries other than the
United. States and England; (2) the transactions are carried
out by banks for customers; (3) each transaction is carried
out by a different bank; thegoods are purchased not with
bank credit but with current income or savings accumulated
in the country of the purchasers.
In order to complete these ten transactions, ten debits and
ten credits to bank accounts of the actual buyers and sellers
are necessary:
Three English sellers are credited in sterling
Three English buyers are debited in sterling
Three American sellers are credited in dollars
Three American buyers are debited in dollars
Three Argentine sellers are credited in pesos
Three Argentine buyers are debited in pesos
One Swedish seller is credited in kronor
One Swedish buyer is debited in kronor496 EXPERIMENTATION
These debits and credits are the essential ones in the trans-
action, but to bring them about, a certain number of inter-
bank debits and credits are required. Both their number and
distribution and the number of exchange transactions in-
volved and their character depend upon the location of the
market where the goods are bought and sold.
Clearing the Ten Transactions through London
MINIMUM NUMBER OF BANK DEPOSITS INVOLVED
If all these transactions are completed in London, then at
least seventeen bank deposits must be created and seventeen
canceled in order to accomplish the ten credits and the ten
debits to the principals. They are distributed as follows:
BANK DEPOSITh CREATED BANK DEPOSITS CANCELED
In
London zo 10




That is to say, ten credits and ten debits to the original buyers
and sellers, and seven debits and seven credits to interbank
accounts.
Of the ten credits and ten debits to the original buyers and
sellers three are in London in sterling in the accounts of the
three English buyers and the three English sellers, three in
Argentina in pesos in the accounts of the three Argentine
buyers and the three Argentine sellers, three in America in
dollars in the accounts of the three American buyers and the
three American sellers, and one in Sweden in kronor in the
accounts of the one Swedish buyer and the one Swedish seller.
All seven credits and seven debits to interbank accounts are
made in sterling:
CREDITS
Three to American banks in payment for American goods sold
to Englishmen, Argentinians, and AmericansA DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 497
Three to Argentine banks in payment for Argentine goods sold
1.0 Englishmen, Americans, and Swedes
One to a Swedish bank in payment for Swedish goods sold to
Argentinians
DEBITS
Three to American banks in payment for English, Argentine, and
American goods bought by Americans
'Three to Argentine banks in payment for English, American,
and Swedish goods bought by Argentinians
One to a Swedish bank in payment for Argentine goods bought
by Swedes
The seven credits and the seven debits to interbank ac-
count:; represent changes in the assets of the American, Ar-
gentine, and Swedish banks which are the contra-entries for
the changes in the deposits on their books of the buyers and
sellers in their respective countries. These banks are acting as
channels and merely record the effects of transactions taking
place in London. Their assets and liabilities rise and fall as
the transactions are concluded in London. Clearance takes
place in London and if complete for the transactions in which
each country as a whole is concerned, there is no net change
in the assets and liabilities of their banks. These relations are
shown in the left column of Chart 28, which lists the 34
entries made on the books of banks to clear the original ten
transactions and the changes in bank assets accompanying
them in the four banking systems.
MINIMUM NUMBER OF EXCHANGE RATES INVOLVED
In nine out of the ten cases exchange rates have to be fixed,
the sale of goods by Englishmen to other Englishmen being
the one exception. There is one in each of the four other
cases in which an Englishman is a party, and there are two in
each of the five cases in which Englishmen are not parties.
These exchange rates have to be fixed as follQws:
In the sterling-dollar exchange six rates:


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.A DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 501
American sellers to Englishmen, to Argentinians, and to other
Americans,
and
three to determine the amount of dollars to be debited to the
American purchasers from Englishmen, from Argentinians, and
from other Americans.
In the sterling-peso exchange six rates:
to determine the amount of pesos to be credited to the
Argentine sellers to Englishmen, to Americans, and to Swedes,
and
three to determine the amount of pesos to be debited to the
.Argendne purchasers from Englishmen, from Swedes, and from
Americans.
In the sterling-krona exchange two rates:
One to determine the amount of kronor to be credited to the
Swedish sellers to Argentinians,
and
one to determine the amount of kronor to be debited to the
Swedish purchasers from Argentinians.
All these rates are fixed in the general market without the
principals knowing from whom they are buying or selling.
These fourteen exchange rates are the minimum number
that must result from these transactions if carried out in Lon-
don.
ACTUAL NUMBER OF BANK DEPOSITS AND EXCHANGE RATES IN-
VOLVED
At the moment of the completion of the transactions three
American banks, three Argentine banks, and one Swedish
bank have come into possession of new sterling deposits
against which new domestic deposit liabilities have been cre-
ated. Three American banks, three Argentine banks, and one
Swedish bank have suffered a reduction in their sterling de-
posits and in exchange have canceled domestic deposits. But
the size of the sterling deposits that these Argentine, Swedish,502 EXPERIMENTATION
and American banks individually desire to maintain or do
maintain is not a function of these particular transactions.
Some of them may not wish to maintain sterling deposits un-
impaired. Since every transaction of commerce is an indi-
vidual transaction, as Ricardo long ago observed, there will
be purchases and sales of sterling among the individual banks
in each country to restore the distribution of the sterling de-
posits previously existing among them or now desired by
them. More than fourteen interbank credits and debits will
therefore be required, and more than fourteen exchange rates
will have to be fixed to effect the ten original transactions.
Beyond the transactions arising from the equalization of the
accounts of individual banks there are the transactions that
take place in the trading in the exchanges that intervenes
before such a distribution of the amount of sterling held by
the banks of any given country among its individual banks is
accomplished. Sometimes a large number of transactions in
the market intervenes between the banks actually having
sterling and those actually desiring it. All this secondary ac-
tivity in the foreign exchange market and turnover in the
sterling deposits of foreign banks affects the breadth of the
market for sterling and therefore its capacity for absorbing
large transactions without concessions in the rates.
Conditions under which Complete Clearance on the Books of
London Banks can take place
If each country in the illustration buys and sells on balance
from all other countries, including England, an equal amount
of goods through London as a market, then it is possible for
all the transactions to be cleared upon the books of London
banks. This is consistent with a large number of possible net
creditor or debtor positions arising between any two pairs of
countries using the London market for the consummation of
these transactions. Though the result is simple, the process of
clearing may be very complex. For the ten transactions it in-
volves in London, as a minimum:A DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 503
i)oneset of offsetting debits and credits to domestic deposit
accounts (Transaction 9)
2)fourtransfers to and from English domestic deposit accounts
from and to the accounts of foreign banks in London (Trans-
actions 1—4)
3)four transfers from the accounts of some foreign banks in
London to the accounts of other foreign banks in London
(Transactions 5—8)
4)one set of offsetting debits and credits in the London ac-
counts of the banks of a single foreign country (Transaction io).
All the transfers involved in Transactions i—B, except those
between Argentine and Swedish banks, may be of unequal
amount without infringing upon the requirements of perfect
clearance in London; that is, without involving any redistri-
bution of foreign balances in London or any changes in the
volume of bank deposits abroad, and without requiring any
transactions in any foreign exchange on London that are not
completely offsetting or any foreign exchange arbitrage op-
erations. Since Argentina and Sweden have been taken as
representative of all countries other than America and Eng-
land the requirement that the transfers between them be
equal in amount is consistent with many other possible net
debtor and creditor positions that are excluded from the ac-
tual examples given.
The requirements for perfect clearance of the ten transac-
tions through London are put in schematic form in Table
Effects of a Transfer of the Market to New York on Bank De-
Bank Assets) and Exchange Rates
If the results of carrying out these ten transactions in the New
York market instead of in the London market are now con-
sidered, then the distribution of debits and credits to the
bank deposits of the various countries will be as follows:
Seventeen bank deposits are created and seventeen are
canceled in order to accomplish the ten credits and the ten
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)A DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 505
credits to the original buyers and sellers, and seven debits and
seven credits to interbank accounts. The ten debits and
credits to the original buyers and sellers will be the same as if
BANK DEPOSITS CREATED BANK DEPOSITS CANCELED
I"
London 3 3




all transactions were cleared through London. But the seven
interbank debits and credits will all be in dollars:
CREDITS
Three to English banks in payment for English goods sold to
Americans, Argentinians, and Englishmen
Three to Argentine banks in payment for Argentine goods sold to
Englishmen, Americans, and Swedes
One to a Swedish bank in payment for Swedish goods sold to
Argeni:inians
DEBITS
Three to English banks in payment for American, Argentine, and
British goods bought by Englishmen
Three to Argentine banks in payment for British, American, and
Swedish goods bought by Argentinians
One to a Swedish bank in payment for Argentine goods bought
by Swedes
In nine of the ten cases an exchange rate has to be fixed,
the sale of American goods to Americans in New York now
being the only exception. There is one in each of the other
four cases in which an American is a party, and there are two
in each of the five cases in which Americans are not parties.
These exchange rates have to be fixed as follows:
In the sterling-dollar exchange, six rates:
Three to determine the amount of sterling to be credited to Eng-
lish sellers to Americans. and other Englishmen,506 EXPERIMENTATION
and
three to determine the amount of sterling to be debited to English
buyers from Americans, Argentinians, and other Englishmen.
In the dollar-peso exchange, six rates:
Three to determine the amount of pesos to be credited to Argen-
tine sellers to Americans, Englishmen, and Swedes,
and
three to determine the amount of pesos to be debited to Argen-
tine buyers from Americans, Englishmen, and Swedes.
In the dollar-krona exchange, two rates:
One to determine the amount of kronor to be credited to Swedish
sellers to Argentinians,
and
one to determine the amount of knonor to be debited to Swedish
buyers from Argentinians.
These fourteen exchange rates are the minimum number
that must result from these transactions if carried out in New
York. As in the case when London was assumed to be the
market, there would arise from these transactions interme-
diary transactions in the foreign exchange market and a tend-
ency would be set up for a net increase in the New York bank
deposits of foreign banks. There would be a broadening of
the market for dollars in the various countries concerned,
provided, however, that the shift in the concentration of
transactions was accompanied by a corresponding change in
customary methods of remittance.
As far as American trade is concerned, the New York banks
that had acted merely as channels through which London
rendered the essential services of providing the market place
have now become principals. When the transactions were
concluded in London, the debits and credits of American
buyers and sellers of goods and services were offset by corre-
sponding changes in the assets of New York banks in the form
of sterling deposits. When New York is the market, the debits
and credits to American buyers and sellers are offset by debitsA DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 507
and credits to the New York accounts of the banks of all the
countries with which Americans have dealings. New York has
taken the first step in the creation of an international money
marker, that of acting as principal for the conclusion of the
international transactions of its own citizens instead of acting
as a channel.
When London was the market, the transactions of English-
men with foreigners other than Americans and of Englishmen
with one another and of foreigners other than Englishmen
or Americans with one another did not concern the American
banking system at all. When New York becomes the market,
all these transactions involve debits and credits to the ac-
counts of the banks of these various countries. New York has,
:in this case, taken the second step in the creation of an inter-
national money market—the participation in the rendering
of money market services in which it was previously not in-
terested at all. The necessity for maintaining many foreign
bankers' deposits in New York, which were not previously
needed, has arisen and to that extent the necessity of main-
taining balances in London has declined.
If the transfer of the concentration of transactions from
London to New York is complete, that is, if New York suc-
ceeds in replacing London as a market for the conclusion of
international transactions, there is no loss in the efficiency
with 'which these transactions are cleared.
The new situation is shown in the right column of Chart
28. The changes involved for the banks of each country are
indicated when one reads across the chart. The London banks
drop out of the picture in transactions not involving English
trade. In cases involving English trade they become channels
instead of principals. The deposits of the Argentine and
Swedish banks rise and fall with the rise or fall of their dollar
rather than their sterling deposits.
Clearance of the Ten Transactions in a Divided Market
In actual practice only a relatively small proportion of the
function of providing an international market place was trans-6o8 EXPERIMENTATION
ferred from London to New York. If the more realistic as-
sumption is adopted that some of the ten transactions in the
illustration are concluded in New York and some in London,
then a net loss in the efficiency with which international clear-
ance is carried out must result. Even if the assumption is con-
tinued that on balance none of the four countries is a net
creditor or debtor as a result of the ten transactions, it may
still be true that each country may be a debtor in its trans-
actions cleared through one market and a creditor in its trans-
actions cleared through the other. An additional burden is
thus placed upon the foreign exchange mechanism. Debits
established in one market will have to be met by credits estab-
lished in the other market instead of being offset by credits
established in the same market. Changes in the volume of
international business activity will have larger effects on the
volume of foreign exchange remittance than if the interna-
tional market place were more centralized. Larger working
balances will have to be kept in the two markets combined
to transact the same amount of business. Finally, as long as
the transfer is not sufficient to change established habits of
remitting through London, London balances will be drawn
down and replenished in a more erratic manner, the ex-
changes on London of other countries using the American
market will consequently be subject to more frequent dis-
turbance, and the sterling-dollar exchange will be subjected
to severer strains than when the international markets were
more highly centralized in London. It is a general characteris-
tic of all clearance that the more divided the clearing mecha-
nism the greater the volume of final means of payment pass-
ing between the parties in proportion to the gross volume of
payments to be effected.
A Divided Responsibility for Long Term
Lending
Removal of the Assumption of Perfect Clearance
A highly artificial assumption has been carried through the
preceding discussion in order to abstract from other elementsA DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 509
in the problem and place in clear relief the loss of interna-
tional stability arising from the partial transfer of part of the
international market for goods and services, from London
to New York; namely, that each country maintained in its
dealings in the central international markets, wherever these
were assumed to be, a balanced position in relation to all
other countries combined. This simplified assumption of
course was not and never could be true. There will always be
net payments to be made or received by any given country as
a result of its transactions concluded in the international
markets for goods and services. These net payments will be
greater when the international financial centers are many
than when they are one. Whether these net payments con-
tribute to international stability or not depends upon their
place in the total balance of payments of the countries con-
cerned and upon their repercussions in the international
money markets where the transactions are concluded. The
importance of this second consideration in its relation to the
first can be brought out by considering the effect of the trans-
fer of a substantial part of the market in international se-
curities from London to New York without the limiting
assumption concerning perfect clearance thus far adopted.
The import and export of securities, in its effect upon bank
deposits and bank assets, is the same as the import and export
of goods and services. All the observations already made con-
cerriing clearance when the international market for goods is
transferred or divided are applicable to securities also. In its
general aspects, therefore, the problem of clearance involved
in a divided market place for security dealings has already
been discussed, and we may simply substitute for 'goods' in
our' ten illustrative cases, securities. When the assumption is
dropped that each of the four countries maintains a balance
in its total securities transactions, but the assumption that all
ten security transactions are carried out in London is re-
tained, then, whatever the relations between any two of these
four countries, such as England and Argentina, and America
and Argentina, the net change in the volume of the sterling510 EXPERIMENTATION
deposits of Argentine, Swedish, and American banks will re-
flect the net long term capital exports or imports of their
respective countries and only that, and the net change in the
total of all these deposits will represent the net long term
capital export or import of England. If it is assumed that the
whole market is transferred to New York then the result is
the same with the positions of New York and London re-
versed, provided however that the customary methods of re-
mittance through London are replaced by remittance through
New York.
The Conditions, most favorable to Exchange Stability under
Imperfect Clearance in a Single Central Money Market
Under these conditions many possible situations may arise,
some of which are more likely to produce stable conditions in
the central money markets and in the foreign exchanges than
others.
THREE LIMITING CASES, ENGLAND ASSUMED TO BE THE MARKET
In order to establish the conditions most favorable to ex-
change stability, three limiting cases are considered: when the
country in which the market is located is (i) the only capital
exporter; (2) the only capital importer; neithercapital
exporter nor capital importer. In terms of the ten transactions
used as illustrations these limiting cases appear as follows
when the market is in London:
Case i. We may first assume that England is a net exporter of
capital, America is a net importer of capital, and the rest of
the world, represented by Argentina and Sweden, is a net
importer of capital. This was substantially the position dur-
ing the period of England's greatest dominance in world trade
before the war, though, of course, there were other capital
exporting countries. In this example, however, the 'rest of
the world' is considered as a whole in order to establish the
theoretical case in which England's foreign exchange position
is least complicated by the international securities transac-
tions of third countries in the London market.A DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 511
If a].1 transactions are completed in London under these
conditions:
a) All ten transactions are carried out on the books of Lon-
don banks by transfers between foreign banks, and between
English depositors and foreign banks, and there is an increase
in the total sterling deposits of foreign banks equal to the net
decrease in the total sterling deposits of English purchasers of
securities. The net increase in the sterling deposits of foreign
banks represents the net export of capital from England.
h) The distribution of the increased total of sterling deposits
of foreign banks between American banks and the banks of
the 'rest of the world' is determined by the net position of
America and of the 'rest of the world' as capital importers.
c) This is consistent with a large number of possible capital
export and capital import relations existing between any two
pairs or groups of countries.
d) The stability of this position depends upon whether Eng-
lish capital exports are properly related to England's capacity
to export capital. If they are, then the distribution of the ster-
ling balances made available to foreign capital importers as a
result of the clearance taking place on the books of London
banks is followed by a second distribution through the op-
eration of the foreign exchange markets which brings this
sterling into the hands of people having debts to pay in Eng-
land.°
8Althoughit is a case that could never occur in practice, this rather simple
and effective result of the location of the international securities market in
London may be contrasted with the situation that would prevail if all the
transactions were carried out in New York while England alone was a capital
exporter. In that case the English banks would find their dollar deposits in
New York reduced by the full amount of their net purchases of securities
from Americans, Argentinians, and Swedes. In order to replenish these bal-
ances they would purchase dollars and the American banks would find them-
selves in possession of a new banking asset, sterling deposits in London.
Against this the American banks would have an increased deposit liability
in part in favor of American sellers of securities and in part in favor of
Argentine and Swedish banks. The distribution of these dollar deposits be-
tween the Argentine and Swedish banks would be in accordance with the net
capital import position of their respective countries. Just as when the market
wasassumedto be in London, the increased sterling obligations of the British512 EXPERIMENTATION
Case 2. If the highly improbable case is assumed that England
is the sole capital importer and the market for international
securities is still in London, then it would also be true that
the British banking system would find itself faced only with
the consequences of England's own capital transactions. Clear-
ance of the ten transactions on the books of London banks
would be completed by the net transfers from the accounts of
foreign banks to English sellers of securities.
Case 3. In order to indicate the effect upon the position of the
London banks of the passage of net capital exports or imports
of other countries through the London market, it may next
be assumed that such a movement takes place while England
is neither importer nor exporter of capital, but that America
is a capital exporter, and Argentina and Sweden are capital
banking system to foreigners would reflect only the British net capital export
position, but instead of being distributed among the various banking systems
of capital importing countries, it would be concentrated as an obligation to
American banks. On the other hand, Argentine and Swedish banks and the
American sellers of securities would be in possession of dollars representing
their borrowings from England. American banks would be in the same posi-
tion as if America had been a capital exporter to Argentina and Sweden and
a capital importer from England to the extent of English purchases of
Argentine and Swedish securities in New York. The clearance of the ten
original transactions on the books of New York banks would not be complete.
Newly created dollar balances of Argentine or Swedish banks and sterling
balances of American banks would remain outstanding. A secondary redistri-
bution of these dollar deposits would be necessary in order to bring them
into the hands of people who were debtors to England. Unless remittance
through New York were the customary method of remittance between other
countries and England, this would involve foreign exchange arbitrage trans-
actions. There would be a strong probability, however, that if London re-
mained the usual channel of remittance between New York and other coun-
tries, the Swedish and Argentine banks would remit the proceeds of the sales
of Swedish and Argentine securities in New York to London as soon as these
sales were completed. If they did so, the dollar accounts of English banks
would be replenished and as far as the distribution of bank deposits inter-
nationallyis concerned, the same simple position would result asifthe
markets for securities had been in London. In this case also the final situation
would be one in which both markets had to deal only with the consequence
of their own capital transactions. The only difference would be a greater
activity in the sterling dollar exchange.A DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 513
importers. This assumption, like those of Cases i and 2, does
not require any further assumption with respect to the rela-
Lions between any two of the four countries involved. Amer-
ica may be capital exporter to England, Argentina may be
capital exporter to Sweden, and England, capital exporter to
Argentina, but in such amounts that on balance the American
capita.l export equals the sum of the Argentine and Swedish
capital import.4
If all ten transactions are completed in London under these
conditions:
a) All ten transactionsare cleared in the London market by
transfers between foreign banks, and between English domes-
tic depositors and foreign banks. The debits and credits to
English domestic depositors are offsetting, and the total of
the sterling deposits of foreign banks is unchanged.
b) There is a redistribution of existing sterling balances be-
tween American banks and the banks of the rest of the world
which is determined by the net position of America as a capi-
tal exporter, and of 'the rest of the world' as capital importer.
c) This is consistent with a large number of possible capital
export and capital import relations existing between any two
countries. In particular, England's capital exports and im-
port:; to and from America, Argentina, and Sweden separately
complicate the process of clearance but do not affect the final
distribution of foreign bank balances in London.
d)'Fhe stability of this position depends on whether the
debits to the balances of the American banks correspond to
the capacity of America to export capital and whether the
cred.its to the balances of the Argentine and Swedish banks
4Theexcess of America's purchases of English, Argentine, and American
securities over English, Argentine, and American purchases of American se-
curities in London (America's net capital export)is assumed to be equal to
the excess of English, American, and Swedish purchases of Argentine securities
over Argentine purchases of English, American, and Swedish securities in
London (Argentina's net capital import) plus the excess of Argentine pur-
chases of Swedish securities over Swedish purchases of Argentine securities in
London (Sweden's net capital import).514 EXPERIMENTATION
correspond to the need of these countries to import capital.
If they do, a secondary redistribution of the sterling balances
takes place which depletes the new balances of Argentine and
Swedish banks and replenishes the balances of American
by bringing them into the hands of people indebted
to the United States. If these conditions are not fulfilled, that
is, if America is over- or under-lending, and Argentina and
Sweden are over- or under-borrowing the exchanges of the
three countries on London will be subjected to various strong
pressures. If, for example, America were over-lending, then
the secondary redistribution of sterling balances' would not
bring them into the hands of people indebted to America.
The increases in the sterling balances of Argentina and Swe-
den (the 'rest of the world' in our illustrations) would re-
main in existence. If then American banks replenished their
sterling balances, an increase in the dollar deposits of English
banks would result, which would be the asset corresponding
to the increased Argentine and Swedish deposits in London.
A new volume as well as a new distribution of interbank in-
debtedness would thus be created, more gold movements and
more exchange arbitrage operations would be necessary and
the problems of credit control in England would be multi-
plied.
THE THREE LIMITING CASES, NEW YORK ASSUMED TO BE THE
MARKET
If the situation in Case i were exactly reversed and America
were the sole net capital exporting country and New York
the market for international securities, then complete clear-
Unless other transactions in the balance of payments make it possible for
the American banks to replenish their balances by purchases of sterling de-
posits the ten transactions cannot be settled by transfers of bank deposits in
London, but under the gold standard must be settled in part by gold move-
ments. If the capacity of America to export capital is great, Americans will
not have to take the initiative in replenishing their balances. Others will do
it for them. As shown elsewhere in these studies, initiative in the foreign ex-
change markets is dosely related to capacity to export capital.A DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 515
ance of all ten transactions could take place on the books of
New York banks except for America's own net capital exports.
This almost happened when American war lending was at its
height. If the situation in Case 2 were exactly reversed and
New York were the sole net capital importing country and
also the market for international securities, then complete
cleara.nce of all ten transactions could take place on the books
of New York banks except for America's own capital imports.
If the circumstances of Casewere exactly reversed and New
York assumed to be the market with America neither capital
exporter nor capital importer, then the American market
would find itself confronted with foreign exchange difficulties
arising from over- or under-lending by England, or under-
or over-borrowing by Argentina or Sweden from England.6
CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM THE LIMITING CASES
From a consideration of these three casesis apparent that
the conditions most favorable to exchange stability are found
when the country in which the international securities market
is located is also the only important capital exporting coun-
try. The problem of the control of the foreign exchanges is
then limited to making an appropriate adjustment between
the capital exports of that country and its own capacity to ex-
port capital. Under these conditions there is the best chance
that exchange stability can be achieved by appropriate credit
control policy in a single country. When the capital exports
of other countries are accomplished through a central money
market then the problem of exchange stability is complicated
for the country where the market is located, and its credit
control policy is subjected to difficulties not of its own mak-
ing.
6Thehighly abstract character of these possible situations serves to empha-
size the type of disturbances created by large movements of securities inter-
nationally that are riot truly related to genuine capital export and import
transactions begun by security purchases and sales and completed by a move-
ment of goods.516 EXPERIMENTATION
Imperfect Clearance in a Single Market when both England
and America are Capital Exporters
None of the three limiting cases is of course applicable to the
situation prevailing after 1925. If it is next assumed that both
England and America are large capital exporters and the
'rest of the world' is a capital importer the actual situation is
more nearly approached. This case is first examined while
still retaining the assumption that all the transactions are
carried out in a single market.
LONDON ASSUMED TO BE THE MARKET
Under these conditions the characteristics of Cases i and 3
are both present:
a) The banks of Argentina and Sweden (the 'rest of the
world') acquire sterling deposits representing the net export
of capital from both England and America.
b) The distribution of these sterling deposits among the
banks of the 'rest of the world' is determined by the net posi-
tion as an importer of capital of each country included in this
expression.7
c) Whether, under these circumstances, all the transactions
may be cleared by transfers from one foreign bank to another
on the books of London banks except for the increase in
foreign bank balances due to England's own capital exports
depends on the character of the secondary distribution of
sterling deposits which brings them into the hands of people
who have debts to pay both in England and America.
d) 'Whether this leads to a further net increase in interbank
indebtedness depends upon the appropriateness of the vol-
ume of security purchases by America, and sale by Argentina
and Sweden, to the capacity of America to export capital and
the need of the 'rest of the world' to import capital as de-
scribed in Case
7There is here a further assumption that every country induded under the
designation 'rest of the world' is a capital importer. Without this the argu-
ment would become very burdensome, without material change in its signifi-
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e)Under the assumptions of this case many situations may
arise to instability in the exchanges. If, for example,
American purchases of securities from the 'rest of the world'
in London exceed very greatly, even for a short period, the
return flow of payments to America through London, sterling
will be strengthened in New York but will be weakened in
other centers. Irrespective of England's own capacity to meet
the obligations created by her own capital exports, England
does find herself obliged to assume obligations to the 'rest of
the world' arising from America's capital export. The move-
ment of the exchanges may be corrected by the mechanism
of exchange arbitrage which effects a new redistribution of
England's dollar balances. If this is not sufficient, the weak-
ness of sterling in other exchanges and its strength in dollars
may, under gold standard arrangements, draw gold from
America through London to the capital importing countries
or their assigns.8 But England might not find that London
was a mere channel for the adjustment of America's position.
The adjustment might be too late, or only partial, for many
reasons. Among them is the fact that the same volume of
tran:sactions affects very differently the great 'trunk line' of
the world's exchanges.—the sterling-dollar rate—and the ster-
ling exchanges on the various capital importing countries and
the various cross rates used in effecting exchange arbitrage
adjustments. London might be obliged to give up gold to
other countries without drawing it from America. To prevent
this a credit control policy might have to be instituted not
really required by England's own balance of payments posi-
tion..
The opposite effects might result if American purchases of
foreign securities in London were regularly, or even for short
less than the stream of payments being made through
London to America, the existence of which gives to America
the opportunity, or imposes upon it the duty, of becoming a
SThecommon post-war case of capital flights to America would be illustrated
by making assumptions opposite to those here postulated, i.e., that Argentina
and Sweden were capital exporters and America a capital importer, and
London the market.518 EXPERIMENTATION
capital exporter. There would be no assurance that the stream
of payments through London resulting from American capital
exports, and of payments due America and made through the
London foreign exchange markets, would synchronize in
either time or amount. The flow of American capital exports
might be erratic or regular, while the flow of payments to
America might be the opposite for any given period. Even if
American purchases of foreign securities in London were
fully offset by a return flow of payments due America as a
result of her service and goods exports, these payments might
be made to a larger extent through direct exchange transac-
tions with New York. This would necessitate still further
triangular operations in the exchanges.
The exigencies of England's own situation, or that of some
country not related to these American capital exports passing
through London, might also impede the smoothness by which
the clearance of American payments in London could be
made. At times sterling might be strong both in dollars and
in the currencies of countries that are creditors of America.
For example, American net purchases of foreign securities in
London might take place at the same time that Bank of Eng-
land policy was making short term investments in London
particularly attractive to the recipients of these new sterling
balances. Another set of circumstances might mean that ster-
ling would be weak both in dollars and in the other exchanges
in spite of the, net movement of American capital through
the London market.
In summary, therefore, it may be said that when London is
the market place for international securities, and at the same
time England shares with America the function of long term
lending to the rest of the world, then the deposit obligations
of English banks to the rest of the world arising from the
purchases and sales of securities in the London market do not
represent the result of her own capital export alone. It has
become inextricably boundwith the capital export of
the United States. It is affected by the relation existing be-A DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 519
tween the volume and regularity of American capital exports
to America's capacity to export capital, and by the relation
between the volume and regularity of her own capital exports
and her own capacity to export capital, and also by the chan-
nels chosen by other countries for remitting to or receiving
payments from America.
NEW YORK ASSUMED TO BE THE MARKET
[f under these conditions the market were transferred to New
York, the ten transactions would for similar reasons not be
completely cleared on the books of New York banks. The
banks of the rest of the world would acquire dollar deposits
representing the net export of capital of both England and
America. The distribution of the dollar deposits coming into
existence in New York among the different importing coun-
tries would be determined by their net position as capital
importers from England and America combined. The posi-
tion of the American banks would be the same as that off the
English banks if the market were in London under the same
assumptions with respect to capital exports. The transfer of
the market to New York would simplify the English problem
by leaving the English banks, as far as their deposit and for-
eign exchange situation is concerned, faced with the problems
raised by English capital exports only, while the American
banks would find their foreign exchange problem and their
deposits and assets influenced by the capital export position
of England as well as that of America.
But here again if London continued to be the customary
channel of remittance between America and other countries,
the would be reversed in part at least by the remit-
tance to London of their dollar balances by Argentine and
Swedish banks. In that case the American and the English
banking systems would be jointly affected by the foreign ex-
change consequences of the capital exports of both countries.
Complete clearance of the ten transactions upon the books of
banks of either center would be impossible and an added520 EXPERIMENTATION
burden would be thrown upon the world's foreign exchange
markets.
The writer has carried the analysis here presented still
further, in order to include the various possible situations
that arise when there is a third capital exporter using either
the London or the New York market. From this he has con-
cluded that the center that acts as the actual market for the
placement or the purchase and sale of securities becomes
more and more involved in the consequences of other coun-
tries' net borrowing and lending, and the process of clearance
upon the books of banks has to be more and more supple-
mented by foreign exchange transactions as the number of
capital exporting countries increases.
Imperfect Clearance in a Divided Market
All these complications follow from a division of the responsi-
bility for long term lending even if the market for interna-
tional security dealings is wholly concentrated in a single
center. If this unrealistic assumption is dropped and the
market is assumed to be divided, then the net balances result-
ing from the ten transactions that have to be remitted through
the exchange markets no longer represent the net capital ex-
port or import position of the countries that are parties to
the ten transactions. All the complications of clearance de-
scribed in the general case of a divided market for interna-
tional transactions are added to those resulting from net
imports or exports of securities. The balances between pairs
of countries, as well as the net balances of each country with
all other countries combined, may result in foreign exchange
transactions that are not offsetting.
General Conclusion: the Conditions most favorable to Ex-
change Stability cannot be approximated in a Decentralized
System
An examination of these various possible situations leads to
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of a newinternationalmoney market performing the time-
bridging functions of extending long term international
credits and providing a market for internationally traded-in
securities:
i)Thepresence of an international securities market contrib-
utes to the stability of the exchange of the country in which
it is Located by broadening the market in that exchange un-
less it is used as a channel for persistent one-way payments
between other countries.
2) When there are two large net capital exporters, and at
the same time the market for international securities is cen-
tralized, then the banking system of the country that has the
market is inextricably involved in any under- or over-lending
operations of the other, provided that it is also the chief for-
eign exchange market for the other country.
3) \IVhen the market for international securities is transferred
in part or in whole to a capital exporting country whose cur-
rency is not the chief channel for accomplishing the inter-
national payments of other countries, then the presence of
all or part of the international market in securities does not
necessarily involve that country in foreign exchange compli-
cations arising from the capital transactions of other coun-
tries; nor does the transfer of the market in securities relieve
the country whose currency is the customary channel of re-
mittance for other countries from the foreign exchange com-
plications arising from the capital transactions of other
countries.
These three abstract conclusions may be applied to the
post-war transfer of part of the function of long term lending
and of international securities dealings from London to New
York as follows:
One of the features of the post-war period, including the
years following 1925, was that the London market for securi-
ties was used as a channel for large one-way movements of
capital. The international movement of funds in and out of
the London securities market was far more important than522 EXPERIMENTATION
the international shifting of bank balances. It often assumed
very great proportions and contributed to a fundamental lack
of stability in the world's exchanges. A mechanism designed
to provide clearance became a channel of remittance through
which reparation payments, flights of capital, and private
movements of capital passed without being properly related
in either time or volume to offsetting flows of payments in
the opposite direction.
The transfer of a portion of the international securities
market to New York from London served to disentangle the
London banking system from some of these burdens and to
transfer them to New York. But to the extent that countries
importing capital from America chose to use their dollar
balances to buy sterling, London was not really relieved of
responsibility through the transfer of the market. As long as
the channel for remittance between New York and the rest
of the world was predominantly through London, the transfer
of the international securities market to New York simply
added to the volume of transactions passing over the dollar-
sterling exchange and left London in much the same position
as if it were still the sole market.
The transfer of a part of the securities market to New York,
however, diminished by one the number of influences tending
to maintain the sterling exchange as the means of remittance
between New York and other countries. And to the extent
that it was accompanied by the transfer of commodity mar-
kets, and the insurance market in whole or in part, the
centralized foreign exchange pattern was changed. To that
extent, but to that extent only, the transfer of dealings in in-
ternational securities from London to New York released the
London market from some of its international responsibili-
ties.
Under the conditions prevailing after the war neither of
the two cases in which America or England could be inde-
pendent of problems arising from over- or under-lending by
the other country was possible. The rise of an internationalA DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 523
securities market in New York in combination with the ap-
peara:rice of America as a large capital exporter made it in-
evitable that both the English and American banking systems
should be inextricably involved in the results of over- and
under-lending and over- or under-borrowing wherever and
whenever these occurred.
A Divided Responsibility for International Trade
Financing
Th.e above analysis has shown that when a financial center
takes over part of the function of providing a market for the
conclusion of international transactions of various kinds from
another financial center there is a substitution of the banks
of the one for those of the other as debtors on demand. It be-
comes necessary for the banks of all countries whose citizens
are dealing in the markets of this second financial center to
maintain accounts there, and the new concentration of trans-
actions takes the form of a Continuous shifting of the control
over deposits in the new center from one hand to another.
This process is a function of the capacity of the second mar-
ket to serve as a market place for the conclusion of interna-
tiona.l transactions. In the special case of transactions in se-
curities, the importance of an appropriate relation between
the volume of security transactions and their location to the
capacity of the various countries involved to export capital
or their need to import capital has been shown.
In this analysis it was assumed that the goods and services
bought and sold were purchased not with bank credit but
from. current income or savings accumulated in the country
of the purchaser. When, however, there is a transfer of the
function of financing international trade from one market to
another a different kind of capacity is involved. The banks
in the country to which this function is transferred assume
demand obligations (deposits)in exchange for short term
claims, and those of the country giving up this function are
relieved of both. The service rendered by the financial center524 EXPERIMENTATION
is no longer the mere transferring of deposits from one for-
eign control to another or from foreign to domestic control,
but the creation of a new volume of deposits in exchange for
short term claims.
Bank Deposits created and maintained by short term Inter-
national Trade Financing
The extension by any money market of short term credit to
finance the movement of international trade has certain gen-
eral effects:
i)Nomatter by whom granted and no matter whether they are
in the form of export or import credits, all credit extensions by
banks to finance the movement of goods in international trade
create bank deposit liabilities in the exporting countries in favor
of the exporters and postpone the cancellation of bank deposit
liabilities in the importing countries to the debit of the importers.
2) All credit extensions by banks to finance the movement of
goods in international trade give rise to interbank deposits or
postpone the cancellation of interbank deposits. The location of
these interbank deposits and the character of the assets held
against the deposits created in favor of the exporters are greatly
influenced by a shift in the source of the credits from one country
to another.
Whenever the banks of any country finance its own exports
in its own currency, then bank deposits are affected as follows:
a)a deposit liability is created in the exporting country in favor
of its own exporters;
b)the bank deposits of the importing country are not, during
the life of the credit, reduced by a debit to the account of the
importers;
c)the bank deposits of the banks of the importing country in
the exporting country are not, during the life of the credit, re-
duced by a debit in payment for imports.
That is to say, one bank deposit is created and two are
maintained intact. The importing country has simply had
its debt postponed. For example, when English exports to
America and to Argentina are financed by sterling creditsA DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 525
granted by London banks, the London banks give credit to
the English exporters and in exchange for this increase in
their deposit liability acquire 90 day claims upon American
and Argentine importers or upon the American and Argen-
tine banks that have arranged the credits on behalf of these
importers. Meanwhile, the existing deposits of American and
Argentine banks in London, which would otherwise have to
be debited in payment for these shipments, remain unim-
paire(l. In Argentina and in America the bank deposits of the
American and Argentine importers in dollars and pesos are
similarly unimpaired. The debt of these two countries has
been postponed.
Whenever the banks of any country finance its own imports
in its own currency, bank deposits are affected as follows:
a)a deposit liability is created in the exporting country in favor
of the exporters;
b) a deposit liability is created in the importing country in favor
of the banks of the exporting country;
c)the bank deposit liabilities of the importing country are not,
during the life of the credit, reduced by a debit to the account
of the importer.
That is to say, two deposit liabilities are created, and one
deposit liability is maintained. The exporting country is re-
lieved of any need for extending credit, for its banks receive
a foreign deposit against which they give deposit credit to
their exporters. The country has received payment for its
exports in foreign bank deposits. For example, when English
imports from America and Argentina are financed by sterling
credit granted in London, the credit superstructure in Lon-
don is affected as follows: sterling deposits of American and
Argentine banks are credited and against this increased de-
posit liability the English banks receive 90 day claims upon
English importers. Meanwhile, the existing bank deposits of
importers in England remain unimpaired. In America and
Argentina new bank deposits are created in favor of the
°Forconvenience we assume the credits are for three months.526 EXPERIMENTATION
American and Argentine exporters in dollars and pesos, and
against the increase in their deposit liabilities the American
and Argentine banks acquire a new asset in the form of ster-
ling deposits. The banks of these two countries are relieved
of the necessity of providing the resources against which to
extend credit to their own exporters. These two countries
receive payment for their exports in the form of sterling de-
posits.
Whenever the banks of any country finance an export of
goods from a second to a third country, bank deposits are
affected as follows:
a)a deposit is created in the exporting country in favor of the
exporters;
b) a deposit is created in the financing country in favor of the
banks of the exporting country;
c)the bank deposits of the importing country are, during the
life of the credit, not reduced by a debit to the account of the
importers;
d)the bank deposits of the banks of the importing country in
the financing country are, during the life of the credit, not re-
duced by a debit in payment of imports.
That is to say, two deposits are created and two deposits
are maintained. The exporting country is paid in deposits in
the financing country and the debt of the importing country
is postponed. For example, when Argentine exports to Swe-
den are financed by sterling credits in London, then the effect
of the credits granted in London is as follows: sterling de-
posits are created in favor of the Argentine banks and against
this increase in their deposit liability the London banks ac-
quire 90 day claims upon Swedish importers or upon the
Swedish banks that have arranged the credit for the importers.
The sterling deposits of the Swedish banks in London, which
would otherwise have had to be debited to pay for the com-
modities imported into Sweden, are maintained intact.10
10Thisassumes what is actually the case, that remittance from Sweden to
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Meanwhile in Argentina, the Argentine banks create peso
deposits in favor of the Argentine exporters and acquire a
new asset against this increased liability in the form of ster-
ling deposits, and in Sweden deposits are not reduced by a
debit to the account of the Swedish importers. Argentina re-
ceives payment for her exports in sterling deposits, and Sweden
has her debt postponed. The case of Swedish exports to Argen-
tina would of course be the same with the two countries in
the reverse role, and the financing of American trade with
Argentina by means of sterling credits has similar effects
upon the credit superstructure in England, Argentina, and
America.
EIGHT ILLUSTRATIVE CASES, LONDON ASSUMED TO BE THE CREDIT
GIVER
The general effects upon bank assets and deposits of short
term international trade financing are illustrated above by
the example of eight transactions financed by sterling credits:
i) American exports to Eng-5) American imports from
land Argentina
2) American imports from6) American exports to Ar-
England gentina
3)Argentine exports to Eng-7) Argentineexportsto
land Sweden
4)English exports to Argen-8) Swedish exports to Argen-
tina tina
The choice of these examples is governed by the same con-
siderations as the choice of the examples used to illustrate
the concentration of transactions in goods and securities, Ar-
gentina and Sweden again standing for all countries other
than England or America. In all eight cases the English bank-
ing system has assumed new deposit liabilities in exchange
for 90dayclaims. These deposit liabilities are in favor of
Englishmen only in the case of English exports, and these
claims are against Englishmen only in the case of English
imports. As these transactions are continually completed and
renewed, a revolving fund of demand deposits in London528 EXPERIMENTATION
under the control of foreigners and a continually maturing
stream of payments to London from foreigners comes into
existence. By fulfilling the function of granting short term
credit, the London banks gain possession of an instrument
giving them a certain control over the exchanges if they wish
to reduce at any time the amount of the new deposit liabili-
ties being created relatively to the amount of old payments
falling due. All the other countries whose foreign trade is
financed in this way are put in a position of acquiring bank-
ing assets in the form of sterling deposits against which they
are able to create deposits in favor of their exporters without
strain upon their existing banking resources. The receipt of
payment for their exports at the time that they are made in
the form of sterling deposits, while payment for their imports
is postponed, results in a net addition to the deposits and to
the resources of their banks.
Effects of a Complete Transfer of International Trade Financ-
ing from London to New York on Bank Deposits and Bank
Assets
If the function of international trade financing is transferred
from London to New York, then New York banks are substi-
tuted for London banks as creatorsof demand deposits under
the control of foreigners. In all eight cases the American
banking system assumes new deposit liabilities in exchange
for 90 day claims. As far as the financing of American exports
is concerned the New York banks find themselves in the posi-
tion of creating demand deposits in favor of, American ex-
porters, no longer against the liquid asset of sterling deposits
but against 90 day claims upon English or Argentine im-
porters, or upon the English or Argentine banks that have
arranged credits with them on behalf of these importers. As
far as the financing of American imports is concerned the
American banks find themselves in the position of creating
demand deposits in favor of English and Argentine banks
against 90 day claims upon American importers instead ofA DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 529
remaining in the status quo made possible by the granting of
credits for these transactions by London banks. They become
principals rather than channels for the financing of American
'exports and they become principals in financing American
imports instead of having no interest in the matter, except
that of arranging sterling credits for American importers.
As far as the financing of the trade between England and
Argentina or Argentina and Sweden is concerned the Ameri-
can banks create deposits in favor of English, Argentine, and
Swedish banks against claims upon the importers of these
various countries. England, Argentina, and Sweden come into
possession of a revolving fund of dollar deposits just as Amer-
ica, Argentina, and Sweden came into possession of a revolv-
ing fund of sterling deposits when the financing was carried
out in London.
The changes in bank deposits and bank assets involved in
the change in the credit giver are shown in Chart 29. Their
distribution among the four banking systems when London
is the credit giver is seen by reading down the left column,
and when New York is the credit giver, by reading down the
right column. The consequences of the transfer for each coun-
try are seen by reading across the chart.
Effects of a Partial Transfer of International Trade Financing
from London to New York on Bank Deposits and Bank Assets
The creation of a new international money market in New
York in this respect, therefore, involved the creation of an
additional international loan fund. If New York had been
able to take over from London the function of the short term
financing of international trade completely and if, at the same
time, the customary methods of remittance had changed so
that remittance through New York in dollars had replaced
remittance through London in sterling, then the efficiency
with which international financial transactions were con-
cluded would not have been reduced. But this was obviously









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































sA DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 533
of transactions, was a sharing of these functions between the
two markets.
The simultane,ous financing by London banks of English
exports and imports and of the offsetting exports and imports
of other countries resulted, of course, in the familiar phenom-
enon of the payment of exports by imports, and since all
the transactions were carried out in sterling, an international
cleara.nce was effected simply on the books of London banks.
With the division of the function of financing international
trade movements between London and New York, this clear-
ance was left incomplete. All the points already made con-
cernmg the loss of international stability resulting from a de-
cline in the degree of concentration of international transac-
tions in London apply also to this form of concentration of
loans. The additions to the bank resources of the rest of the
world resulting from the extension of credit to finance inter-
national trade by the central money market were now partly
in the form of dollar deposits and partly in the form of ster-
ling deposits. The utilization of these two international loan
funds as part of the general means of settlement of interna-
tional transactions could not fail to entail a greater strain
the foreign exchange mechanism of the world than the
use of only one—the sterling fund.
The Conflict between Technique and Capacity
One common thread has run throughout this long abstract
discussion: the conflict between the technical requirements
of the banking process itself and the actual distribution of
banking resources. This conflict added to all other sources of
instability in the operation of the international gold standard
system, after 1925, one very pervasive and important technical
weakness. The economies and conveniences resulting from
the offsetting of debits and credits of an international char-
acter upon the books of banks are increased with every exten-
sion of the area within which clearance takes place. Bank
clearance by its very nature is always seeking greater and534 EXPERIMENTATION
greater centralization. On the other hand, the provision of the
medium in which international clearance is effected and of
the place where it is carried out is a function of the develop-
ment of banking facilities. The centralization of banking
facilities depends upon the capacity of the centers where they
are located to perform the banking services. The centraliza-
tion of clearance is, therefore, limited by the centralization of
banking resources and banking services. When the interna-
tional banking function is divided, the international clearing
function also is divided. The imperfections of clearing be-
come greater and therefore the reliance upon other means of
settlement than those provided by the banking system itself
becomes greater. As international banking becomes more de-
centralized, because of a change in the distribution of the
real resources that the banks in the various financial centers
command, the technical. means of effecting international
clearance becomes less simple, and therefore, unless new and
effective techniques are developed, less efficient.CHAPTER i8
The Experiment of Creating
an International Money Market in New York
The capacity of any market to be an international financial
center is a function of its ability to provide a market place
for international transactions in goods, services, and securities
and to extend long and short term credit to foreigners. These
are the primary services of such a center. The power to render
either promotes the power to render the other. The ability
to provide a market place for international dealings in goods
promotes the capacity to extend short term credit because it
attracts working balances from abroad, and increases the
familiarity of the bankers with trade practices and credit
risks, and because credits in the currency in terms of which
dealings in goods are carried out are convenient for all con-
cerned.. For equally natural reasons the capacity to grant long
term credits adds to the capacity to provide a market for
dealings in securities. From the performance of the two pri-
mary services springs the capacity to perform two derivative
services also—to act as holder and employer of foreign funds,
md to provide a channel of international remittance.
The rise of the United States as a capital exporter forced
the London market to share with, but not to surrender to,
New York the function of providing an international market
place for securities and to sacrifice a part of its
pelling power. But Great Britain retained her predominance
as a market place for goods. This is well brought out by Mad-
den and Nadler (op. cit.,pp. 222—3)
"The fine mechanism of the London money market is the result
of the international economic position of Great Britain. In Lon-
535536 EXPERIMENTATION
don and a few other British cities are found some of the most im-
portant commodity markets of the world, such as Manchester for
cotton, Liverpool for grain, London for metals. Any commodity
of world importance can find a ready sale in these commodity
markets, and the transactions are financed through the London
money market. The fact that under normal conditions a large
number of world commodities are quoted in pounds sterling
creates a large amount of sterling bills and necessitates the main-
tenance of banking connections in London by important mer-
chants throughout the world. British shipping is world-wide, and
the operations of the merchant marine create a continuous supply
of sterling bills. In addition, shipping bills of other countries are
often stated in pounds sterling. British insurance companies op-
erate throughout the world, and their international financial
transactions contribute to the activity of the London money mar-
ket. The strength of London as a financial center is, therefore,
based primarily upon the turnover of commodities and of serv-
ices; and thus the London market differed from the New York
market, which, under conditions as they existed prior to 1933,
wasbased largely on the turnover of securities."
These circumstances imposed distinct limitations upon the
capacity of New York to be a great international money mar-
ket, and also greatly increased the concern of the London
market in the manner in which America exercised her new
powers as a creditor nation. The international difficulties that
arose from the competition between New York and London
as international markets were not a mere reflection of the
disordered economy of the war years. They were permanent
and altered the very nature of the problems with which the
two markets had to deal. The strength of the London market
before the war lay in its unrivaled capacity to perform the
two primary and therefore the two derivative services of an
international money market for the whole world and in its
possession of the most highly developed institutional equip-
ment for doing so. The competition of another growing mar-
ket impaired this capacity and was, in a measure, destructiveA DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 537
of old established techniques in London. It was in part re-
sponsible for a loss of integration and coordination in the
response of the London market to Bank rate and for the sub-
st:itution of new methods of control in that market. The
weakness of New York as an international market after the
war lay in the unequal development of its capacity to per-
form the international money market services and in the
experimental character of its institutional equipment. In
both these respects the entrenched position of the London
money market seriously impeded the development of New
York as a stable international financial center. Both markets
were deeply influenced by the loss of technical efficiency in
international clearance inherent in the decentralization of
the pre-war London-centered system of world finance.
The answer to the question whether there was a loss of
stability in international financial relations attributable to
the particular circumstances in which New York actually be-
gan to assume international money market functions on a
large scale lies partly, but not wholly, in an examination of
the sources of weakness just referred to. These may be placed
in proper perspective by again emphasizing a distinction
previously made between the surface pull and the basic pull
of an international money market over the world's exchanges.
Surface Pull and Basic Pull
When a given international money market is in a position
to control certain flexible items in the balance of interna-
tional payments of its country it may be said to possess a
surface pull over the exchanges. Under these circumstances
the financial authorities, or, in a well integrated, firmly estab-
lished market, the financial community as a whole acting in
accordance with customary and empirically developed bank-
i.ng practices, may modify the currently accumulating debit
(import) items in the balance of payments in such a way as
to allow the currently accumulating credit (export) items538 EXPERIMENTATION
that constitute the country's basic pull over the exchanges to
correct any weaknesses that may from time to time develop.
An international money market is in the best position to
contribute to the stability of the world's exchanges, assuming
that the basic pull exists, if, first, it can control the volume of
its international lending, both long and short term, so that
by a marginal adjustment in this component of the debit
(import) side of the balance of payments, the total imports
of the country may be cleared against the total exports at a
given rate of exchange; and, second, it can establish stable
domestic credit conditions that will contribute to stable in-
terest rates and prices within its own country so that the re-
quired adjustment will not be subject to swift and violent
alteration. The greater the volume of international transac-
tions concluded in that market and the more its currency is
used as an international means of remittance, the broader
will be its exchange market and therefore disturbances aris-
ing from particular circumstances will be more likely to be
offsetting and their influence upon the market will be propor-
tionately less. Provided the first two requirements are met,
the broader the market the easier it will be to keep the ex-
changes stable. In a divided system, world-wide exchange
stability is best promoted if the center countries all meet the
first two requirements. If they do, then the disturbances
arising from difficulties in other countries are likely to be of a
magnitude that can be effectively dealt with, but if one great
money market meets the first two conditions and another
does not, then the difficulties suggested in Chapter i7 are
unavoidable.
The New York market found it hard to meet these re-
quirements and to develop appropriate techniques for the
exercise of its surface pull over the exchanges so as to pro-
mote international stability under the gold standard after
1925. Its difficulties in this respect can best be brought out
by considering certain peculiarities of the American balance
of payments.A DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 539
The American Balance of Payments Problem
The Pro blem---—The Underlying Strength of the Dollar
All students of the international balance of payments of any
country are aware that it is impossible to assume that any
item is offsetting against any other item.' The total is always
being adjusted through the influence of continually changing
conditions upon marginal elements in all the items. Never-
a measure of the adjustment that has to be made in
the balance of payments of any country through long and
short term credit operations and through the movement of
gold and currency may be found in the current position of
the trade of that country in goods and services together with
the payments due as a result of past financial operations. The
position of the United States in this respect after 1919 (Chart
30 A) indicates that during the period 1919—31 the dollar
exercised a strong basic pull over the world's exchanges. Until
1922 this was due to large surpluses of commodity exports
over imports. These began a violent four year decline in 1919,
and by 1922 the United States reached an even balance with
the rest of the world in the exchange of goods and services.
Thereafter, with the exception of a very small export balance
in 1924, goods and services combined gave a relatively small
import balance. By the end of the war, however, past capital
advances to foreigners had produced a net credit (export) in
the interest and dividend account, and from 1920 on this be-
gan to grow, being swelled after 1923 by the beginning of
regular war debt repayments. The steadily increasing net
payments on this account kept the total of trade plus interest
a credit rather than a debit item. New York, therefore, con-
tinued to develop as an international money market under
circumstances in which the dollar had a fundamental pull
over the exchanges resulting from the basic transactions of
For a warning on this point cf. T. E. Gregory, 'The Causes of Gold Move-
ments into and out of Great Britain, 1925to1929,'SelectedDocuments of the
Gold Delegation (League of Nations, 1931),passim.540
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commerceand the service of past debt. That there was an ex-
port balance to be adjusted was due to the interest item, but
the fluctuations in its size were due to trade in goods and serv-
ices. rrhe adjustments required were not especially great.
In the main, America was faced with a problem of reinvest-
ment of interest (Table 37).
The Adjustment—Offsetting the Basic Pull
The offsetting of the net credit item in the American balance
of payments resulting from trade in goods and services and
the payment of interest and dividends on past debt was ac-
compEished by means of capital and currency movements that
exhibited quite different characteristics at various times.
For the three years of the immediate post-war readjust-
1919—21,theadjusting items were:(i)largegovern-
ment loans; (2)privatecapital exports on long term; a
large import of gold;(4) a very large return of short term
MillionDollars
Net CapitalImports+






























balancesbelonging to foreigners and accumulated in New
York during the war. These have all been referred to in pre-
ceding chapters. In 1919 the continuance of large government
loans together with withdrawals of short term capital filled
the gap. In 1920, when government loans tapered off (Chart
3 i), long term private capital exports and continued veryTABLE 37
TheBalance of Payments of the United States, 1919-1935
Exports(credits) +,Imports(debits) —(millionsof dollars)
1919 1920 192!192219231924
IThe Problem and the Adjustment, FirstStatement
iCommoditytrade (net) +4,016 +2,950 +1,976 +719 +375 —981
2Current invisibles —849—729 —651—716 —756
(i) +(2) +2,772+2,101+1,247+68 —341 +225
3mt. + Div. (md. war debts) +293+103+167 +382 +508 +487
The Problem (i) +(2)+(3) +3,065 +2,204+1,414 +450 +167+712
4Long term capital —2,157—i,o6g—757 —717+1—602
5Short term capital _9851—435k +375+3 +216
Net capital movements+ —2,157 —2,054 —1,192 —342+4—386
6Gold + Currency +250 +50—786 —235 —245 —266
The Adjustment (4) ++(6) —1,907—2,004 —1,978—577 —241—652
7Error —1,158 —200+564 +127+74—6o
Net adjustment —3,065 —2,204 —1,414 —450 —167 —712
IIThe Problem and the Adjustment, Second Statement
iCommoditytrade + current invis-
ibles +2,772+2,101+1,247+68—341—225
2mt. + Div. (mci. war debts) +293+103+167+382 +508 +487
3Long term private capital(cxci.
new issues) —ig —368—124—32 +381 +250
The Problem (i)+(2)+(3) +3,046+1,836+1,290+418 +548+962
4 New foreign issues —357 —461—547 —685 —380 —852
5Shortterm capital _9851 +375+3 +216
6Government loans —1,781 —240 —8b
++(6) —2,138—i,686 —i,o68 —310 —377 —636
7Gold + Currency +250 +50—786 —235 —245 —266
The Adjustment (4) ++(6)+ —r,888 —1,636 —1,854—545—622—902
8Error —1,158 —200+564 +127+74—6o
Net adjustment —3,046 —1,836 —1,290—418—548 —962
IIISubsidiary Tables
Interest and Dividends
iWardebt receipts +243 +53+87 +157 +258 +182
2mt. + Div. rec'd from foreigners +150+150+i8o+350 +400+455
(i)+(2) +393+203+267+507 +658 +637
3mt. + Div. paid to foreigners —zoo —100—100 —125 —150 —150
Net mt. + Div. (mci. war debts)
(i)+(2)+ +293+103+167 +382 +508 +487
Long Term Capital
xGovernment capital —1,781 —240 —86
2Private capital —376 —829 —67r—717+i
Net long term capital movement
(i)+(2) —2,157 —1,067—757 —717 -i-i
Private Long Term Capital
xNew foreign issues —357 —46!—547 —685 —380 —852
2Otherprivatecapitalmovements —'9 —368 —124—32 +381+250
Net private long term capital (') + —376 —829 —671—717+x
SOURCE: The Balance of International Payments of the United States in 1936(Departmentof
Commerce, 1937),pp.93-519251926 1927 1928 1929 1930193119321933 1934 1935
+683+378+68i +1,037+84!+782 +334 +289 +225+478+236





—6i ±350+900—,88 —8o—485 —709—409 —385+184+1,075
--548—.252+177—850—217—752 —490 —192 —336+386 +1,537
+42 —-112 +99+232—135 --258+i66—gi+83—1,329—2,075
--506--364+276—6i8—35.2 —1,010—324 —283 —253—943—538
1-120±208—783—107 —95+38! +164 +152+38+482+355
—386 --156—507—725—447—62g —i6o —131—215 —461—I83
—156 --506—218 —i6—325 —228—489 —361—x8g+93—167
+542 ±662+725+741+772+857 +649 +492+404+368+350
+46'-1-397+478+449+494+555 +431+244+59+202+506
+748 ±553+985 +1,174+941 +1,184 +591 +375+274+663+689
—948 —1,201—1,111 —631—822 —212—27—10 0 —44
—611-35°+900—i88 —8o—485 —709—409 —355+184 +1,075




—847 —553—985 —1,174—941 —1,184 —59'—375 —274—663—689
+187 +195+206+207+207+241 +113+99+20 +1 0
+520 +735+8oo+893+979+916 +662 +46!+452+493+52!




—487 —602 —723—662—'37—267 +219 +217+49+202+462
—948 —1,201—1,111 —631 —822—212—27—10 0 —44
+461 +397+478+449+494+555 +43'+244+59+202+506
—487 —602—723—662—137 —267+219-1-217+49+202+462
IDepartmentof Commerce Estimates of i922, TheInternational Financial Position of
the United Stales (National Industrial Conference Board, 1929),p.8o.546 EXPERIMENTATION
large withdrawals of short term capital from America bore
the main burden, and in 1921 these were supplemented by
heavy gold imports. From 1922 to 1924 the adjustments re-
quired were moderate and were met by a combination of
continued gold imports and moderate net capital exports.
America began to attract short term capital in the manner
appropriate to the position of a creditor country with an in-
ternational money market. After 1924themovement of capi-
tal, which was facilitated by the confidence inspired by the
return to gold, was ample to make the necessary adjustments
without a continued drain of gold from the rest of the world
(Table 37).
The dimensions of the problem, and the nature of the ad-
justment in each year are shown in Chart 32, and the contri-
bution of capital and cash movements in offsetting the basic
underlying pull on the exchanges represented by the trade
and interest items is shown for the entire period in Chart
30B.
The picture of the international position of the United
States disclosed by these charts suggests that the long run
problems of adjustment were not overwhelming and could be
solved by the development of money market techniques and
by gradual evolutionary changes in the basic items in the
balance of payments of the following types:
i)thetemporary smoothing out of short run fluctuations
through the development of a broad market for dollars in the
various exchanges and the management of the flow of short term
credits upon the British model
2) the development in America of a technique of cyclical adjust-
ment between long and short term advances to foreigners which
would prevent the stream of capital exports from becoming ex-
cessive at some times and stopping altogether at others
thegrowth of an American market for foreign securities in
which loans for productive purposes could be profitably placed
in response to differential interest returns reflecting the relative
abundance of capital in America and in other countries
4) the establishment in the merchandise and service items in theA DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 547
American balance of payments of a long run trend which would
gradually bring the United States into the next stage of the in-
ternational investment cycle, that of receiving payment for in-
I.erest on past investments largely in goods.
There was, indeed, no way by which the United States
could escape the economic adjustments necessarily involved
in a sudden change from a debtor to a creditor status, or
evade the duty of coordinating her international and her
domestic financial and economic policy, but the balance of
payments figures did not, at the time of the return togold,
carry on their face any apparent threat tointernational eco-
nomic and financial stability.
The Major Complicating Factor—The Private Import of
Capital into America
There: was, however, a complicating factor; one that was not
present for Great Britain while she was dominant in the man-
agement of the international gold standard system before the
CHART 33
The fliternational Iviovement
of Long Term Private Capital
in the American Balance of
Payments, 1919-1935
war.From 1923 on, not only was America an interest-receiving
country but foreign capital resumed its steady migration to
the United States. It was not the net export of goods and
services that created the major money market problems of
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Britain's return to the gold standard in 1925, but the size of
these items plus the capital import accomplished through
private dealings in outstanding securities.
When the composition of the capital items in the American
balance of payments is more closely examined, the true
magnitude of the American money market problem begins
to become evident. In Chartthe total long term capital
move:ment is shown together with its two component parts—
new Iforeign issues placed in the American market and net
movements exclusive of these new issues. In Chart
the net inward movement of capital resulting from pri-
vate long term transactions other than new issues is repre-
sented as part of the basic pull of the dollar over the world's
exchanges, and in Chart 34 B new foreign issues placed in the
United States are included among the balancing operations.
Chart 34 A thus constitutes a second statement of the Ameri-
can balance of payments problem, more accurate than the
first because the motives leading to foreign investment in
America were strong and persistent. In this statement the
basic pull continues after 1925tofluctuate with America's
trade in goods and services, but the annual adjustment re-
quired is some $300millionto $400 million greater than that
indic:ated by Chart 30A.The need for new foreign issues is
shown in its true dimensions, and the problem of adjustment,
as a money market problem, is not minimized.
Obstacles to the Development of Appropriate
Techniques of Adjustment
An improvised Institutional Equipment
In meeting this situation the New York money market was
faced by certain difficulties of an institutional character pe-
culiar to itself. One of the most familiar was the artificial
character of the American discount market. This was far
from an equivalent of the London discount market before
the war as an instrument for controlling the international550 EXPERIMENTATION
flow of funds. In the first place it was built up upon the thesis
that the finance bill was undesirable whereas in the pre-war
London market the finance bill was one of the chief instru-
ments for the international equalization of interest rates and
one of the most sensitive parts of the money market in the
international movement of funds. The following extract from
an interview of the writer with a man of long pre-war experi-
ence in the London market brings out this point:
"The idea of the Federal Reserve system of setting up rules as
to what is eligible, and the prejudice which was created against
finance bills is alien to the whole nature of the international
banking business before the war. The kite or finance bill drawn
for interest arbitrage purposes was useful and necessary. Why
interfere with the natural process by which the interest rates of
the world are brought into a better balance and are steadied by
the drawing of bills which increased the demand for money
where it is cheap and decreased it where it is dear. The alterna-
tive constantly present of borrowing in London was an impor-
tant stabilizing influence on world trade everywhere before the
war."
In his study of the New York bill market, Professor Beckhart
has shown that the volume of dollar acceptances was after
1925 actually quite insensitive to changes in differential inter-
est rates between London and New York.
Not only did New York not possess a short term credit in-
strument well adapted to interest arbitrage transactions, and
thus helpful in promoting exchange stability, but in the call
loan it possessed one that gave the dollar an erratic and inter-
mittent pull over the exchanges. The call loan rate, being
connected with the rate of the Federal Reserve banks only
through the general rate structure and fluctuating through a
wider range than any of the rates in the London market, was
peculiarly inappropriate as the major short term interest rate
of an internatidnal money market.
Far more important was the general lack of experienced
organization in the New York market for the conduct of for-A DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 551
eign business. In America there was little expert institutional
buyin.g of foreign securities like that of the British investment
trusts. There were no well developed 'usual channels' through
which foreign securities were placed. As a result, both the
bidding for loans and their placement with the investing
public were carried on with an extraordinary lack of restraint
and care.2 Unrestricted competition within the New York
market and between the New York and the London markets,
at a time when there was a shortage of capital in many parts
of the world, produced a set of circumstances in international
lending wholly dissimilar to any with which the pre-war
British financial system had to contend. Finally, the absence
of a system of payment for securities by installments made
necessary the use of large syndicate operations in placing new
loans and led to a degree of artificial support of security
prices on the exchanges which the London market had long
outgrown.
The improvised and experimental character of parts of the
institutional equipment of New York for performing inter-
national money market functions rendered very difficult an
appropriate response in total long and short term lending to
the requirements of the international position of the United
States.
Lack of Integration between Long and Short Term Foreign
Lending
THE DILEMMA OF A CAPITAL IMPORTING CREDITOR COUNTRY
The: major complicating factor in the adjustment of the
American balance of payments has been shown to be the
movement of 'other private capital,' exclusive of new issues
(Chart .Thisinward movement of capital had three con-
stituents:(1)fundsseeking safety in a world filled with
monetary, exchange, and political uncertainty;(2) a specu-
lative, or semi-speculative movement caused by prospects of
2Cf. H. E. Peters, The Foreign Debt of the Argentine Republic Uohns Hop-
kins Press, 1934)
,pp.123, 129—30.552 EXPERIMENTATION
capital appreciation and not responsive to changes in the
relative interest rates brought about by the discount policy
of central banks; abackwash of American foreign lend-
ing itself. Higher yields were regularly obtainable in America
than in Great Britain and other European creditor countries
on securities of essentially similar types? This was necessary
for the first placement of new foreign issues in the undevel-
oped American market, but it resulted in the early repatria-
tion of many foreign securities originally placed in New York.
The relative importance of these elements in contributing
to the continuous stream of foreign investment in America
varied at different periods in the post-war years. The first was
undoubtedly the more important from 1922 tO 1924, the third
immediately after 1925, and the second after 1927, but all
were in greater or less degree, present throughout.
This created a situation quite new for an international
money market. In the pre-war international gold standard
world securities traded in internationally were purchased
At the time of England's return to the gold standard the following circular
was sent out to its clients by a well known international banking firm in
New York:
"A most interesting sidelight on the foreign bond situation in this market is
afforded by a comparison with corresponding issues quoted in London. Lon-
don has, of course, been the traditional market for flotation of the bonds of
all nations for many years. The excellent background thus afforded has
naturally made British investors keen judges of values in respect to foreign
issues. The following is a comparison of the current prices and yields of a
number of foreign bonds dealt in on the New York market with the prices
and yields of corresponding issues dealt in on the London market. In every
case the yield on the issues quoted in New York is higher than in London.
In the case of the French issues the difference is especially great, amounting in
some instances to about 11/4%.Thefact that so great a difference in yields
exists between practically identical issues in New York and in London sug-
gests that as soon as we become more thoroughly acquainted with the various
foreign situations our opinions of these types of securities will improve, with a
corresponding effect on the market quotation. In this connection it should be
borne in mind that the difference in yields just referred to is not due to the
money situation inasmuch as the London money market is higher than the
New York market, time money being approximately 41,4%inLondon as com-
pared with 4% in New York. The table follows:A DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL, SYSTEM 553
predominantly for yield and income. Great Britain as a major
capital exporter provided for her own domestic capital needs
and newforeignlending was sensitive in both time and
amount to changes in interest rates.4 The flow of international
securities, therefore, was in the main one of the important
elements of adjustment in the gold standard mechanism, and
bears little resemblance to the foreign buying of securities in
America after 1925.Forexample, no pre-war precedent could
be found for the very complicated situation that arose when
England and America, by a policy of central bank coopera-
FOREIGN BONDS ON NEW YORK MARKET FOREIGN BONDS ON LONDON MARKET
YIELD YIELD
TO MA- TO MA-





Austrian Guar. 7S, Austrian Guar. 6s,
'943 96 7.41 (sterling) 1943 6.33
Czechoslovak Ext. Czechoslovak Ext.
6s, B, 1952 99 8.09 8s, Ser. B, 1952 100 8.oo
German Ext. 7s, German Ext. 7s,
1949 7.51 1949 9954 7.04
Jap.Ext. 634s, 1954 7.09 Jap. Ext. 6s, 1959goj46.71
Kingdom ofNorway Kingdomof Norway
Ext. 6s, 1952 6.02 6s, ig6i 103 5.4!
Rep. of Finland 6s, Rep. of Finland 6s,
1945 86 7.33 1963 88 6.9o
Paris-Lyons-Medit. Paris-Lyons-Medit.
Ext.. 6s, 1958 8.13 Ext. 6s, 1958 87346.97
Paris-OrleansR.R. Paris-Orleans R.R.
Ext. 75,1954 83 8.6o Ext. 6s, 1956 84347.26
Rep. of Peru Sec. Rep. of Peru 734's,
8s,1944 zoo 8.oo 1948 104 7.14
DutchEastIndies Dutch East Indies
Exi:.6s, 1962 102 5.87 5S,1962 5.i9
City of Bergen 6s, City of Bergen 534's,
'949 97346.22 1963 100 5.50
City of Greater City of Greater
Prague 734s, 195290 8.45 Prague 754s, 195294 8.05
Queensland6s, 1947104 5.68 Queensland 5% stock,
1960 99345.03
The discrepancy in yields did not come to an end with the removal of the
restrictionsinthe capital market in London, but had a tendency to persist.
'Cf. Ch. 19, The Pre.War Technique of Shifting from the Long Term to the
ShortTerm Shoulder in InternationalLending.554 EXPERIMENTATION
tion, were attempting to divert capital to the London market
by making investment in sterling deposits, bills, and prime
British securities attractive through higher interest rates in
London than New York. Agreed upon inter-market interest
rate differentials, as an instrument of international coopera-
tion, it was then found, had to meet a serious technical ob-
stacle in the different interest rate structures in the two mar-
kets. It was not easy to pursue a policy of attracting lenders
to London and borrowers to America if America, though able
to attract long term borrowers, could not repel long term
lenders.
A DEPOSIT-ArrRACTING AS COMPARED WITH A DEPOSIT-COMPEL-
LING POWER
Difficulties of a somewhat different nature were present in
the short term markets. Before the war the bulk of the foreign
deposits held in London and many foreign short term in-
vestments in sterling, especially in acceptances, were in a true
sense part of the basic pull of sterling over the exchanges.
They were funds held in London as working capital and have,
therefore, frequently been referred to in these studies as being
the result of London's deposit-compelling power. Because
New York did not fully perform all the functions of an inter-
national money market, fewer foreign funds held or employed
in New York were of this character. A larger proportion were
held there because New York was attractive to foreign short
term lenders, and a smaller proportion because they had to be
there. This was particularly true of the balances of foreign
central banks which amounted in 1927 to over a billion dol-
lars,5 and were largely invested in bankers acceptances through
the agency and with the guarantee of the Federal Reserve
banks. It was also true of foreign funds attracted to the call
loan market when the rate was relatively high, and of funds
coming to New York as a haven of refuge. Consequently the
influence of a rise in the Federal Reserve discount rate, when
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refleci:ed in the general rate structure of the New York mar-
ket, resulted not so much in a reduction of American foreign
short term lending as in an increase in American short term
borrowing (attraction of foreign funds). A reduction in
American interest rates, conversely, depended for its immedi-
ate international effects more upon a decrease in American
short term borrowing (repulsion of foreign funds) than on
an increase in American short term lending. In combination
with the lack of direct responsiveness of the call loan rate to
changes in the discount rate, this meant that the response to
American credit control policy of the flexible item, short
term capital, in the American balance of payments depended
more on the power of New York to attract or repel foreign
lenders than on its power to grant or deny the applications of
foreign borrowers. This situation may with some license of
expression be summed up by saying that New York was
carrying on international deposit banking instead of interna-
tional commercial banking.6
SHIFTING FROM THE LONG TO THE SHORT TERM SHOULDER
In spite of these imperfections in the organization and func-
tioning of the New York market, Chart 35 is evidence of the
beginnings of an adjusting mechanism whereby fluctuations
in long term foreign lending were offset by fluctuations in
short term capital movements. The comparison from year to
year is not satisfactory because of changes in the method by
which the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce has
calculated the capital items. In particular, the very large ap-
parent import of short term capital in 1927 is due to changes
in the methods of compilation. In this year the amount of
foreign balances was first ascertained by questionnaire, and
the 'error' in the balance of payments computations is ex-
ceptionally large. In analyzing the changes in the volume of
foreign bank deposits in the United States between the end
6A11bankingis deposit banking, but the phrase in this context seems to the
write:r to convey the distinction intended. It is used in the Macmillan Report.556 EXPERIMENTATION
of 1926 and the end of 1927 the Bureau of Foreign and Domes-
tic Commerce reached the conclusion that there had been no
change.7 A more accurate picture of the situation, therefore,
is obtained by plotting the year 1927 as exhibiting no change
Dollars
CHART35
Long and Short Term Capital
Movements in the American
Balance of Payments, 1919-
1935
in short term capital movements than by plotting the pub-
lished figure.
From 1922 to 1926 and in 193 i the net movements of long
and short term capital show an inverse relationship which
represents in a rough way the use of short term credit to off-
set the effects of declines in long term lending. In the case of
the United States, however, during these years most of the
important offsetting movements of long and short term capi-
tal were influenced by special circumstances and it is hazard-
ous to base any generalization upon the relation shown.
A Fortuitous as compared with a Functional Relation be-
tween Goods Export and Capital Export
The difficulties of working out appropriate techniques of ad-
justment after 1922 were accentuated in the case of the
United States by two circumstances:(i)the absence, or at
least the suspension, of the economic forces that, in the theory
of the international investment cycle, result in a unfavorable
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merchandise balance in a creditor country; 8(2)a lack of
functional connection between the volume of goods exports
andtheamount of savings available for lending abroad. R. A.
Young has described the special forces that prevented the
United States from developing a merchandise import surplus
from 1922 to 1928(cf. Table 37). American demands for
foreign products did not widen during the period sufficiently
to overturn the balance of merchandise trade, partly because
American credit expansion did not stimulate industrial and
trade expansion on lines that would greatly stimulate com-
modity imports. Foreign production and international trade
were too thoroughly demoralized from monetary disruption,
and foreign enterprise was too concerned with reconstruction
and readjustment to take full advantage of the potential
capacity of the American market. The American tariff policy
contributed to keeping down imports. The disorganized pro-
ductive conditions prevailing abroad increased foreign de-
pendence upon American raw materials, foods, and manu-
factures, to which the war had given rise, and American
manufacturers engaged in an aggressive campaign to expand
their foreign markets under the urgent necessity of employ-
ing war-stimulated productive capacity.9 To this last may be
added the fact that export prices in the United States were de-
clinin.g from 1925 to 1928. In the export trade of the United
States raw materials were becoming as before the war rela-
tively less important than finished goods, while in the import
trade they were becoming relatively more important than fin-
ished goods.1°
From a banking point of view the strong pull on the ex-
changes, to which this failure of the merchandise trade bat-
8Aquestion may be raised as to the general appropriateness of applying the
theory of the international investment cycle, developed on the basis of British
experience, to a country with relatively small international trade and large
agricultural production.
9Young, op. cit., p. '4'.
10E.J. Stone, unpublished thesis, Certain Post-War Balance of Payments
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ance to turn over so largely contributed, meant a growth of
bank balances abroad which confronted American banking
institutions with foreign connections, taken collectively, with
a problem of remittance home. Net exports of goods, services,
and securities increase both the foreign assets and domestic
deposits of the banks. Banks whose foreign assets accumulate
too rapidly attempt to replace them by domestic assets, which
contributes to easy money in the home market. A connection
is thus established between the current accumulation of
foreign credits through trade by a country having an inter-
national money market and the creation of favorable condi-
tions in that market for the placement of foreign loans. In
London interviews granted the writer it was repeatedly stated
by investment bankers that before the war they never con-
cerned themselves with the position of the balance of pay-
ments, but that when money was knocking around, looking
for employment, they felt that to be a good time for bringing
forward foreign issues. In a market so sensitive as London to
international considerations the pressure for the remittance
home of balances accumulating abroad was probably suffi-
cient to account for the closeness with which net foreign lend-
ing approximated the need for such lending as suggested by
the position of the exchanges. The same banking connection
unquestionably existed in the New York market when its in-
ternational functions were being developed. But international
considerations were of relatively minor importance compared
with the domestic interests of a great continent, and there-
fore this mechanism could not always be relied upon to bring
about an adjustment in net foreign lending sufficiently close
to avoid recourse to large movements of gold and currency.
The continued foreign lending of America in amounts suffi-
cient to support the purchasing power of her export markets
to the degree necessary to maintain the volume of her goods
exports was largely due to pressure exerted within the Ameri-
can banking system for the employment of bank funds not
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payments position of the country. The capacity of the New
York market to extend long term credit was great, but the
economic connections between the volume of savings available
for lending abroad and the character of the country's foreign
trade were very loose. The harmony between America's need
for foreign lending and her capacity to lend was in large
degree fortuitous. It was the product of an inflationary set-
ting.
The Critical Decisions of 1927 in their Inflationary
Setting
The difficulties of the New York market in making appropri-
ate marginal adjustments in the financial items in the balance
of payments of a capital importing, deposit-attracting country
with the aid of an improvised institutional equipment were
aggravated by the failure of the American banking com-
munity as a whole to achieve stable domestic credit condi-
tions. While the rest of the former gold standard world was
preparing from 1920 to 1924 to return to the gold standard
the seeds of a great inflationary movement were being sown
in the receptive soil of a one-way banking system in the
United States (cf. Ch. 10 and 12).Duringthe years when the
international gold standard facade was being completed, these
seeds yielded an abundant harvest.
BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY AS A GUIDE TO CREDIT CONTROL, APRIL
TO MARCH 1927"
The technique of credit control employed by the Federal Re-
serve authorities after 1925 was on the whole one of benev-
olent, though anxious, neutrality toward the behavior of the
credit base and the credit superstructure of the member banks.
Though the speculative movement already in progress late in
This month is taken as the end of a period, not because itis an entirely
satislfactory dividing line, but because March 23, 1927 was the call date closest
to the beginning of the gold export movement from the United States of
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1924 continued, subject to one temporary interruption,
throughout 1925, 1926, and the first part of 1927, no large
scale open market operations were undertaken. The active
checks imposed upon speculation were limited to changes in
the discount rate, but great reliance was placed on the deter-
TABLE 38





TRANSACTION (millions of dollars) ACCOUNTS
Increase in Monetary Gold Stock +251
Decrease in Money in Circulation outside the Reserve
Banks, the Treasury, and AllReportingBanks
(estimated)
Increase in Cash in Vault of All Reporting Banks
(estimated) 341
Decrease in Treasury Currency —29
Decrease in Government Securities held by the Reserve Banks —20
Decrease in Bills Bought held by the Reserve Banks —Bi
Increase in Bills Discounted at the Reserve Banks +66
Decrease in Other Deposits at the Reserve Banks + 17
Increase in Unexpended Capital Funds of the Reserve
Banks —34
+35'
Increase in Member Bank Reserve Accounts due to these
Items +153
Actual Increase in Member Bank Reserve Accounts +1 6o
'CL Ap. Table 2, subsidiary Table 2, for the method of estimating these figures.
rent effects of member bank indebtedness to the Reserve
banks.
In 1925 the securities markets were very active. Brokers
loans, especially by banks outside New York City, and loans
on securities increased rapidly throughout the year. During
the latter half money rates rose rapidly, the average call loan
rate rising from 4.09 per cent in July to 5.32 per cent in
December. The rate on time loans, however, rose only from
4 to 4% per cent, and this discrepancy in the behavior of theA DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 561
rates afforded an excellent example of the intermittent
pull over the exchanges caused by the roving position of the
call loan in the rate structure of the New York market. The
Federal Reserve banks kept their portfolio of government
securities fairly constant, and the increase in banking reserves
TABLE 38
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TRANSACTION 2(millionsof dollars) T}IE COMPTROLLER
Increase in Monetary Gold Stock +251
Decreasein Money in Circulation outside the Treasury,
the Reserve Banks, and All Reporting Banks +17
Decrea3e in Treasury Currency —29
Increasein Commercial Bank Float (incomplete) +4
Increase in Loans plus Investments (adj.) of All Reporting
Banks +4,623
Decrease in Government Securities held by the Reserve
Banks —20
Increasein Bills Bought held by the Reserve Banks —8r
Increase in Real Estate held by All Reporting Banks
(esthnated on basis of a monthly increase of io million)+240
Increasein Capital Funds of All Reporting Banks —8i6
+5,135 —946
Increase in Deposits (adj.) of All Reporting Banks due to
these Items +4,189
Actual Increase in Deposits (adj.) of All Reporting Banks +3,943
2Cf.Table 25,note3.
called for by the credit expansion was provided partly by an
increase in bills bought by the Federal Reserve banks, but
chiefly by an increase in member bank borrowings. The fact
that interest rates in the market were forced up beyond the
Federal Reserve discount rates was an encouragement to bor-
rowing and prevented the liquidation of rediscounts at the
Federal Reserve banks.12 This situation finally led to increases
12Beckhart,op. cit., IV, 55—6, quotes A. C. Miller of the Federal Reserve
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in the discount rates at the Federal Reserve banks from 3'/2
to 4 per cent. The last rate to be increased was that of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York on January 8, 1926. These
increases, when applied for, were granted reluctantly and
with considerable delay by the Federal Reserve Board.
With the increase in the Federal Reserve rates stock prices
and brokers loans began a decline that continued until May
1926. The speculative movement seemed to be checked.
Money rates fell and in April the discount rate of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York was reduced from 4 to 31/2 per
cent. This proved, however, to be only an interruption in
speculative activity. During the latter part of 1926 and the
first quarter of 1927 the New York stock market was very
active. Call loan rates again rose rapidly, and the discount
rate of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York was again
raised to 4 per cent in August. The effectiveness of this slight
increase in checking the speculative boom was, however,
minimized by continuous18 additions to American gold sup-
plies. As in 1920 and 1921, this gold was used by American
banks in 1926 and 1927 to reduce their borrowings at the
Reserve banks and to increase their reserves to the extent
necessary to finance the speculative credit expansion. Once
again the power of the American banking system to acquire
reserve funds from sources independent of the Federal Re-
serve banks had weakened the effectiveness of the discount
rate as an instrument of domestic credit control.
The influences affecting the American credit base and
superstructure from April 1925 to March 1927 are shown in
Table 38. Changes in the domestic circulation had little effect
on reserve balances. Open market holdings of government
securities declined only $20 million, but bills bought declined
$8i million. Most of the effect of this decline on member bank
reserve accounts was neutralized by an increase in bills dis-
counted. Federal Reserve operations taken as a whole only
In only 5 months out of the 24 between April 1925 and March 1927 was
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partly offset the effects of a net increase in monetary gold
stock of $251 million. By going only $66 million further into
debt the member banks were able to increase their reserves
$i6o ]nillion, and this was sufficient to make possible an in-
crease in 'deposits adjusted' of all banks in the United States
of $3,g43 million and an increase in 'loans and discounts ad-
justed' of $4,623 million. The size of this multiple expansion
was partly due to the difference in the legal reserve required
against time and demand deposits of member banks and
partly to the great power of expansion residing in the Ameri-
can system of redeposited reserves of non-member banks. The
more rapid gTowth of loans and investments than deposits
was due to the expansion of capital funds.
Throughout this period the management of the Federal
Reserve system was faithful to the guiding principle of its
Tenth Annual Report—that it should maintain sufficient
credit to allow the free flow of goods through the production
process. It adhered to what C. 0. Hardy has called the 'Sound
Credit Conditions Standard,'but in so doing it found itself
upon the horns of a dilemma, namely how to carry out its
dual mandate to accommodate industry, agriculture, and trade
but not to allow the use of its funds for speculative purposes.
The difficulties of its position were greatly aggravated by a
still further dilemma, well illustrated by the extreme sensi-
tiveness of the London market during the period just de-
scribed to changes in American interest rates,15 namely how
to combat speculative tendencies in the American credit sys-
tem without attracting gold from abroad.
The Critical Decisions of 1927
THECONCEPT OF GOLD HELD IN TRUST
Prior to 1917theUnited States had shared some of the ap-
prehensions of countries practicing a gold repulsion policy
14C.0. Hardy, Credit Policies of the Federal Reserve System(Brookings
1932), pp.74—g5 passim.
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(cf. Ch. 2). With the recovery from the 192 0—2 i depression,
the same anxiety over the consequences of excessive gold ac-
cumulation was again acutely felt by some American bankers.
As early as 1923 the Tenth Annual Report of the Federal Re-
serve Board emphasized the view that the gold then accumu-
lating in the United States should be regarded as, in a sense,
held in trust for other nations, which upon their return to
gold would need to draw upon the surplus American sup-
plies. G. E. Roberts has described the attitude of these Ameri-
can bankers:
"The attitude of the reserve authorities and of bankers generally
towards gold during these years was one of apprehension and
anxiety. Far from being viewed as advantageous and desirable,
they were regarded as abnormal, temporary, and therefore a men-
ace to financial stability. Bankers generally viewed with misgiv-
ings the development of a structure of credit upon them, consid-
ering it probable that within a short time the reestablishment of
Europe upon a gold basis, together with economic recovery,
would result in the recall of a substantial portion of this gold,
thereby possibly requiring a drastic contraction of credit in the
United States. Competitive conditions practically compelled an
expansion of credits, as additions to reserves occurred, but a
wholesome prudence forbade them to incur continuing indebted-
ness at the reserve banks for the purpose of serving the speculative
operations of the stock markets, by this time of increasing im-
portance." 16
When,therefore, a conjuncture off events arose in Europe
in 1927 that seemed to require from the United States a con-
tribution of a part of her existing gold stocks in order to
assist Great Britain to maintain her position on the gold
standard without great deflationary pressure on her banking
system and to assist France to prepare for a definitive stabiliza-
tion of the franc, the basis for a sympathetic response to the
situation on the part of the United States was already in
existence.
16'GoldMovements in and out of the United States and Their Effects,' Sc-
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THEFRENCH ENTRY INTO THE GOLD MARKET, 1927
In the spring of 1927 France actively re-entered the London
market for gold. As already indicated the Bank of France at
the same time began to ship gold released from pledge at
the Bank of England to the United States.'7 This gold was
sent in $io million lots and when $30 million had been
shipped, the Federal Reserve banks purchased the remaining
$6o million to prevent its coming to New York and soon after
disposed of it in London.18 This operation was not allowed to
interfere with the policy of benevolent neutrality toward the
credit base in America, for the Federal Reserve banks sold
securities to offset the easing effects of the gold purchase
abroad. In the latter part of May they increased their port-
folio $ioo million to offset the tightening effects of an equiva-
lent increase of gold under earmark. American credit control
policy took the form at this time of stabilizing interest rates
in the face of exceptional inter-central bank gold transac-
tions.
THE POLICY OF GOLD REDISTRIBUTION
In June 1927 American gold exports, including in this term
sales of gold abroad, gold shipments, and gold earmarkings,
became substantial and a definite policy of encouraging this
movement was decided upon at a conference of central bank-
ers held in New York in July 1927 and attended by Montagu
Norman, Hjalmar Schacht, Charles Rist, and Benjamin
Strong. It was agreed, in harmony with the Moreau-Norman
conversations of the preceding month, that France should
buy the bulk of the gold she desired from the United States
and that in order to facilitate this the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York would take the lead in bringing about easier
money conditions.'9 In this decision international considera-
Cf.Ch. 15,TheDc Facto Adherence to the Gold Exchange Standard and
the Realization of Potential Elements of Strength.
18Roberts,op. cit., p. 49.
19Beckhart,op. cit., IV, 71. For this whole episode, and especially the Chicago566 EXPERIMENTATION
tions were uppermost, but the beginnings of a mild cyclical
depression in business made the solution of the international
problem seem to harmonize with the requirements of domes-
tic credit policy.
On July 29 the Federal Reserve Bank of New York reduced
its buying rate on bankers acceptances and on August 5 low-
ered its discount rate from 4 to 3½percent. The London
open market rate had been raised in June close to Bank rate,
and in August the differential rate relationship between
London and New York of July 1924 was once more reestab-
lished (Chart 49). In June, July, and August the Federal
Reserve banks invested the proceeds of their sales of gold in
London in sterling bills. Sterling was strengthened and in
November 1927 was higher than at any time since December
1914.
TheAttempt to Offset Gold Redistribution without having
previously offset Gold Accumulation
OFFSETTING OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS, MARCH 1927 TO DECEM-
BER1927
The definiteadoption of an easy money policy, accompanied
bypurchases of securities by the Federal Reserve banks to
offsetgold exports, was a signal for renewed speculative ac-
tivity on the New York Stock Exchange. Stock prices advanced
so greatly that the dividend yield on stocks fell below the
bond yield. Most of this advance took place during the period
of open market purchases, which were brought to an end in
November. During the rest of 1927 the portfolio policy of
the Federal Reserve banks was neutral.
The forces affecting the American credit base and credit
superstructure between the call dates March 23, 1927 and
December 31, 1927 are shown in Table 39. The drain on re-
serves caused by losses of gold was supplemented by a rise in
rate controversy that followed, cf. Beckhart, Vol. IV, Ch. III, passim. Dr.
Beckhart points out that Dr. Schacht preferred to have the American policy
related purely to American domestic conditions.A DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 567
money in circulation. This was, however, of a seasonal char-
acter. The increase in government securities held by the Fed-
eral Reserve banks was more than sufficient to offset the effects
of the gold loss, and reserves were further replenished by a
large increase in 'bills bought.' The two items together more
than offset the combined drain of gold exports and increase in
circulation. The resulting net increase in reserves was not
offset by a corresponding decrease in bills discounted. There
'was no shift from the discount to the open market shoulder.
On the contrary both bills discounted and member bank re-
serve accounts rose. The superstructure of credit built up
on this increased credit base was very large. Both 'loans and
investments (adjusted) 'and 'deposits (adjusted) 'of all banks
increased at an annual rate of 8.i per cent (Table 45).
CREDIT RESTRICTION, JANUARY TO JUNE 1928
The increasing speculative activity in New York brought
about a complete reversal of Federal Reserve policy. The
Federal Reserve banks began to dispose of their portfolio, and
between January 25 and February 3, 1928 a general advance
in discount rates from 31/2 to 4 per cent was carried out. Open
market rates were rising in New York from the beginning of
the year, and since the London rate was falling, the differ-
ential interest rate, as far as time and call rates are concerned,
once more left New York the higher market. Until March 7
therestrictive policy of the Reserve banks, which still in-
cluded definite encouragement of gold exports, seemed suc-
cessful, but in the spring stock prices again rose, and brokers
loans began to grow rapidly once more. Market rates of in-
terest continued to rise rapidly and on May i8 the New York
Federal Reserve Bank rate was raised to 4½percent. This
was followed, after a break in the stock market in June, by a
further advance to 5 per cent in July. Open market sales were
on a large scale. By June 1928 the New York-London interest
rate differential was completely reversed (Chart 49) and
foreign funds were flowing in large volume to the New York568 EXPERIMENTATION
market both for employment at short term at the high yields
prevailing and for speculative investment.
The forces playing upon the American credit base and
TABLE 39






TRANSACTION (millions of dollars) ACCOUNTS
Decreasein Monetary Gold Stock —218
Increasein Money in Circulation outside the Reserve
Banks, the Treasury, and All Reporting Banks
(estimated)
Decrease in Cash in Vault of All Reporting Banks
(estimated) +30 1
Increasein Treasury Currency +8
Increase in Government Securities held by the Reserve
Banks +261
Increase in Bills Bought held by the Reserve Banks + '54
Increase in Bills Discounted at the Reserve Banks +152
Increase in Other Deposits at the Reserve Banks —12
Increase in Unexpended Capital Funds of the Reserve
Banks
—410
Increase in Member Bank Reserve Accounts due to these
Items +195
1
ActualIncrease in Member Bank Reserve Accounts +131
1Thelarge discrepancy between the calculated and actual increase in Member
Bank Reserve Accounts is probably due to a change in the proportion that Cash
in Vault of Member Banks bears to Cash in Vault of All Banks at the year end,
rendering the method employed in estimating the item Cash in Vault unsatis-
factory when the period begins or ends on December 31. This probability is
confirmed by the large discrepancy in the opposite sense for the next period.
credit superstructure during this period are shown in Table
40. The effects of gold exports on the reserves of member
banks were largely but not wholly offset by changes in the
monetary circulation and in cash in vault of commercialA DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 569
banks. Reserves were still further diminished by the sale of
government securities and by a reduction in bills bought by
the Federal Reserve banks, but were built up in almost equal
TABLE 39
March 23,1927—December31,1927, aPeriod during which Gold Exports







TRANSACTION (millions of dollars) THE COMPTROLLER
Increase in Monetary Gold Stock —218
Increase in Money in Circulation outside the Treasury,
the Reserve Banks, and All Reporting Banks (estimated) —171
Increase in Treasury Currency +8
Increase in Commercial BankFloat(incomplete) +385 2
Increase in Net Indebtedness to Foreign Banks (Member
Banks only) —323
Increase in Loans plus Investments (adj.) of All
Reporting Banks +3,051
Increase in Government Securities held by the Reserve
Banks +261
in Bills Bought held by the Reserve Banks 1-154
in Real Estate owned by All Reporting Banks
(esthnated on basis of a monthly increase of i 0 million) +90
Increase in Capital Funds of All Reporting Banks
(esti:inated) —450
+3,949 —1,162
Increase in Deposits (adj.) of Alt Reporting Banks due
to these Items +2,787 2
Actual Increase in Deposits (adj.) of All Reporting
Banks +3,107
2 The large discrepancy between the calculated and actual increase in Deposits
(adj.) is probably due to the fact that the incomplete figure for Commercial
Bank Float introduces a larger error into the calculation for periods that begin
or end on December 3! than for other periods. This consideration affects the
results for the next period in the opposite sense.
amounts by an increase in rediscounts. During the expansion
phase of this cycle of open market operations there had been
no shift from the discount to the open market shoulder. Dur-
ing the period of restriction there was a shift from the open570 EXPERIMENTATION
market to the discount shoulder. The experience of 1922—24
was not repeated,2° and a large volume of indebtedness to the
Federal Reserve banks was built up. This was helpful in mak-
ing discount policy effective, but it also restored once more
TABLE 40





TRANSACTION (millions of dollars) ACCOUNTS
Decrease in Monetary Gold Stock —270
Decrease in Money in Circulation outside the Reserve
Banks, the Treasury, and All Reporting Banks
(estimated) +70
Decrease in Cash in Vault of All Reporting Banks
(estimated) +136 '
Decrease in Government Securities held by the Reserve
Banks —392
Decrease in Bills Bought held by the Reserve Banks —162
Increase in Bills Discounted at the Reserve Banks +422
Decrease in Other Deposits at the Reserve Banks +4
Increase in Unexpended Capital Funds of the Reserve
Banks —20
+632 —844
Decrease in Member Bank Reserve Accounts due to these
Items —212
Actual Decrease in Member Bank Reserve Accounts —87
1 Cf. Table 39, note i.
the now familiar situation in which a future gold import
movement might fix the reserve credit represented by these
rediscounts permanently in the American credit system.
Though reserve balances were reduced, 'deposits(ad-
justed) 'ofall banks increased nearly half a billion dollars.
Once again this was possible because of the conversion of
20 Cf. Ch. jo, Shifting from the Open Market to the Discount Shoulder.A DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 571
demandinto time deposits. The rate of increase in deposits,
however, was much reduced, falling to 1.8 per cent, but 'loans
and investments (adjusted)' increased $i½ billion,that is,
at an annual rate of 5.5 per cent, although the banks were not
increasing their loans on securities. During January and
TABLE 40
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TRANSACTION (millions of dollars) THE COMPTROLLER
J)ecrease in Monetary Gold Stock —270
1)ecrease in Money in Circulation outside the Treasury,
the Reserve Banks, and All Reporting Banks
(estimated) +70
in Commercial Bank Float (incomplete) _442
1)ecreasein Net Indebtedness to Foreign Banks (Member
Banks only) + 165
Increase in Loans plus Investments (adj.) of All Reporting
Banks +1,551
Decrease in Government Securities held by the Reserve
Banks —392
Decrease in Bills Bought held by the Reserve Banks —162
Increase: in Real Estate owned by All Reporting Banks
(estimated on basis of a monthly increase of 7 million) +42
in Capital Funds of All Reporting Banks
(estimated) —360
+1,828 —1,228
Increase in Deposits (adj.) of All Reporting Banks due to
these Items +6oo 2
Actual]:ncrease in Deposits (adj.) of All Reporting Banks+489
2Cf.Table 39, note 2.
February 1928 brokers loans tended slightly downward, the
of New York banks falling rapidly. Loans for out-of-
town banks increased and, with rising money rates, 'loans for
the account of others' were growing. This was the source of
the net increase in speculative credit for the period. Begin-
ning on March 7 all three classes of loans increased until572 EXPERIMENTATION
June 8, when total brokers loans were one billion dollars
greater than the year before when the gold redistribution
program first went into effect.
TABLE 41






TRANSACTION (millions of dollars) ACCOUNTS
Decrease in Monetary Gold Stock —488
Decrease in Money in Circulation outside the Reserve
Banks, the Treasury, and All Reporting Banks
(estimated) —101
Decrease in Cash in Vault of All Reporting Banks
(estimated) +i66 1
Increase in Treasury Currency +8
Decrease in Government Securities held by the Reserve
Banks —131
Decrease in Bills Bought held by the Reserve Banks —8
Increase in Bills Discounted at the Reserve Banks +574
Increase in Other Deposits at the Reserve Banks —8
Increase in Unexpended Capital Funds of the Reserve
Banks —29
+748 —765
Decrease in Member Bank Reserve Accounts due to
these Items —17 1
Actual Increase in Member Bank Reserve Accounts +44
The considerations making the estimate of changes in Cash in Vault unreliable
when the period begins or ends on December 31 apply in slightly less degree
when the period begins or ends on June 30. The basis of the estimate does not
permit allowance for seasonal changes.
THE PERIOD OF GOLD REDISTRIBUTION AS A WHOLE
The forces playing upon the American credit base and credit
superstructure for the period of gold redistribution taken as
a whole are shown in Table 41.Thefull force of gold exports
was allowed to take effect in diminishing reserves. The netA DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 573
gains in reserves drawn from changes in monetary circulation
and cash in vault were more than offset by the reduction of
$13i million in the security holdings of the Federal Reserve
TABLE 4!
March 23, 1927—June 30, 1928,aPeriod during which Gold Exports were







TRANSACTION (millions of dollars) THE COMPTROLLER
Decrease in Monetary Gold Stock —488
Decrease in Money in Circulation outside the Reserve
Banks, the Treasury, and All Reporting Banks
(estimated) —lox
Increase in Treasury Currency +8
Increase in Commercial Bank Float (incomplete) +34'
Increase in Net Indebtedness to Foreign Banks (Member
Banks only) —158
Increase in Loans plus Investments (adj.) of All Reporting
Banks +4,602
in Government Securities held by the Reserve
Banks —'3'
Decrease in Bills Bought held by the Reserve Banks —8
in Real Estate owned by All Reporting Banks
(estimated) +132
Increase in Capital Funds of All Reporting Banks
(estimated) —8zo
+5,083 —1,696
Increa;e in Deposits (adj.)of AllReporting Banks due to
these items +3,387
ActualIncrease in Deposits (adj.)ofAll Reporting Banks+3,596
banks.Yet the member bank reserves were slightly increased
owing to an increase in rediscounts of $547 million. By going
into debt to this amount the member banks were able to
mairLtain their reserves, and on this nearly stationary reserve
base a great superstructure was reared. In spite of factors
directly reducing them by $'½billion(Table 4'), 'deposits574 EXPERIMENTATION
adjusted' increased $3½billion,at an annual rate of 5.2 per
cent, and 'loans and investments (adjusted)' increased $4½
billion,or at an annual rate of 6.7 per cent (Table 45)
TABLE 42




CHANGES (millions of dollars) IN MEMBER BANK RESERVE ACCOUNTS
June 30, 1920Oct. 10, 1924
to to
Oct. io, 1924June 30, 1928
Monetary Gold Stock +1,854' _3791 Money in Circulation outside the
Reserve Banks, the Treasury, and All
Reporting Banks(partly estimated) +47° —41
Cash in Vault of All Reporting Banks
(estimated) +135 +141
Treasury Currency +320 —23
Federal Reserve Float —123 2+25 2
Government Securities held by the
Reserve Banks +229 —370
Bills Bought held by the Reserve Banks —224 +46
Bills Discounted at the Reserve Banks —2,165+765
Other Deposits at the Reserve Banks —22 +29
Unexpended Capital Funds of the
Reserve Banks —34 —27
+3,008—2,568+i,oo6—840
Increase in Member Bank Reserve
Accounts due to these Items +440' +166
Actual Increase in Member Bank
Reserve Accounts +358 +155
'Until April i 925, Gold Coin and Bullion in the United States. The substantial
difference between the calculated and the actual change in Member Bank
Reserve Accounts from June 1920 to October i 924 occurred in the early part
of that period and is probably due to differences in the behavior of Gold Coin
and Bullion as given by the Treasury in the earlier years and the behavior of
the actual Monetary Gold Stock.A DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 575
Contingent Liabilities of American Banks
This great increase in the credit superstructure upon a prac-
tically stationary credit base coincided with a striking growth
TABLE 42
june 30,1920—OCtObel10, 1924, the Period of Preparation for the Return
toGold;October 10, 1924—June 30, 1928,thePeriod of the Completion
of the Gold Standard Facade
THE CREDIT SUPERSTRUCTU RE
EFFECT ON DEPOSITS
(EXCL. INTERBANK DEPOSITS)
OF ALL BANKS REPORTING TO THE
CHANCES (millions of dollars) IN COMPTROLLER
June 30, 1920 Oct. 10, 1924
to to
Oct. 10, 1924 June 30, 1928
Monetary Gold Stock +1,854 1 _3791
Money in circulation outside the
Reserve Banks, the Treasury, and
All Reporting Banks +470 —41
Treasury Currency +320 —23
Commercial Bank Float
(incomplete) —217 +473
Net Indebtedness to Foreign Banks
(incomplete) —147 —1584
Loans plus Investments (adj.) of All
Reporting Banks +4,813 +10,783
Government Securities held by the
Reserve Banks +229 —370
Bills Bought held by the Reserve
Banks —224 +46
Real Estate owned by All Reporting
Banks (partly estimated) +727 +444
Capital Funds of All Reporting
Banks (partly estimated) —1,037 —z,8o6
+8,413—1,625+11,746—2,777
Increase in Deposits (adj.) of All
Reporting Banks due to these
Itenis +6,788 +8,969
ActuaLIncreasein Deposits (adj.)
of All Reporting Banks +6,155 +9,333
2 Calculated from Federal Reserve Bank statements.
From June 1921.
No estimate from December 1923 to March 1927; from March 1927 to June
1928, Member Banks only.576 EXPERIMENTATION
in 'loans for the account of others.' This was of great im-
portance to the banking system, for such loans constitute, in
effect, contingent liabilities of banks. When loans are placed
by banks for non-banking lenders, they have the same im•
mediate effect on bank assets and liabilities as the sale of any
security or other asset by banks. Assets and deposits both fall,
but the banks remain under a non-contractual, but neverthe-
less economically binding compulsion to take back the loans
and reconstitute the deposits of non-banking lenders upon
demand. The replacement of loans transferred to 'others' by
new bank loans meant that the lending power of banks was
being employed without regard to this contingency. From a
money market point of view, 'loans for the account of others'
were part of the vast superstructure of bank credit brought
into existence during the period of gold redistribution.
The One-Way American Banking System
Domestic Credit Expansion, 1920.—1928
THE CREDIT BASE AND CREDIT SUPERSTRUCTURE
The behavior of the American credit base and credit super-
structure during the years when the preliminary prepara-
tions were being made for the return to gold (1920—24) was
in striking contrast to their behavior during the period when
the return to gold on a world-wide basis was actually com-
pleted (1925—1928). This is brought out in Table 42, the
main features of which may be summarized briefly. From
June i 920 to October i 924 member banks acquired reserve
funds from outside sources amounting to $2,779 million, for
to the increase in the gold supply was added an increase in
reserves from changes in the circulation and composition of
the currency of $925 million, made up of a $470 million re-
turn of currency from circulation, a $135milliondecrease in
cash in vault, and a $320 million increase in Treasury Cur-
rency. The relatively moderate increase in reserve balances
is explained by the slight decrease in the portfolio and floatA DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 577
of the Federal Reserve system and by the repayment of $2,-
:165 m:illion in rediscounts.
From October 1924 to June 1928 reserve balances also in-
creased moderately, but this was accomplished despite a loss
i.n gold of million and a reduction in the open market
portfolio of the Federal Reserve banks of $370 million. Cur-
rency factors contributed somewhat to the net increase in re-
serves, but it was due chiefly to a large increase in rediscounts.
'The real shift from the open market to the discount shoulder
occurred in this period. The real contrast between the two
periods, as far as the growth in the basis of credit is concerned,
is that between acquiring reserve funds outside the central
banking system in the first period and going further into
debt in the second.
The striking features of the erection of the increased credit
superstructure on the increased credit base were that the in-
crease in reserves was greater in the first period than in the
second, while the increase in deposits was greater in the
second period than in the first; and that the increase in de-
posits was greater than the increase in loans and investments
in the first period and less in the second. Even more surpris-
ing for a country continuously on the gold standard was the
fact that while the increase in reserves during the first period
was more than double the increase in the second, the increase
in loans and investments in the second period was more than
double the increase in the first. Since the first period was one
of gold imports and the second one of gold exports, the ex-
pression 'delayed gold inflation' takes on a very powerful
statistical meaning, as is indicated by the following figures
taken from Table 42:
June 1920— October 1924—
October 1924 June 1928
(5' months) months)
(millions of dollars)
Monetary Gold Stock +1,854 —379
MemberBank Reserves +358 +155
Deposits (adj.) of All Reporting Banks +6,155 +9,333
Loans and Investments (adj.) of All Re-
porting Banks +4,813 +10,783578 EXPERIMENTATION
The major explanation of the much more rapid growth of
deposits than of loans and investments during the first pe-
riod was the gold inflow. During the second period the major
explanation of the much more rapid growth of loans and
investments than of deposits was the great increase in capital
funds of American banks. The major explanation of the more
rapid proportionate growth of deposits to reserves is found in
the institutional factor already frequently mentioned, the
transfer of deposits from the category of demand deposits to
that of time deposits.
THE RATIO SYSTEM OF THE REPORTING MEMBER BANKS
This reclassification of deposits was, in effect, a reduction in
the basic banking ratio) primary reserves to total deposits. In
TABLE 43
The Expansion of Deposits of All Reporting Member Banks, 1920-




CHANGE IN THE RATIO
CASH ANDRATIO OF From the
TOTAL AT RESERVE(2) TO (x)preceding From
DEPOSITS BANKS(PERCENTAGE) date June 1920
(r) (2)
June 1920 14,036 1,752 12.482
June 1922 14,504 1,719 11.851 13,771
Nov.1924 1,991 11.089 i6,8oo '5,779
June 1928 20,719 2,021 9.754 18,225 i6,igi
BEXPANSION BY PERIODS—PERMISSIVE FACTORS
INCREASE AT- INCREASE AT-
TRIBUTABLE TRIBUTABLE
ACTUAL INCREASETO CHANGES TO CHANGES
IN DEPOSITS IN RESERVES IN RATIO
(6) (7) (6)—(7)
June 1920—June 1922 466 —265' 733
June 1g22—Nov. 1924 3,450 2,2961 1,154
Nov. 1924—June 1928 2,765 271' 2,494
June 1920—NOV. 1924 3,918 1,7432 2,175
June 1920—June 1928 6,683 2,1552 4,528
1 Difference betweenat the end of the period and (i) at thebeginningof the
period.
2 Difference betweenat theendof the period and (i) in June 1920.A DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 579
the case of the member banks of the Federal Reserve system
primary reserves are 'cash' and 'due from the Federal Reserve
banks. The figures for all reporting member banks disclose
a. steady reduction in this ratio from 12.5 per cent in June 1920
to 9.7 per cent in June 1928 (Table 43). From 1920 to 1922
thisdue to a decline in cash in vault, but from then on it
was due to a steady and persistent reduction in the ratio of
deposits at the Reserve banks to total deposits.
This was the third great increase in the potential lending
power of the American banking system after 1914. It is in a
direct line of descent from the changes in the reserve require-
ments accomplished by the passage of the Federal Reserve
Act itself, and the war-time amendments of June 1917. Quan-
titatively, for 1920—28, it was more important as a permissive
Eactor of bank credit expansion than all the changes in actual
reserves during the period. Of the total expansion of deposits
of all reporting member banks from June 1920 to June 1928
67.7 per cent was made possible by the changes in this ratio.
The relative importance of the two factors for various periods
between 1920 and 1928 is shown by the accompanying figures
derived from Table 43. The form in which the figures of the
PERCENTAGE OF THE INCREASE IN TOTAL DE-
POSITS ATTRIBUTABLE TO CHANGES IN
AMOUNT OFRATIO OF RESERVES TO DEPOSITS
RESERVES Within the Since
Period June
June1920to June 1922 0 100
June1922 to November1924 66.6
. 334
November 1924 toJune1928 9.8 91.2
June 11)20 to November 1924 44.5 55.5
June 1)20 to June 1928 32.3 67.7
reporting member banks are published does not admit of
presenting a ratio of 'secondary reserves' to 'total deposits'
corresponding to the ratio 'money at call and short notice' to
'total deposits' of the London clearing banks. The dominating



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































securities,' however, makes it possible to indicate in the
growth of the ratio 'loans on securities' to 'totalS deposits' the
steady increase in the proportion of the secondary reserve to
the deposits of the reporting member banks (Chart 36 and
Table 44).
During the entire post-war period the American banking
system was changing the proportionate distribution of its
Total Inn, and In,,sIm,nIs
—




















1924 1925 1926 1921 '928
'1.1 Demand Deposits
Cash on Hand and ,1th Reset.,
Reserves Rest,., Banks—S'
Cash ,n V.slts..t,till-Illiii
1924 1925 1926 192? 1928
assets. It was not, as the British banking system was, working
back to a traditionally established set of ratios (Charts 46 and
47). The Federal Reserve banks were, as a consequence, de-
prived of one of the prime essentials of effective credit con-
trol—a stable set of ratios of primary and secondary reserves
to total deposits in the banking system. Their efforts to re-
strict credit met with failure. They were attempting to carry
out a tug-of-war with an elastic rope.
RATE OF GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN CREDIT SUPERSTRUCTURE
Despite the depressions of 1920, 1924,
ods of gold loss of 1925 and 1927 the
tern was elastic in one direction alone.
1922 were, although there had been a
and 1927 and the pen-
American banking sys-
Bank deposits in June
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per cent, still at the level of June 1920, the peak of war and
post-war inflation, and between 1922 and 1924 they were
growing at an annual rate of 7.2 per cent.2' The year 1924
stand:; at the peak of a bank credit expansion virtually un-
broken since 1914 (Chart 37). The general return of other
countries to gold did not halt this expansion. The period of
benevolent neutrality as a guide to credit policy, April 1925
IIUø..
CHART 37
to March 1927, during which loans and investments were in-
creasing at an annual rate of 4.4 per cent and deposits at
per cent, represents merely an interlude between two periods
of much more rapid growth, and even when there was a sub-
stantial check to the growth in deposits from December 1927
to June 1928, loans and investments were still increasing at a
rapid rate (Table 45).
The One-Way American Banking System in its Relation to
American Foreign Lending
The pressure for the employment of bank funds in America,
which was the outstanding characteristic of American bank-
21 Cf.Ch.io, The Complete Cyde of Open Market Operations, June 1922
to October io, 1924..
A,iThn..,tic American Banks,Reserves,
Loans and In vestments, and
Deposits, 1914-1932
A,,..,I citic,Ce.npIc.lI.c .1Ic. C.c..ncy. 1932. p.560
Ann,,I Rcpccl ofthe F.d.,.I Rn.,., Scood. pp. 128Z584 EXPERIMENTATION
TABLE 45
Rate of Growth of Loans and Investments and of Deposits of All
Banks Reporting to the Comptroller, 1920-1928, selected intervals
LOANS AND
INVESTMENTS GROWTH ANNUAL DEPOSITS GROWTH ANNUAL
(adj.) DURING RATE (adj.) DURINGRATE OP
($ooo,ooo PERIOD GROWTH ($000,000 PERIOD GROWTH
omitted) (percentage) omitted) (percentage)
June 30, 1920 41,435 38,006
June 30, 1922 39,697 —4.2 —2.! 37,874 —0.4 —0.2
months)
June 30, 1922 39,697 37,874
Oct. 10, 1924 46,077i6.i 6.8 44,160 16.2 7.2
(27 months)
Oct. 10, 1924 46,077 44,160
April 6, 1925 47,560 3.2 6.i 45,954 4 8.2
(6 months)
April 6, 1925 47,560 45,954
March 23, 1927 52,114 g.6 4.4 49,802 8.4 3.9
(24 months)
March23, 1927 52,114 49,802
Dec. 3', 1927 55,165 5.8 8.i 52,909 6.2 8.i
months)
Dec. 31, 1927 55,165 52,909
June 27, 1928 56,726 2.8 5.5 53,398 0.9 i.8
(6 months)
June 30, 1920 41,435 38,006
Oct. 10, 1924 46,077 11.2 2.5 44,160 16.2 3.6
(51 months)
Oct. 10, 1924 46,077 44,160
June 27, 1928 56,716 23.1 5.7 53,398 20.9 5.2
months)
March23, 1927 52,114 49,802
June 27, 1928 56,716 9.0 6.7 53,398 7.2 5.2
(i6months)
ing after 1924, coincided with a very strong demand for capi-
tal from other countries. This demand had three outstanding
characteristics: it was in part (i) directly connected with the
completion of the currency reforms discussed in Chapter
(2) a function of the destruction of working capital in Cen-
tral Europe; relatedto the economic development of theA DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 585
less highly industrial areas of the world, particularly South
America. These characteristics of the demand for capital were
stamped upon the record of American foreign lending as
soon as the feeling of confidence necessary to release the
abundant supply of funds was established by the German and
British return to gold. The supply steadily increased from
October 1924 to June 1928 with the inflationary situation in
American banking and the mushroom growth of the highly
competitive, improvised institutional equipment of the Amer-
ican market for the placement of foreign loans, as may be
seen in the annual lists of American foreign invest-
ments compiled by Max Winkler and published by the For-
eign Policy Association. These lists are comprehensive, and
include refunding operations, large bank credits, and direct
capital investments. In Table 46 the items given by Dr.
Winkler for 1923—28 are distributed by major geographical
areas, divided into groups affording a convenient basis for
tracing the major changes in the direction of the American
capital export.
Au examination of the individual items included in these
totals reveals the relatively great importance in 1924 and 1925
of loans and credits connected with currency stabilization
operations and their progressive decline thereafter, the rise
in importance m 1925 and 1926 of provincial state and mu-
nicipal borrowing and the later very vigorous growth of cor-
porate borrowing and direct investment of capital, and finally
the growing element of general investment abroad through
investment trusts and similar types of financial organization.
The progressive pushing of American capital more and more
into capital-poor regions and regions of rich but relatively
undeveloped natural resources, and the appearance of pro-
gressively poorer credit risks among the borrowers reveal the
pressure of competitive lending by a new creditor country
with superabundant deposits and an inflationary psychology.
In Table 46 the investments and credits placed in Great
Britain and Canada are eliminated from the totals in order toTABLE 46
Geographical Distribution of American Foreign Investments
Refunding included, 1923-1928(millionsof dollars)
1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928
TotalEurope 126 673 1,334 730 838
United Kingdom 1 329 3 31 115
FormerEuropean Neutrals 75 202 262 122 172 248
France, Italy, and Belgium u 248 298 107 123 142
Germany 176 308 414 313 422
OtherCentral Europe 40 46 137 84 199 101
TotalSouth and Central
America '3' 263 358 630 625 638
SouthAmerica 62 221 506 506 578
Central America 69 42 124 119 6o
Canada i6o 371 432 504 490 359
Total Oceania 70 187 157 36 155 148
Japan 20 187 67 30 32 91
Australia 90 6 g8 57
Dutch East Indies 50 25
AllOther 56 95 20! 135 203 208
GrandTotal 5431,5892,4822,0352,3112,481
Total, exci. the United
Kingdomand Canada 383 1,2171,711 1,5281,7911,907
PERCENTAGESOF THE GRAND TOTAL EXCLUDING THE UNITED KINGDOM
AND CANADA
Former European Neutralsig.6 16.5 15.2 8.o g.6 13.0
France,Italy, and Belgium 2.9 20.4 17.3 7.0 6.g 7.4.
Germany 14.5 17.9 27.! 17.5 22.1
OtherCentral Europe 10.4 3.8 7.9 5.5II.' 5.3
South America u6.i 20 8J33•, 28.2 30.3
CentralAmerica 3.5,1 8.i 6.6 3.2
Japan 5.2 15.4 3.8 2.0 i.8 4.8
Australia 5.2 .4 5.5 3.0
DutchEast Indies 13.1 1.4
AllOther 14.6 7.8 11.9 8.8 11.4 10.9
100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0
Germanyplus Other
Central Europe 10.4 18.3 25.8 32.6 ,8.6 27.4
SouthandCentralAmerica34.2 21.6 20.8 41.2 34.8 33.5
Central Europe plus South
and Central America 44.6 39.9 46.6 73.8 53.4 6o.g
Compiled from lists published by Max Winkler in Foreign Folicy Information
Service,Vol.III, IV, and V, Special SupplementsA DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 587
remove the effects of the single great credit operation in con-
nection with the British return to gold and of the steady
Canadian borrowing. The capital exports to other groups
are expressed as percentages of the remaining total. In order
to bring out more clearly certain aspects of the geographical
concentration of capital exports the percentages for Germany
and Central Europe and for South and Central America are
given separately.
Concentration of Liabilities in New York
The promotion and sale of this great volume of foreign loans
was in large measure due to the employment of the abundant
lending power of the American one-way banking system in
the securities markets. The rising and active markets of this
period did not, on this account, as was often supposed, de-
prive industry and trade of needed funds, or indeed, except
for the increases in working balances needed to operate them,
'absorb' bank credit at all. They did, however, cause a steady
decline in the relative importance of the commercial loan as
compared to the loan on securities and in the investments of
American banks. This was a genuine source of instability.
Not only were the banks less closely in touch with the day to
day operations of their commercial customers, as indicated in
Chapter io, but the value of their assets became subject to a
wider range of fluctuation and hence, in time of stress, the
forces tending to contract bank credit were likely to be more
severe.
In addition, the growth in loans on securities, to which
foreign lending contributed, enormously increased the con-
cent:ration of liabilities in the New York market because it
created a growing claim on bank deposits throughout the
country that would be exercised as soon as brokers loans be-
gan to be called in and securities margins increased. The for-
eign lending also promoted an international concentration of
liabilities in New York in the form of an extreme dependence
of certain areas in the world upon new American loans to588 EXPERIMENTATION
meet their current international obligations. Both these forms
of concentration of liabilities are, in themselves, appropriate
to a large domestic and international capital market, but the
inflationary setting in which New York became an interna-
tional financial center developed them both to a dangerous
degree.
The One-Way American Banking System in its Relation to
the international Distribution of
These dangers were not generall
years American loans supported








y recognized, and for four
the whole structure of the
to provide a general setting
Gold Importing Countries other than
States and the United Kingdom, 1925-1928
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SOURCE: 'Statistics of Gold Movements i 925-1930,' Table II,
on 11th Distribution of Gold (submitted to the Gold Delegation
Committee, Geneva, League of Nations, 193 i), p. 67
in which a gold redistribution program could be conceived
and attempted, and therefore stamped upon the international
distribution of gold from 1925 to 1928 a distinctive pattern.
This was the satisfaction of the demand of certain major gold
importing areas jointly by Great Britain, as distributor of the
South African output, and by the United States as distributor
of existing stocks. This division of the role of gold distributor
was complicated by the drawing of gold from Great Britain
22Cf. Ch. 4, Loans in Support of the Foreign Exchanges in their Relation to
International Clearance. It was not common for American lenders to stipulate
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to the United States in 1925 and 1927 when the underlying
pull of the dollar over the world's exchanges was insufficiently
offset.
The post-1925 pattern of international gold distribution
may be represented simply in two short tables. The chief
gold. importing countries other than the United States and
Great Britain from 1925 to 1928 are shown in Table 47. The
relative importance of the contributions of the United States
and Great Britain to the satisfaction of their demand is indi-
cated in Table 48 A, in which the gold exports of the United
States and Great Britain are grouped by major 'export areas,'
as was done by T. E. Gregory in the League of Nations report
on British gold movements in Selected Documents of the Gold
Delegation. The sources from which the gold supplies of
Great Britain and the United States were replenished in the
face of this demand are indicated in Table 48 B. The place of
the gold imports and exports from the areas included in these
tables in the total gold trade of Great Britain and the United
States and therefore the role of these two countries as gold
distributors is shown in Table 48 C.
These tables illustrate perfectly the statistical difficulties
encountered whenever the official statistics of different coun-
tries bearing on the same transactions are compared, but
they clearly establish a pattern of international gold distribu-
tion. The sole important source for the replenishment of the
British gold supply was the South African production. After
the American gold shipments to Australia just before the
Brit:ish return to gold, Australian gold moved to the United
States, and America also regularly received the surplus gold
production of Canada as well as some shipments from Japan
(cf. Ch. 14).Thebuilding up of the gold reserves of Germany
was, until 1928, shared between Great Britain and the United
States, but the gold taken by South American central banks
in connection with currency stabilization was drawn mostly
from the United States, and that taken by the central banks
of the smaller European countries, from Great Britain. In-590 EXPERIMENTATION
dian demand was largely satisfied outside Great Britain and
the United States as far as these statistics show, but probably
a large portion of Indian gold imports was shipped directly
from South Africa as a result of sales negotiated in the Lon-
TABLE 48
United Kingdom and United States as Gold Distributors
Net imports +, Net exports —(millionsof dollars)
1925 1926 1927 1928
ATRADEWITH EXPORT AREAS
United Kingdom'
France and Belgium —3 —7 —4 —96
Germany and Holland —23 —13 —20 —109
SouthAmerica —I
BritishIndia —64 —12 — I 2 — I 0
Switzerland —25 —4 —6 —13
TheUnited States —29 —I —19
UnitedStates 2
France +5 +11 —308
Germany —68 —47
South and Central America —12 +39 —85 —101
BritishIndia —58 —3 —I
BTRADE WITH IMPORT AREAS
United Kingdom
Africa(except Egypt) +124 +r67 +133 +153
Russia +19 +7 —6 +i8
Spain —2 —7 +10
UnitedStates
United Kingdom +43 +1 +30 +5
Holland +6 +7 —4
Canada —12 +40 +34 +8o
Japan +11 +14 +20
Australia —27 +51 +22
CSUMMARY BY TRADING AREAS AND TOTAL TRADE
United Kingdom
Net loss to export areas —144 —38 —66 —288
Netgain from import areas +143 +172 +119 +i8i
Balancewith these two groups —' +134 +52 —47
Netbalance with all countries —40 +55 +2' —62
United States
Net loss to export areas —133 —8 —90 —438
Netgainfromimportareas +21 +io6 +113 +8i
Balance with these twogroups —112 +io8 +23 —357
Netbalance with allcountries —34 +g8 +6 —392
'T.E. Gregory, 'The Causes of Gold Movements into andoutof Great Britain,
1925to1929,'SelectedDocuments on the Distribution of Gold, p.30.
2 FederalReserve Board, AnnualReport, 1928,pp.88-9.A DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 591
don market. After Great Britain returned to the gold stand-
ard .America did not share the burden of meeting Indian
demand. The diversion of the new French demand from
Great Britain to America is clear, but even in the figures for
1928 the secondary effects of the American gold redistribu-
tion policy begin to appear in the substantial British exports
of lg.28 to Germany.23 The simultaneous strengthening of the
German exchange through German borrowing in America
in the latter part of 1928 and the weakening of sterling
through the general attraction of European funds to New
York to share in the speculative activity stimulated in the
easy money policy canceled in large part the advantages of
the diversion of French demand for gold from London in
1927(cf. Ch. 19,BankRate and the Defense of Sterling).
These secondary consequences of the American gold re-
distribution policy were a final chapter in the long and
intricate history of the relations between America's one-way
banking system and the international distribution of gold
that has occupied a substantial part of our whole analysis of
the war and post-war period. Our emphasis upon this re-
lationship began with the discussion of the pull of America
on th.e world's gold supplies early in the war before America
became a belligerent. It was continued in the history of the
American gold concentration policy during the war, and in
the distinction made between the legal and the economic
significance of gold reserves during the post-war boom. The
whole subsequent history of gold accumulation in America
from 1920 to 1924 and of the treatment of that gold in the
American banking system illustrated the dangers inherent in
clinging to the outward forms of an international institution
no longer truly international. Only in the light of this history
can the interrelations between the one-way American bank-
ing system and the international distribution of gold from
1925 to 1928, and especially the failure of the gold redistribu-
tion l?0hCY of 1927, be satisfactorily interpreted.
Cf. Ch. i6, The Modification of the Principle of Gold Economy.592 EXPERIMENTATION
The Continental Background
Many of the special circumstances that attended the develop-
ment of an international money market in New York may
be considered either as exceptional aspects of the post-war re-
adjustment or as institutional difficulties that could be over-
come by learning from experience. There was always present,
however, one important and permanent factor that must
never be overlooked, namely that New York is the domestic
money market for a continent. The economically diverse geo-
graphical areas of this continent require for the maintenance
of an even and balancing flow of inward and outward pay-
ments two general types of service from central money mar-
kets. The first is clear and obvious—the provision of a con-
tinuous and flexible flow of short term credit to facilitate
non-local settlements and to finance imports from other parts
of America and abroad, and the provision of long term credit
to supplement local capital accumulations when these are
insufficient to develop local resources. The second type is not
so obvious—the maintenance, free from violent interruption,
of the purchasing power of customers in other parts of Amer-
ica and abroad through the rendering of similar services to
the areas in which local products are marketed.
After the war New York assumed the major responsibility
for rendering both types of service instead of sharing this re-
sponsibility with London.24 In taking over much of London's
share of the first type of central money market service, the
New York market was simply enlarging its direct financial
assistance to domestic clients. Its relation to the welfare of
America was perfectly obvious to all parties concerned. In
taking over, however, a share in London's financial services to
foreign countries, American banks were assuming entirely
new responsibilities. These were not felt to be as binding
upon American banks as the responsibilities assumed toward
24 Cf. Ch.7, The Release of Forces leading to the Rise of an International
Money Market in New York' and 'Sharing with London during the War,'
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domestic clients. They had been discharged for years outside
the American banking system, and the resulting benefits to
the American economy had long been accepted by American
bankers without much thought or analysis. The new banker-
customer relationships established with foreigners did not
have the stability acquired by long experience and mutual
confidence. The connection between individual business
transactions with foreigners and the general welfare of the
various economic areas in the United States and of the mdi-
vidual American clients of American banks was by no means
always apparent. Though important, it was diffused. Conse-
que:ritly it was almost inevitable that whenever any conflict
arose between the obligations of American banks to their
established domestic clients and their new responsibilities to
foreign clients, the former would predominate. The shift in
the source of international credits from a market in which for
generations international considerations had played a major
role to one in which they were traditionally of minor impor-
tance involved, at least at the outset, a loss in the regularity
and appropriateness with which such credits were extended.
The mere size and diversity of the economic interests of the
United States compelled this result.
J.. G. Smith has attempted a rough statistical measure of the
relative importance of the foreign and domestic flow of funds
through the New York markets:
"The total ebb and flow of funds of the New York market due
to foreign trade relationships during 1929 amounted to approxi-
mately $24 billion, whereas the ebb and flow of funds due to
domestic economic relationships in that year amounted to at
least ten times as much, or $262 billion. This is about the ratio
of the domestic to the foreign trade of the United States." 25
In a world economy in which the general flow of goods and
services, both interregional and international, had attained,
by a slow process of adaptation, a certain approximate bal
25 Beckhart, op. cit., II, Professor Smith usestheterm "foreign trade re-
lationships" in its broadest sense, induding goods, services, securities, and
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ance, this circumstance would perhaps be of relatively small
importance. Under such conditions the international move-
ment of funds through the New York or any international
money market would be in general harmony with the domes-
tic flow of funds through that market. Neither would inter-
fere with the other, and some element of both would enter
into the balance of payments of any economic area, no matter
how small, that had any part in both interregional and inter-
national trade. But since such economic conditions were not
realized after the war, the minor role of international trade
in the American economy became important in the function-
ing of New York as an international money market.
Under a wide variety of circumstances the New York banks
might find that they were not acting as channels of remittance
between the rest of the country and foreign countries. They
might at times be accumulating cash and deposits from both,
and at other times they might be losing to both. Under such
circumstances a credit policy based primarily on international
considerations might not be the same as one based primarily
upon domestic considerations. A policy of credit restriction,
for example, might seem to be imperatively called for to
check an unequally rapid development of certain portions of
the American economy, leading to a lack of balance in the
distribution of domestic purchasing power at the same time
that the position of the American balance of payments and
of American foreign commerce might seem to require an op-
posite policy. A conflict of this sort arose in 1927, but its true
nature was not understood, and long run domestic considera-
tions did not prevail in the formulation of policy. As a re-
sult, the economic trends within the United States, which
constituted America's special contribution to the causes of
the approaching world economic depression, were accentu-
ated.
After 1927Americanprosperity exhibited certain peculiar
traits which may be summarized briefly.
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creased steadily from November 1927 to June 1929, but not
until the spring of 1929 in an extraordinary degree. This in-
crease was very unevenly spread over different industries.
Production of iron and steel was at a record level owing to
the activity of the automobile, the machinery, and railway
equipment industries. The machinery and electrical equip-
ment industries were active in response to export demand,
and there was record production in the new rayon industry.
On the other hand, while textiles, both wool and cotton, and
boots and shoes were active, none of these industries was in a
really satisfactory position. Resources were diverted on a
great scale into certain lines in which mass production was
highly developed. In these lines a technological revolution
was taking place that was producing technological unemploy-
ment impossible for new industries, such as hotels and gas
stations, to absorb. The development of mass production in-
dustries was greatly stimulated by cheap and abundant capi-
tal. Furthermore, the demand for a substantial portion of the
increased manufacturing output was dependent upon exports,
indirectly made possible by foreign lending and by credit ex-
tended to finance installment sales. America was not, in an
economic sense, receiving payment for a large part of its
manufacturing output.
2) The Prosperity of the Extractive Industries. Copper pro-
duction was at record levels, largely reflecting the develop-
ment of the electric power industry, but in the spring of 1929
this resulted in a record accumulation of stocks. Record pro-
duct:ion of petroleum also resulted in a record accumulation
of stocks. Coal mining, however, continued to be depressed.
TheCondition of Agriculture. Throughout the period of
prosperity the position of agriculture was unsatisfactory. The
value of agricultural crops increased from 1928 to 1929 only
1.5 pier cent. The increases were in hay, potatoes, fruits, vege-
tables, and sugar, but the value of the cotton and grain crops,
in which acreage was being increased without regard to world
forces of supply and demand, was decreasing.596 EXPERIMENTATION
4) The Prosperity of the Building Industry. For eight years
after the war demand for the products of American heavy
industry and many of the extractive occupations and light in-
dustry was stimulated by a building boom. Under the stimu-
lus of cheap and abundant capital this had by 1928 more than
made up the deficit in war-time construction and satisfied the
demand created by a continuous drain of population from
the farms to industrial and urban centers. In 1928 the boom
began to peter out and between 1928 and 1929buildingcon-
tracts awarded fell nearly a billion dollars.
For years the American economy had been allowed to ex-
pand without regard to the true possibilities of its markets or
the production of other countries. For years this expansion
had been concentrated largely in a relatively few lines of pro-
duction, and the prosperity of the country as a whole had
been predominantly urban and manufacturing while agricul-
ture was relatively depressed. Finally, for years credit had
been allowed to expand more rapidly than production and
trade. If in 1927 these trends had been checked and the eco-
nomic adjustments, so painfully accomplished during the
world depression of the 'thirties, had been then forced upon
America, the prosperity phase of the business
cycle of 1920—29 would have been shorter but the trough of
the world economic depression, in all probability, would not
have been so deep. The facade of the international gold stand-
ard would probably not have been completed, the crisis in
German reparation would have been advanced four or five
years, the false confidence introduced by the return to gold
would have been temporarily shattered, and Great Britain
would have had to face realistically the internal problems of
a readjustment of her industry to her new international posi-
tion. The long run benefits would, in the light of subsequent
history, have been very great, but the price would have been
great too. Even if the financial statesmen of 1927 could have
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have been allowed to pay that price. From a world point of
view 1927 was a turning point, but that fact only became
clear long after the critical decisions had been made.
The continuation of urban and manufacturing prosperity
in America in 1927 obscured one further set of potential prob-
lems arising from the growth of a powerful international
money market in New York. Because America is a continent,
New York is the center of a great domestic gold standard sys-
tem, in addition to being a central market in an international
gold standard system. Itis subject to certain obligations
toward the domestic part of the total gold standard area of
which it is the center that it does not have toward the foreign
part. For example, the forces that affect the international
prices of basic raw materials operate upon certain sections of
the American economy as they do upon countries whose econ-
omy is built largely around the production of certain raw
materials. In the international gold standard system of pre-
war days the traditional remedy for economic depressions
heavily upon countries producing primary raw ma-
terials was for those countries to be tided over by credits from
central money markets or, if these were not adequate, to aban-
don their membership in the gold standard system tempo-
rarily.20 But it is not possible for Kansas to go off the gold
standard while the United States remains on it. The banking
20H.E.Petersconcludes his monograph, The Foreign Debt of the Argentine
Republic, in the following words:
"It is difficult to see how the existence of even an ideal banking system would
have greatly helped the Argentine nation during the past ten years. Possibly
the government finances would have been forced to a higher plane by a sever-
ance of connections with the state bank; private institutions might have been
placed in a stronger position requiring smaller reserves for safety. Butthede-
cline of agricultural prices could not have been affected in any way, since the
Argentine must remain purely passive in its relation with world price levels.
More than likely the central bank, had it existed from 1928tothe present,
would, have made vigorous efforts to keep the peso at par with the gold cur-
rencies. In the writer's opinion, this would have had much more disastrous
effects than the policy actually followed. That Argentina suffered so little from
the world depression, in spite of the fact that the country produces those corn-598 EXPERIMENTATION
systems of parts of the United States, when subject to the
same kind of drain upon reserves experienced by outlying
countries in the international gold standard system, cannot be
relieved by suspending gold payments and allowing their
exchange rates to fall, while continuing to provide the essen-
tial banking services at home. A general deterioration, pos-
sibly ending in a general suspension in their banking systems,
can be avoided only by drawing upon advances from the cen-
tral money market in some form. There is, therefore, an over-
riding responsibility upon the New York money market to
meet this type of domestic need or to take steps to prevent the
development of such a need, though these may involve the
adoption of credit policies contrary to those required by the
other responsibilities of New York as an international money
market. There can be little doubt thatthe territories of
Argentina and of Australia had been geographically contigu-
ous to, and politically part of, England, the history of London
as the center of the world's international financial machinery
before the war would have been different.
Conflicts between its international responsibilities and the
passing requirements of situations of mainly domestic origin
are always present in any international money market. They
have been stressed at this point because the continental back-
ground of the New York money market inevitably increased
the importance and frequency of such conflicts. This circum-
stance permanently adds to the number of the problems in-
volved in the decentralization of the world's international
credit system. It accounts in part for the fundamental doubt
entertained in other countries concerning the continued avail-
ability of credit facilities in New York of the type that could
be relied upon in London before the war.
modities whose values were most seriously affected by price dedines, must be
at least in part attributed to the behavior of the peso. Inelastic, rigid, uncon-
trolled, and subject to numerous other theoretical objections, the peso has
sustained an extraordinarily constant level of prices. This is probably the
greatest single advantage that a currency can possess.A DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 599
The Capacity of New York to be an International Money
Market, Summary
The great strength of the London market before the war lay
in its possession of the capacity to perform the two primary
functions of an international money market—to be a market
place for the conclusion of international transactions and to
extend credit, and therefore to perform the derivative func-
tions of such a market—to provide the means for temporary
employment of international funds and to serve as a custom-
ary channel of international remittance. The performance of
each international money market function forwards the per-
formance of the others and when they have been rendered
for a long period by a given center an immense institutional
momentum tends to perpetuate the rendering of these services
by that center even when its capacity to do so is impaired. The
fact that New York was second in the field had a bearing on
all its efforts to make itself into an international money mar-
ket of the first rank. New York was not able to and in the
nature of things could not attain the completeness of the
London market. At most it could share the field in very un-
equal degree in the various departments of international fi-
nancial activity, and at the cost of the technical disadvantages
inherent in a decentralization of international clearance.
The special circumstances that have been passed in review
contributed to the unequal development of the various ele-
ments of capacity of the New York money market to be an
international money market. These various elements of Ca-
pacity may be summarized and commented upon as follows:
i)Thepossession of a volume of savings and banking resources
sufficient to carry out time-bridging credit operations of an in-
ternalional character;
2) The possession of banking facilities adequate for the proper
administration of a revolving fund of deposits for financing in-
ternational transactions.
These first and most obvious requirements of an6oo EXPERIMENTATION
tional money market were adequately met by the New York
market. They were indeed present in excess, for New York
as a great international money market was born and devel-
oped in an inflationary setting.
3) The possession of a geographical location and the technical
equipment necessary to provide international markets in com-
modities, and in various types of service, such as ship chartering,
and in securities;
4) The possession of a favorable balance of payments in goods,
services, and current payments arising from past international in-
debtedness.
These two elements of capacity are fundamental. The first
is responsible for the breadth of the international relations of
the market. The second is the foundation of its power to ex-
tend international credits without imperiling its own ex-
changes, often referred to above by such terms as 'strong
underlying position' or 'the possession of a basic pull over the
exchanges.' The international money market in New York
was created under circumstances in which the first of these
elements of capacity was only partly exploited and developed.
The second was present throughout, but after 1922,anun-
usual and complicating factor was also present—a large and
continuous import of capital into the United States as a result
of private investment and private dealings in securities other
than new foreign issues.
Thepossession of the power to attract the resources of others
for employment in the performance of part of these international
functions through the creation and maintenance of markets for
attractive short term instruments of investment;
6) The possession of the technical equipment and ability neces-
sary to harmonize the size and flow of balancing financial items
in the total balance of payments with the essential need for them.
These two elements of capacity we have referred to at times
as the surface pull of the money market over the exchanges.
The power of an international money market to alter the
flow of funds internationally by reducing the current creationA DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 6oi
of present deposits and future claims, while allowing past
claims to accumulate, is dependent upon the responsiveness
of the amount of foreign and domestic funds employed in
international financial transactions in the market to changes
in interest rates or other forms of control. The exercise of
this control in a manner contributing to international finan-
cial stability, moreover, involves the resolution, in some man-
ner, of conflicts arising between internal domestic credit re-
quirements and the special international responsibilities as-
sumed by the market. In both these respects the circumstances
under which New York became an international money mar-
ket were unfortunate. The competitive relations between the
New York and London short term credit markets complicated
one aspect of the problem and the continental background
of the New York money market complicated the other. The
new and untried nature of the financial instruments and
techniques developed in New York for carrying out its inter-
national responsibilities complicated them both.
7) The possession of the confidence of the whole international
trading and financial world.
During the period when the international money market
in New York was being created America enjoyed the immense
prestige of being the only country on the gold standard.
Moreover, America had great credit resources and enormous
real wealth. Together with an earnest desire on the part of
the New York market to assume international financial re-
sponsibilities, these factors contributed to the creation of
confidence. But this confidence did not extend in all respects
to the banking practices and techniques developed in the
New York market. There was always an element of doubt as
to the solidity of the new international banker-customer re-
lationships established in New York—an element of doubt
that could be eliminated only by long years of successful ex-
perience in their administration.
All these elements of capacity are mutually dependent and602 EXPERIMENTATION
intricately interrelated. Together they contribute to a final
element of capacity.
8) The possession for a broad foreign exchange market with
many countries that can provide a general instrument of inter-
national clearance and an habitual channel of international re-
mittance.
The continued use of the sterling-dollar exchange as the
'trunk-line' rate for the Empire and the continent of Europe
and even for certain other countries, notably Japan, China,
and Argentina, in their dealings in New York was evidence
of the failure of the New York market to develop this charac-
teristic of a central international money market. Conse-
quently, the impact of all the elements of international in-
stability arising from the sum total of the international trans-
actions of the United States was instantly and directly felt in
London.CHAPTER 19
The Experiment of Defending Sterling
In the thirty-five years from i88o to 1914 sterling was on an
average below par in New York in only ten, and above par in
twent:y-five. In the twenty-seven years from i888 to 1914, the
average annual rate was below par only four times. In striking
contrast, the only year between 1925 and 1931 in which the
annual average rate was above par was 1928,whenit was
4.8666 (Table 49). From the moment of the return to gold,
TABLE49
Sterling-Dollar Exchange, 1880-1914 and 1925-1931
AnnualAverage Rates
i8So.1.8490 i8go4.8703 19004.8717 19104.8676 19254.8310
i88i4.8460 iSgi4.8677 19014.8786 19114.8660 19264.8589
18824.8757 18924.8777 19024.8764 19124.8701 19274.8616
1883.1.8543 18934.8704 19034.8682 19134.8678 19284.8666
18844.8590 18944.8819 19044.8717 19144.8844 19294.8568
18854.8597 18954.8944 19054.8663 19304.8625




Thepre-war figures were compiled by A. C. Silverman from the National Mone-
tary Commission reports and other sources; the post-war figures were compiled
from Tue Economist; cf. Table 57.
the Bank of England was continually resisting a tendency to
lose gold,' though Great Britain was still the greatest creditor
country in the world and the British international banking
system was still without a peer. In the examination of the
operation of the gold bullion standard in Great Britain after
1925, there are therefore three threads to be followed—the
1Committeeon Finance and Industry(MacmillanCommittee), Report
('93'),Cmd. 3897, p.70.
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causes of this pressure on sterling, the techniques by which
it was combated, and the progress made toward its elimina-
tion.
The Weakening of Great Britain's Basic Pull over the
Exchanges
Aside from the war-time reduction in British overseas invest-
ments, two major groups of causes contributed to the under-
lying weakness of sterling—those growing out of the imper-
fect adaptation of Great Britain to new competitive condi-
tions and those directly connected with the restoration of the
international gold standard system.
The Phenomenon of 'Unsheltered' Trades
After the return to gold in 1925 British trade and industry
were by no means uniformly inactive or unprofitable.2 Pro-
fessor Bowley's index of earnings showed a fall of only about
1 per cent from December 1924 to December 1929 in com-
parison with a fall of about 8 per cent in the cost of living,
indicating that real wages for those employed were rising.
Production also was increasing, but relatively to the rest of
the world British industry was depressed and the number of
unemployed remained steady at about a million.3 This persis-
tent unemployment was very unevenly distributed among the
various sectors of the British economy and was highly con-
centrated in the chief export industries,4 which had become
known as the 'unsheltered' trades.
INFLUENCE OF LONG RUN TRENDS
The difficulties of the 'unsheltered' trades which had come
rapidly to the forefront of discussion after July 1924were
from 1925 to 1931bothchronic and acute. In Chapter ii we
2Ibid.,Lord Bradhury's Minute of Dissent, p. 277.. 8 Ibid.,p. 47.
It had begun after the war in the munitions industries, and by the time of
the Macmillan investigations, had spread to building, public works, and road
transport. Memorandum of Henry Clay, Minutes of Evidence(Macmillan
Committee), II, 253.
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have indicated the attitude taken by the Balfour Report
towa:rd this old ° problem in the greatly accentuated form it
assumed after the war but before the return to gold. The
relatively optimistic conclusion of that report with respect to
the future of British trade was based upon three postulates
which may be briefly repeated:
1)In an international trade based upon quality Great Britain
is in a strong competitive position;
2) The growth of new industry creates new wants and therefore
new trade;
3) Great Britain is a tremendous consuming market of the prod-
ucts of other countries and, therefore, is in a peculiarly advan-
tageous position for receiving her share of exports.
In 1925 British industry had not yet adjusted itself suffi-
ciently to take advantage of the first of these circumstances.
The long run effects of the second, also involving great read-
justrrients in British industry, had not had time to work them-
selves out, and not until after the second breakdown of the
gold standard was full advantage taken of the third.7 The
hopes of the Balfour Committee were therefore disappointed.
industry was very slow to recognize its new position
and to adapt itself to the long run economic trends described
in Chapter 7. As late as 1930 Professor Clay was able to write
in the Memorandum already referred to (p. 253)
[the war] rendered profit-making easy, and so deterred in-
dustry from making the normal and necessary adjustment to the
continuous technical, commercial and competitive change that
would have gone on even if there had been no war; with the re-
suit that, when the post-War boom ended, there was six years'
adjustment to be made all at once. In the case of the coal and
heavy industries, the necessity of this adjustment was further de-
6Thehistorical origins of the difficulties of British 'unsheltered' trades go
back to fundamental changes in world trade in the 1870's. Cf. L. H. Jenks, The
Migration of British Capital to 1875(Knopf,1927), pp. 327—31.
7 The third circumstance was, of course, extremely important in the formation
of the sterling area. It was, however, not specifically taken advantage of until
the conclusion of the Ottawa Agreements and the other bilateral trade agree-
ment; after the breakdown of 1931. Cf. Ch.Cultivating England's Garden.6o6 EXPERIMENTATION
ferred by the misfortunes of Germany until 1924 or 1925. It may
be doubted whether even now all the industries that are faced
with an entirely new situation compared with pre-War realize
the need of reorganization to meet it.
Among the changes to which adjustment of this kind is neces-
sary, and has been delayed, are the decline in birth-rate all over
the world, slowing down of rate of growth of industries supplying
necessaries; the shift of expenditure from necessaries to luxuries,
helped by the reduction in the size of families; the decline of sav-
ing; fuel economy affecting the coal industry; disarmament affect-
ing heavy steel and ship-building."
ACCELERATION OF TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCE, ESPECIALLY IN THE
UNITED STATES, AFTER 1925
One reason for the urgency of radical measures of reorganiza-
tion in the British export industries was the failure of Great
Britain to keep fully abreast of technological advances con-
tinuously taking place in competing countries, particularly
in the United States after 1925. Both W. W. Stewart and 0.
M. W. Sprague, who in turn served as economic advisers to
the Bank of England, tried to impress upon the Macmillan
Committee the view that since the difficulties of the export
industries were the result of their failure to reduce costs and
redistribute labor and capital in the new proportions re-
quired, they could not be cured by any monetary means. Pro-
fessor Sprague even went so far as to say that if the economic
remedy was not applied the country would suffer decline or
revolution.8
THE RETURN OF THE RUHR TO PRODUCTION
The unsheltered trades of Great Britain had enjoyed during
the Restoration period one temporary respite of major im-
portance—reduced German competition because of the dis-
organization of production in the Ruhr—but this ended with
the stabilization of the mark and the beginnings of the flow
8Minutesof Evidence (Macmillan Committee), II, 185—6,309, especiallyan-
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of foreign capital to Germany. The return of the Ruhr to
production was the decisive factor in British unemployment
in 1925, and would in any event have added to the difficulty
of defending sterling, but it was the strike of 1926 that, by
stimulating competing sources of supply, made Ruhr compe-
tition. the dominating influence in British unemployment
throughout the period of Experimentation.9 Not only was the
British coal strike important, as we have shown, in the Be!-
gian and Italian stabilizations, and a primary factor in the
history of the consolidation of the gold standard in Germany,
but ii: weakened Great Britain's basic pull over the exchanges
and undermined her position in the central nucleus of the
gold standard world.
THE EFFORT TO FACE THE BASIC PROBLEM OF INDUSTRIAL RE-
CONSTRUCTION
In ad.dition to the causes suggested above, certain general con-
ditions peculiar to the British economy contributed to rela-
tively high costs of production. Among them were the addi-
tions to costs represented by the evolution of the unemploy-
meni: insurance scheme into a relief scheme and the weight of
taxation. These diminished the amount of profits added to
reserve, which had been the chief source of British pre-war
capital accumulation. Finally, the difficulty of reducing costs
was greatly increased because money rates of wages were main-
tained though the cost of living was declining.
Countless examples of the failure of British costs to meet
those of competitors may be cited.'° Yet some progress was
being made toward a basic readjustment. For an objective
appraisal of that progress and of the road still to be traveled,
one cannot do better than quote again from Professor Clay's
Memorandum (pp. 254—6):
°Cf.ibid., p. 185, especially answer to question 7635; cf. also Henry Clay,
bc
10E.g.,those mentioned in Brown, op. cit., pp. 247—8, in Mr. Bevin's evidence
before the Macmillan Committee, and in J. M. Keynes, The Economic Con-
sequences of Mr. Churchill.6o8 EXPERIMENTATION
"The 9 per cent of unemployment that persisted through all
other changes from 1921 to 1929 I should attribute...tothe
dislocation by war of the adjustment of British industry to world
demands, and to the delay in affecting a readjustment to the
changed post-War demands. Much has been done—the demobili-
sation of the munitions industries; the big reduction in costs
(other than by reduction of wage-rates) in coal, iron and steel,
engineering and shipbuilding, and, to a less extent, in textiles;
the development of a number of new industries, and the reor-
ganisation of some old industries; the writing off of large amounts
of indebtedness incurred during the boom or subsequently—but
our dependence on external trade remains substantial, and our
costs in competitive industries are still so high, compared with
other countries, that we tend to be the marginal producer, the
first to be squeezed out when anything affects demand.
The dislocation from which British industry has suffered since
1920 is so much greater than any dislocation caused by trade
fluctuation, as to differ almost in kind; but it can be cured only
by the same kind of readjustments as brought about trade recov-
ery before the War. The income-receivers who employ British in-
dustry have reduced their spending on its products, either because
its prices are too high or because investment in its products does
not offer an attractive enough return. Recovery can be effected
only by getting its prices down, by reducing costs; or finding new
outlets for the employment of labour, in which prices can be
obtained which will cover the costs. The diversion of industry to
new directions, however, takes time and initially would probably
require lower wage standards; it could not be carried far enough
to remove the specific post-war unemployment in less than a
generation; and it involves the scrapping of the skill and capital
specialised to the industries in which at present our prices are
too high to permit full employment, and our costs too high to
encourage investment."
Difficulties attributable to the Return to Gold Itself
These serious, non-monetary causes of pressure on sterling
were aggravated after 1925 by several special difficulties aris-
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which the stabilization principles of the Brussels Conference
of 1920werefinally put into effect.
THE OVERVALUATION OF THE POUND
In returning to gold on the basis of the old parity with the
dollar Great Britain deliberately assumed the burdens en-
tailed by an overvaluation of sterling against the dollar. The
architects of the return to gold admitted that a certain read-
justment of British prices downward would be required, but
the official opinion was that this could be easily accomplished
and that the burdens entailed would be small relative to the
general advantages of the return to gold at the old rate. The
subject is dealt with in the Report of the Committee on Cur-
rency and Bank of England Note Issues (sec. 20):
"..theadjustment of price levels required to restore and main-
tain pre-war parity needs to be only some 11/2percent larger
than that required to hold the exchange at its present rate. If
the adjustment of price levels necessary to attain this end is long
deferred, the exchange will inevitably fall back to the rate justi-
fied by comparative price levels—or below it, since the psycho-
logical causes which have operated to force it up will tend to act
in the other direction—and a period of fluctuating values is likely
to ensue. To allow the exchange to fall back now, with the cer-
of having later on to raise it again, would be a short-sighted
policy injurious to trade and industry. But, if this view is ac-
cepted and we are prepared to face any price adjustment which
may be necessary to maintain the present exchange rate, there is
nothing to be said for refusing to accept the very small (11/2 per
cent)extra adjustment involved in the re-establishment of an
effe:tive gold standard."
Ii: was the opinion of competent witnesses before the Mac-
milian Committee that in the main the adjustments required
by this overvaluation were accomplished shortly after the
return to gold. The following testimony of Walter Stewart
before that Committee presents this view (questions 76 14—
19):
"Haveyou anything to say on the appropriateness of the time6io EXPERIMENTATION
and manner of the return to the gold standard in this country?
—There is never a perfectly appropriate time for doing an in-
convenient thing, but I do not feel that postponement would
have reduced the difficulty of readjustment. 'The manner,' I take
it, refers chiefly to the question of the parity on return?
Yes?—On that, I feel that this country had no real alternative.
The degree to which sterling was below par in the years imme-
diately preceding the return was not of sufficient magnitude to
be a determining factor in the competitive position of British
industry subsequent to the return. I say 'subsequent' because
after the return to gold in this country the return of France and
Belgium to gold at relatively very much lower rates of exchange
meant that even if there had been, say, ten per cent devaluation
in sterling most of the problems that have to do with money
costs in industry in this country compared with industry in France
and Belgium would have been very much the same.
So that in your view the sooner it was got over the better, so
to speak?—It was a question not only of getting over, but of get-
ting forward. The general return to gold, in which this country
took the lead, by making the decision that it did in 1925,restored
confidence and laid the basis for foreign investment and capital
expenditure all over the world. It was not merely that prices in
gold standard countries began to move in unison, but capital and
enterprise were willing to go into countries where they never
would have assumed the risk if there had not been a stable cur-
rency.
So the step has your approval?—Yes.
At the same time I suppose the readjustment consequent upon
the return to the gold standard has been one of the difficulties
with which we have been faced?—I quite agree. The extent of•
those difficulties depends upon the length of time, after the re-
turn to gold, during which the adjustments required by that
particular change were made.
You think it has expired now?—I should think that by the
end of 1925,sofar as the effects of that particular adjustment are
concerned, it had been completed."
In this testimony the important distinction is stressed be-
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dollar and the subsequent difficulties arising from the French
and Belgian stabilizations.
THE DEPRECIATION OF THE FRENCH AND BELGIAN FRANCS SUBSE-
QUENT TO THE BRITISH RETURN TO GOLD
In another part of the published evidence before the Mac-
millan Committee appears the following exchange between
Governor Norman and Lord Macmillan concerning the ap-
propriateness of the date chosen for the return to gold (ques-
tions 3353—63)
"Was that [i.e. the opinion that April 1925wasan appropriate
time to return to gold] because the circumstances as they were
then conceived were thought to render the change as little dis-
turbing as possible?—As little disturbing as possible, and the
fact that a decision at that moment had to be taken to go either
to the right or to the left.
But were not the hopes that the change would be made with
the least possible disturbance to a large extent falsified—in short,
those who thought that the time was apposite and who prophe-
sied that the change could be made with comparatively little
disturbance were Out ifl their calculations, because it turned Out
in the event that it did cause very considerable disturbance, either
by itself or in association with those other causes. You see what
I mean?—Yes.
It may be quite true that a person says now is the moment to
do a thing, now is the most favourable moment, and that is, of
course, a judgment proceeding upon a survey of the whole posi-
tion. Those who came to that decision may have been wrong in
their survey, or things may have occurred to falsify their predic-
tion?-—I should think it was true that some of the events which
occurred in association with or subsequent to that change were
unexpected in regard to time and extent, and have made the
position of industry as you have described it more difficult than
was foreseen. I have not the exact sequence of events very clearly
in my mind; it was some years ago—but that is the impression I
have.
That is how it appears to me following up Mr. Bevin's point,
that if all had turned out as was expected, or shall I say, hoped,612 EXPERIMENTATION
the disturbance with which he and those associated with him were
confronted would have been much less serious?—! agree.
But in consequence of the other causes that have conspired
since that time to falsify that expectation the result has been, in
fact, very serious?—.—Very serious for industry.
And if these circumstances which have supervened had been
foreseen it may be that you would not have reverted to the gold
standard at the time you did?—! will not say that.
That is, of course, speculation?—Yes.
Mr. Keynes: May we ask what those other circumstances were?
—I think they were very largely France and Belgium—the stabili-
sation of France and Belgium.
Their return to the gold standard?—Yes, at certain levels. Ger-
many, for that matter, too. As I remember it those were the prin-
cipal questions.
You mean their stabilising their money at a low level rather
than at a high level?—At a very low level.
Mr. Newbold: What do you think induced them to do that at
a very low level while we did it at a high level?—I do not know.
I think the levels they chose were largely fortuitous."
This colloquy has a double significance: it contains a rec-
ôgnition by the Bank of England of the serious consequences
of an overvaluation of the pound and a strong implication
that even had the subsequent history of the French and Bel-
gian francs been foreseen, the date of the British return to
gold and the choice of the old par would not have been
altered. The foundations of that choice were far too deeply
laid in the character of British banks and British bankers,
and in the traditional policies of British government.'1
MACMILLAN COMMITTEE SUMMARY
It is extremely difficult to measure the influence of the under-
and overvaluation of currencies at the time of stabilization
upon the subsequent course of events. There has been general
"Cf. Ch. 9, The Recognition and Measurement of the Problem by Great
Britain. In another part of his testimony Governor Norman again stressed
the importance of the expiry of the Gold and Silver (Export Control) Act
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agreement, however, that the difficulties that placed the Bank
of England upon the defensive in maintaining sterling after
1925werepartly due to the initial overvaluation of sterling
and to the stabilization of the reichsmark, the franc, and the
belga. at levels favorable to German, French, and Belgian ex-
port industries. The cautious statement of the Macmillan
Committee on this point is probably as definite an appraisal
as can be safely given:
"Great Britain established a gold-parity which meant that her
existing level of sterling incomes and costs was relatively too high
in terms of gold, so that, failing a downward adjustment, those
of her industries which are subject to foreign competition were
put at an artificial disadvantage. France and Belgium, on the
other hand, somewhat later established a gold-parity which, pend-
ing an upward adjustment of their wages and other costs in terms
of francs, gave an artificial advantage to their export industries.
Other countries provide examples of an intermediate character.
Thus the distribution of foreign trade, which would correspond
to the relative efficiencies of different countries for different pur-
poses, has been seriously disturbed from the equilibrium position
corresponding to the normal relations between their costs in
terms of gold.•••" 12
THEBRITISH ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT TO THE RETURN TO GOLD
The price difficulties created by the choice of various levels
of currency stabilization in the general process of returning
to gold were only part of the explanation of the weakness of
sterling from 1925 to 1931. Their relation to, and relative
importance in comparison with, the more deep-seated diffi-
culties of British export trade is clearly set forth in the testi-
mon.y before the Macmillan Committee by Dr. Stewart (ques-
non; 7621—5 and 7633—5):
12 p.io6. The statement as here quoted is taken from its context where
it forms a part of a general interpretation of the difficulties encountered in
operating the gold standard after 1925.Itis not given here as representative
of the broad view of the Committee on the whole problem, but only to indi-
cate their acceptance of the fact of relative under- and overvaluations of
currencies as an element in weakening the position of Great Britain.614 EXPERIMENTATION
"Mr. Keynes: You think at the end of 1925 our wages were ad-
justed to the situation?—No; I think that with the movements of
finance and of commodity prices, there had been adjustment by
the end of 1925.
The prices of international commodities must make adjust-
ment on the next day. One is really thinking of those commodities
which are not the subject of international trade?—If one refers
to the competitive level of money costs and local costs I should
regard the further depreciation of the franc, both in France and
Belgium, as a much more serious factor in affecting the competi-
tive costs of industry in this country than the further appreciation
of sterling which was necessary to bring the pound to par. When
I refer to the end of 1925 I mean before the franc's further de-
preciation during 1926.
What had happened before the end of 1925 to make our ad-
justment complete? We had increased the value of our money, we
had not by that date increased our efficiency or diminished our
money costs?—You had brought the financial position into line
with the financial position in other countries.
What do you mean by 'the financial position in other coun-
tries'?—The general balance of payments as affected by short
money and long money.
But we had not brought costs into line?—No. I had not re-
garded that as being primarily a financial question. If the return
of sterling to par was expected to bring about an entire readjust-
ment of costs between the different countries, then the adjust-
ment has not been completed.
Chairman: What have you to say in regard to the figure of io
per cent that has been spoken of, as a measure, so to speak, of the
readjustment?—I have no real basis for measuring the extent of
adjustment required if both finance and industry are included.
I quite agree with the statement made a moment ago, that the
measure of the full problem was the measure of your relative
money costs. The adjustment to the return to gold that appeared
to be necessary then, because the dollar was the only gold cur-
rency, was an adjustment to the American situation. Subsequent
adjustments, which became more difficult, were adjustments to
the Continent. There were factors which obscured the real prob-
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put the German economic machine out of action, gave an appear-
ance of industrial strength to this country which was really arti-
ficial. The subsequent depreciation of the franc in 1926 gave
sterling an appearance of financial strength at that time which
was really artificial. That, I think, obscured the reality of the
competitive position, and made it appear that all that was neces-
sary was to adjust to the American position. I think it was not
possible at that time to have foreseen the extent to which the
French franc would fall.
So:, if one is judging the wisdom and propriety of the return to
the gold standard as and when it took place it scarcely seems fair
to form a judgment in the light of what has happened since?—I
agree.
M:r. Keynes: Your argument is that the position was really worse
than it looked? That is to say, that we were not in 1925 as strong
as we seemed to be, that the events in the Ruhr strengthened us.
Therefore, this burden of io per cent was not on top of a good
situation but on top of a situation which was worse than people
thought it was?—It was worse than it looked to most publicists at
the time, and they therefore ascribed the subsequent difficulties to
the return to gold rather than to the return of the Ruhr to pro-
duction. In other words, I believe there would have been a coal
stoppage in this country in 1926 whether you had returned to
gold or not. It was the return of the Ruhr to production which
was the decisive factor in 1925. In 1925 most of the increased
unemployment in this country was in the coal industry. There
would have been an increase in unemployment, and you would
have had a coal problem, whether you had returned to gold or
not. Further, when you speak of the situation having been worse
than was anticipated, I think it would have become increasingly
worse if you had not returned to gold in 1925."
British Capital Exports and the Amount Available for
Investment Overseas
The Relation of Capital Export to Goods Export
Because of this situation the placing of new foreign capital
issues in London after 1925 did not have the effect of stimu-
lating British trade to the extent that was true before the war.6i6 EXPERIMENTATION
Great Britain was no longer the cheapest or most convenient
market in which to spend the proceeds of British foreign
loans. In Chapter 12 we noted that this lack of direct connec-
tion between capital export and goods export had raised the
question of over-lending from 1922 to 1924, and had led to the
imposition of the embargo on new issues for foreign countries,
and the partial embargo on colonial issues, the effects of which
were shown in Table 32. In November 1925 this embargo was
lifted, but the dilemma that had led to its imposition re-
mained. The position of the export trades required all the
stimulation that could be drawn from foreign loans, but the
loss of direct connection between new lending and new ex-
port orders made that lending dangerous from a balance of
payments point of view. A powerful sanction therefore existed
for insisting upon the spending of the proceeds of British
loans at home. Other pressures, however, worked against this
tendency. The general interest of Great Britain in complet-
ing the process of post-war currency stabilization and general
reconstruction was still strong and her response to the demand
for cooperation in that process through loans was still to be
depended on. The City, moreover, was directly interested in
maintaining its position as the world's banker against the in-
creasing competition of Wall Street and was also subject to the
general financial factors that always lead to new loans in a
period of optimism.
New British Foreign Lending, 1925—1929
Inthe last two months of 1925 new issues for foreign countries
reappeared in the London market, especially Italian and Ger-
man industrial issues, and some Argentine loans. In 1926 for-
eign government issues again began to be placed, and Empire
borrowing again reached the levels of the Restoration period.
In spite of internal industrial trouble and an unprecedented
adverse merchandise trade balance, overseas lending began
in 1926 to approach that of 1922—24. It increased throughout
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very close correlation with the changes in industrial condi-
tions at home. British industry was becoming less able to carry
on the old traditions of self-financing and a demand was grow-
ing for a better organization of the new issues market to meet
the needs of domestic borrowers. Before the war four-fifths of
the new issues in London were for overseas purposes, but after
1925 overseas issues were only about two-fifths of the total
according to figures published by the Midland Bank. While






New York was hastily improvising a new market for foreign
issues, London was failing 14toadapt itself to a relative de-
cline in the importance of its foreign issue business. At no
time during these years did Great Britain approach her pre-
TABLE 50
New Foreign Capital Applications in London
1925 -.1928 (millions of pounds)
1925 1926 1927 1928
TotalOverseas 87.8 112.4 138.7 143.3
BritishCommonwealth 57.5 52.0 87.7 86.i
India and Ceylon 3.4 2.i [.4 7.7
Australia and New Zealand 25.5 31.5 41.0 34.7
Canada and Newfoundland 2.0 6.o 7.0 20.0
Africa 15.0 6.5 28.0 16.5
Asia other than India or Ceylon i1.0 5.0 5.0 4.3
Foreign Countries 30.4 60.4 50.9 57.3
Europe 11.0 24.8 21.5 33.8
South America 14.0 26.5 26.0 19.8
Other 5.4 9.1 3.4 3.6
Germany 6.o 7.0 8.3
souRcE:MidlandBank, MonthlyReview,Dec. 1928—Jan.1929,pp. 7-8; Dec.
1926--Jan.1927, pp.3-4
13MidlandBank, Monthly Review, February—March 1929,p.6.
Cf. Macmillan Report, pp. i6i if.6i8 EXPERIMENTATION
war status as a provider of capital for employment overseas.'5
The annual totals of new foreign capital applications in Lon-
don and their geographical distribution for 1925—28 (Table
50) are in striking contrast to the corresponding figures for
the United States. The role of the two countries as interna-
tional lenders may be roughly compared by placing the Mid-
land Bank figures by the side of those of the Commercial and
Financial Chronicle for the United States, though because
of the exclusion of offers of vendors' shares and short term an-
ticipatory borrowings from the Midland Bank figures, this
may somewhat underestimate the British share.
Wew Foreign Lending exclusive of Refunding 16(millionsof dollars)
1925 1926 1927 1928
British 406 546 673 696
American r,o86 1,145 1,561 1,348
British as a percentage of American 36.4 47.7 43.1 52.4
GreatBritain's participation in the great mass of long term
European and South American lending following the return
to gold was relatively small. Of the British total for the four
years 58.8 per cent went to the Empire, and of this Australia
took 46.6 per cent. The very moderate amount of long term
loans to Germany and the relative importance of stabilization
loans, such as those to Belgium and Poland in 1926, were no-
table features of British capital export to Europe. Through-
out the period Argentina and Brazil continued to be steady
borrowers, but British lending to South America showed no
such rising trend as that of the United States (Table 46).
Steadiness and moderation seem to be the characteristics of
British long term foreign lending when compared with Amer-
ican foreign lending, but not when it is considered in relation
to the amount available for investment overseas.
15MidlandBank, Monthly Review, December 1926—January 1927,p.
'°TheAmerican figures (Commercial and Financial Chronicle, Vol. 128, Part
1,p.316) are, of course,muchsmaller than the all-inclusive figures based on
Dr. Winkler's lists used for another purpose in Ch.i8, The One-Way
American Banking System inits Relation to American Foreign Lending
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The Amount available for Investment Overseas
The outstanding features of the Board of Trade estimates of
the British balance of international payments from 1925 to
1929 were the heavy excess of imports over exports of goods,
and the small margin available for foreign lending. That a
fundamental change as compared to pre-war conditions had
taken place in the merchandise items is shown by the figures
for volume, rather than value. According to the Midland
Bank the volume of imports in 1925 was ii 1.5 per cent of
1913, and of exports only 76.0 per cent of 1913. In value, im-
port:; of both raw materials and manufactured goods in-
creased heavily in 1925. The import of meat and manufac-
tured iron products increased notably. The latter item, in
conjunction with a decline in coal and iron and steel exports,
provided a measure of the difficulties of the unsheltered
trades in the year of the return to gold.17
During 1925 the statement was often made in England that
the country must actually be living on its capital, because the
current invisible credits were not fully offsetting the net mer-
chandise debit, but subsequent revisions of the Board of
Trade estimates disclosed £54 million available for invest-
ment abroad. In 1926 the preliminary figures again seemed
to justify similar statements. That year was dominated by the
coal and general strikes. For the first time England imported
coal, to the extent of £43 million, and exported £34 million
less than in 1925. Total imports fell £80 million but total ex-
ports fell £150 million. In the final estimates a record adverse
merchandise balance of £477 million seemed to be fully covered
by current invisible credits, but only a nominal amount, £9
million, was left over for overseas investment. In 1927 the con-
sequences of industrial disputes were still being felt. Although
imports fell and exports rose the surplus of imports was still
unusually heavy, £388 million. Some improvement in ship-
ping income and a continued return from foreign invest-
17 Midland Bank, Monthly Review, January—February 1926, p. 6.620 EXPERIMENTATION
ments at a higher level than in 1925, together with the reduc-
tion in the merchandise adverse balance, however, combined
to give a surplus available for investment overseas of £114
million. The trends in the merchandise trade of 1927 contin-
ued in 1928 and in spite of a slight drop in invisible items, the
surplus for foreign investment reached £137 million (revised
figure, £149 million). Nevertheless, this was still far below
pre-war. In 1929 the current items in the British balance of
payments changed only slightly, and the surplus available
for investment overseas was approximately at the level of the
preceding year.
Statistical Evidence of British Over-lending
The Midland Bank figures of new overseas lending regularly
exceeded the Board of Trade figures of the amount available
for investment overseas from 1924 to 1928. These two esti-
mates were published by the Macmillan Committee in Ap-
pendix IV of its Report in such a way as to bring out the
contrast very clearly, though not as part of a single table in
which the new foreign lending is a balancing item. In the
Board of Trade figures the excess of imports of merchandise
and bullion is set over against net government receipts from
overseas, national shipping income, income from overseas in.-
vestments, receipts from short interest and commissions and
other sources. The net credit balance resulting is compared
with the figures for new foreign loans (millions of pounds)
in the accompanying table.
CREDIT BALANCE CREDIT BALANCE
ON OTHER NEW ON OTHER NEW
BALANCE OFFOREIGN BALANCE OF FOREIGN
PAYMENTS ITEMSLOANS PAYMENTS ITEMS LOANS
1924 86 134 1927 114 139
1925 54 88 1928 137 143
1926 9 112 1929 138 94
1930 39 109
Theseestimates have frequently been quoted together as di-
rect evidence of over-lending.18 Though far from conclusive,
18 E.g., by H. E. Fraser, Great Britain and the Gold Standard (London, Mac-
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they undoubtedly show that the weakness of Great Britain's
basic pull over the exchanges, combined with her effort to
maintain her position as an international lender from 1925
to 1928, made the attraction of foreign balances and the sale
of securities to foreigners of the greatest importance in main-
taining her position as a gold standard country. The problems
raised by this situation cannot be satisfactorily dealt with ex-
cept in the light of the new techniques employed by the Lon-
don money market in exercising its surface pull over the ex-
changes.
Changes in Money Market Technique
The gold standard was defended after 1925 by a money mar-
ket technique that in all its externals appeared to be the same
as that employed before the war. Instead of spectacular new
types of organization or newly invented machinery, there were
merely modifications of practice. Yet these, when considered
as a whole, produced a subtle but pervasive change, the im-
portance of which for the interpretation of the post-war gold
standard cannot be exaggerated.
Competition and Monopoly in the London Money Market
THE DOCTRINE OF THE USUAL CHANNELS
The business of the London money market is conducted on
the basis of oral agreements, with a minimum of formal cor-
respondence. The men in the market do not change as readily
from one connection to another as they do in other markets.
This is one of those extremely important non-statistical facts
that must be given weight in discussions of money market
technique, for it is a force making for the type of stability
that. goes with 'old-established' institutions and methods. It
has been said that it is one of the characteristics of the peculiar
British business genius that when, by a process of trial and
error, a method of doing a given type of business has been
worked out that in general gives satisfactory results, the busi-
ness community stops at this point and continues to use that622 EXPERIMENTATION
method as long as it proves serviceable. It was by such a proc-
ess of finding the appropriate means of carrying out its busi-
ness and stopping short when it was found that the monopoly
element in the London market had its origin and sanction.
The internal organization of the London money market is
evidence of the British conviction that international banking
cannot be carried out under a complete laissez-faire system.
In connection with the discount market proper it is correct
to say that the monopoly element was and is enforced by the
Bank of England. In 1933therewere twenty-two acceptance
houses in London. There could be no more, for the Bank of
England would not discount the bills of any other acceptance
house. Since that date the number has been somewhat re-
duced by amalgamations and increased by the admission to
discount at the Bank of England of certain 'purchase' paper,
that is, the bills of firms employed in the finance of install-
merit sales. The principle of strict limitation of the number
of houses by the customary sanctions has, however, not been
infringed. Similarly, the Bank of England will not permit
the establishment of new discount houses unless it is to re-
place one that has gone out of business.
In general, however, the monopoly in the London market
is one of clients based upon traditional connections. This has
brought with it a geographical division in the field of business
also. It is not now (1939), and was not before the first world
war, rigid and inflexible. But it was, and is still in somewhat
less degree, a hard fact to be reckoned with. In order to de-
scribe it without exaggeration, yet with due recognition of
its importance, we call it the Doctrine of the Usual Channels.
The Doctrine of the Usual Channels did not come to be
observed in the London money market because it was in the
public interest. It was not a hard and fast principle established
by agreement. It was respected simply because, from a private
business point of view, it had been shown to be profitable
and safe. One of the reasons, for example, for the development
of a London tradition under which various merchant bankersA DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 623
respected the field of activity of other merchant bankers was
that capital issues had often come into the market for the pur-
pose of taking up short term advances made by merchant
banking houses directly or through the discount market. It
was natural for the discount market to look for the short term
borrowing from the same sources that customarily arranged
the ]ong term issues. Respect for the usual channels was es-
pecially marked in the issue business. The founders of
Hambro's, for example, were originally Danes, and the Dan-
ish business has always been regarded as belonging to them,
though this does not mean that new Danish borrowers who
had not previously approached the London market might
not use some other house. Baring's had the Russian and Ar-
gentine connection, Rothschild's the Spanish connection.
Many other examples might be cited. The division of the
field, of business in this way was not limited to the underwrit-
ing of foreign issues but extended to the acceptance business
also, although in less degree. The word would go out among
the drawers that so and so knows the cotton business. "You
won't have to explain to them what form of insurance policy
is used and the usual trade customs and so forth. It saves
a lot of time and troublesome explanation to get credit from
them." This was a cumulative and genetic process and by it
a particular acceptor became the recognized channel for cer-
tain. types of bills.If, therefore, a London house had for
many decades specialized in a particular country or in a par-
ticular type of business, such as foreign treasury bills, it could
he assumed that the transaction had been carefully looked
into and, as far as the judgment of that house could guaran-
tee it, was safe. Powerful considerations of self-interest, there-
fore, developed this important type of monopoly in an
otherwise intensely competitive market. It is, moreover, a
characteristic British attitude, as expressed to us in interviews
abroad, to cling to the Doctrine of the Usual Channels be-
cause "it saves a lot of thinking."
The establishment of these usual channels through which624 EXPERIMENTATION
business came into the London market prevented certain
types of competition, notably the duplication of credit lines
from various sources to the same borrower. The situation
arose, for example, in which one might say that if a loan for
Greece could not be secured at Hambro's, it could not be
secured in England. It prevented certain types of cut-throat
competition in rates and introduced into the customer-banker
relation an element of stability and responsibility that comes
from long continued business contact. The fact that before
the war customers could not turn readily to another market,
such as New York, for their accommodation, or go from
bank to bank in London in search of the best terms, was un-
questionably one of the important factors in the development
of the technique of the London money market as the world's
financial center.
General Encroachment of the Joint Stock Banks upon all
Fields in the Money Market
Though the Doctrine of the Usual Channels is still observed
in the London money market, an intensification of competi-
tion since the war has tended to undermine it. The outstand-
ing cause of this change is the encroachment of the great joint
stock banks upon every field of money market activity. They
were becoming more interested in the foreign exchange mar-
ket, and were assuming new responsibilities in connection
with the capital market. Before the war they were, in the
great majority of issues, merely agents. After the war it be-
came more common for purchasers of new issues to have the
joint stock banks make the issue, acting under their instruc-
tions. After the return to gold, the joint stock banks also acted
more frequently as principals in making new issues. They
continued to act as agents for the borrowers of course, but
that had become 'the old-fashioned way.'
The growth of the acceptance business of the joint stock
banks is obvious from the regularly published figures of their
acceptances. Concerning its effect two opposite opinions areA DBCENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 625
held in the market. The joint stock banker takes the view
that the change was inevitable because drawers are becoming
more and more gTeat corporations or aggregrations of capi-
tal, and personal contacts, so important in the business of the
merchant banker, are becoming inevitably less frequent and
less c:lose. This view asserts that consequently nothing is lost
in this respect through the entry of the joint stock banks into
the acceptance business. Many merchant bankers feel, how-
ever, that there is an element of bureaucracy inseparable from
the joint stock bank merely because of its size, which inevi-
tably leads to a loss of flexibility and adaptability in the con-
duct of the acceptance business. Whatever may be the judg-
ment formed on this point the entry of the joint stock banks
into the acceptance business has at times affected the stability
of the market because of the competition they introduced by
cutting rates. At one time rates of acceptance were actually
cut i.n half; and, in consequence, the acceptance houses were
obliged to seek twice as much business in order to secure the
same income. This factor is always either actually or poten-
tially present and leads to an abandonment of the attitude of
waiting for and selecting business characteristic of the pre-
war acceptance market in favor of an active promotion of
business with a consequent danger of loss of quality.19
In general, the post-war tendency was for the joint stock
banks to take care of all the business of their British clients,
including their foreign business. The 'exchange banks' and
the 'foreign banks' tended to retain the business of their par-
ticular countries, and many of the acceptance houses and
merchant bankers were obliged more and more to seek busi-
ness; in countries where there was definite lack of working
such as Germany and Poland.
The effect of the internal competition in the London mar-
ket in the field of acceptances as well as of underwriting,
when brought into combination with the new external corn-
19 Testimony of Sir Robert Kindersley, Minutes of Evidence(Macmillan
Committee), I, 72,especiallyanswers to questions ii6i and 1165.626 EXPERIMENTATION
petition of the New York money market, is part of the ex-
planation of the great extensions of credit, especially short
term, to Central Europe, the results of which were manifest
after 1929.
COMPETITION AMONG THE JOINT STOCK BANKS
Before the war competition among the joint stock banks was
very active, but was tempered by agreement upon certain
principles. Since the war competition has become much more
active but there are still general principles of agreement,
regular and friendly consultation, and avoidance of the cut-
throat competition in rates that was at times a feature of the
New York market. Such a generalization can be made on the
basis of statements by those in a position to know but is im-
possible to document. Nevertheless, two examples of the in-
creasing competition may be cited—the location of banks
and the rate of credit interest. Before the war each of the
big banks had a recognized predominance in certain parts
of the country, and when other banks thought of establishing
branches, they did not try to break in there. They pursued
a live and let live policy in this respect, but since the war,
branches of all the banks may be found in almost every ham-
let in England. Before the war the rate of credit interest paid
to depositors was restricted to an agreed maximum. This was
generally respected after the war in the metropolitan area,
but in the provinces unrestrained competition in this respect
reigned for years among the managers of the branches of the
big banks until the situation was finally taken in hand by
concerted action of the head offices in the early 1930's.
COMPETITION OF FOREIGN BANKS IN THE LONDON MONEY
MARKET
Before the war the chief competition offered by foreign banks
domiciled in London was that of the D banks of Germany.
In particular, the German banks offered on occasion higher
credit interest rates and more liberal terms of credit on ac-A DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 627
ceptances, but this competition was not generally regarded as
unfriendly by the British banks on the characteristic ground
that whatever stimulated trade helped England. In contrast,
the establishment of American banks in London after the
war often resulted in a competition in rates of commission
and in services rendered that tended to ignore some of the
traditional restraint that London institutions had learned to
rega:cd as in their own interest. This was, however, but a
minor factor in comparison with the general impact of the
competition of the alternative money markets in which inter-
national trade and finance could be arranged.
If we now turn from an examination of the monopoly and
competitive aspects of the money market as a whole to an ex-
amination of its various departments, it becomes clear that
in a].1 there were changes in practice or in attitude or in the
quality and quantity of the business done.
The Bullion Market
The London bullion market is an old institution. Before the
war it consisted of four brokers: Mocatta and Goldsmid, Pix-
Icy and Abell, Sharp and Wilkins, and Samuel Montagu and
Company; and two refiners: Johnson Matthey and Company,
and N. M. Rothschild and Son. All four brokers were estab-
lished before the international gold standard was widely
adopted, and one was in the bullion business before the Bank
of England was founded. The business of N. M. Rothschild
and Son as refiners dates to Napoleonic times, and, in addi-
tion, this house had long acted as agents for many South Afri-
can gold mines on account of its connection with the early
financing of the industry. For many years these brokers met
in the office of Sharp and Wilkins for what was known as the
weekly 'fixing' of the prices of gold and silver. For them the
adoption of the gold standard meant a restriction of business
and narrow profit margins because of the limits placed upon
the fluctuations in the price of gold by the Bank of England's
standing offer to buy gold at 77 s. g d. per standard ounce628 EXPERIMENTATION
(84 S. 9.81 d. per fine oz.) and to sell it at 77 s. iol/2 d. per
standard ounce (84 S.1 1.45 d. per fine oz.)Thoughfrom a
private profit point of view silver was much more important
to the bullion market than gold, the brokers continued to
'fix' the price of both metals and to provide the machinery for
bringing bids and offers together. Through their hands
flowed the vast and complex stream of gold transactions ex-
haustively analyzed in the pre-war part of these studies. The
gold movement through London was, until the World War
changed the whole course of events, responsive to the fluctu-
ating currents of world trade. It reflected the seasonal move-
ments of the exchanges, the changing relations of debtor to
creditor countries in the different phases of the business cycle,
and the secular trends in the development of the banking
systems of the world. It was intimately connected with the
functioning of the London-centered international banking
and credit system and with the volume and direction of
British capital export.
THE ABDICATION AND RECOVERY OF ITS PRE-WAR FUNCTIONS BY
THE BULLION MARKET, 1914—1925
During the war the London bullion market abdicated these
pre-war functions. The direction of gold distribution was
taken over by the government and the Bank of England. Gold
and credit were used together to 'force a balance' on the
books of England and on the world's books,21 at the cost of
breaking the organic connections between gold distribution,
credit distribution, and goods distribution established in the
course of a century in the hierarchy of financial centers domi-
nated by London. The organization of the bullion market,
however, remained intact. With only slight changes in the
representation of the South African mines, it once more took
over after the war the function of distributing newly pro-
20Forthe justification of using the term 'sell' in this connection cf. Ch. 2,
TheMinimum Change in Legal Form consistent with the Necessary Changes
in Practice.
21Ourwhole discussion in Book One, Breakdown, is a marshaling of evidence
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duced gold. From September 'gig to April it operated
as an insulated compartment in the London money market,
having no direct connections with or influence upon the Eng-
lish credit base. A distinction was drawn between gold in
England and gold with a license for export. South African
gold was once more sold to the highest bidder through agents
in London. The demand was once more expressed through
bids made by the bullion brokers for clients. The price was
based upon the bid of that country whose fixed obligatory
purchase price for gold yielded, at current exchange rates,
the highest price in sterling, provided that bid was above
84 S. 9.81 d. per fine ounce, the standing bid of the Bank of
England. Only one outstanding modification of the pre-war
position remained. There was no upper limit to the price of
gold except that fixed by the fluctuations in the exchange
rates because of the suspension of the Bank of England's obli-
gatiori to redeem its notes.
The return of England to the gold standard in April 1925
once more fixed this upper limit at 84 S. 11.45 d., and for the
first time since 1914 made the buying price of the Bank of
England a competitive bid. The pre-war range of fluctuation
in price was restored. The international flow of gold through
the market was once more modified by Bank of England pur-
chases and sales, and the bids made in the market once again
directly influenced the credit base. The distinction between
gold in England and gold with a license for export disap-
peared, and the statement of the value of the gold held by
the Bank of England in pounds sterling in its balance sheet
once more corresponded to the valuation placed upon that
gold by the highest bidder in the world's markets.
CHANGES IN THE TECHNIQUE OF THE MARKET AFTER THE RE-
TURN TO GOLD
The return to gold had certain repercussions upon the tech-
nique of the bullion market as a mechanism for bringing bids
and offers together. With the rise of the South African pound
to its old parity with the dollar and the fall of the price of630 EXPERIMENTATION
gold in sterling, the so-called 'premium' on gold in South
African pounds disappeared in January 1925. It became more
profitable for South African mines to bring their output to
the Pretoria mint for coinage into sovereigns than to send
it to London for sale, and South African gold shipments were
temporarily suspended.22 New arrangements were needed to
allow the London bullion market once more to function
freely as the distributor of South African gold throughout
the world. The South African Reserve Bank undertook to
buy gold from the producers and to sell it in London through
N. M. Rothschild as their agents in the bullion market, and
thus became the principal buyer, taking over 84.64 per cent
of all gold produced in South Africa in 1926 and 90.9 per
cent in 1927. In order to avoid fluctuations in its own reserve
resulting from differences in the amount bought in South
Africa and sold in London in a given week the Reserve Bank
adopted a system of earmarking sovereigns and releasing
sovereigns from earmark at the Bank of England. The gold
sent by it to London for sale was consigned to the Bank of
England, checked and weighed, and held at the bullion office
pending sale in the open market. Together with certain direct
shipments to N. M. Rothschild from Rhodesia and other
parts of Africa, the South African Reserve Bank shipments
were the bulk of the new gold physically handled by the
market, but did not measure completely its actual work. Sub-
stantial shipments were made directly from South Africa to
India, to Argentina, and sometimes to other countries to take
advantage of economies in transportation costs. This gold,
however, was sold and paid for in the London bullion mar-
ket and the financial results of the shipments were the same
as if they had passed through London. For this reason the
gold distribution figures in Table 48 understate the role of
England as a gold distributor.
The technique actually employed in the bullion market
22 For a discussion of the 'premium' on gold in South Africa and the conse-
quences of itsdisappearancecf. Brown, op.cit., pp.75—9, i8t—6, 280—1.A DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM
after 1925 has been described by the writer in England and
the NewGoldStandard (p. 283):
"Theexact manner in which the open market price of gold is
fixed is not a matter of record. No account of the meeting at which
the open market for gold is conducted has ever been given. But it
is clear that the prevailing rates of exchange, the demand of India
and the trade, and the presence or absence of special buyers in the
market will determine whether or not Messrs. Rothschild, as
agents for the producers, can obtain for them a price higher than
the buying price of the Bank of England. If they cannot dispose
of all the available gold to better advantage on the first day after
its arrival and if, in their judgment, no buyers at a higher price
are likely to come forward the following day, what remains is sold
to the Bank of England. In the case of Reserve Bank gold the
transaction is closed by a transfer to the credit of the Reserve
Bank's account, which takes the form of a cheque drawn by the
Bullion Department of the Bank on the Issue Department with
whom the gold is lodged. In the case of other gold the Bank of
England makes payment by a Bullion Office cheque, which is
cleared the same day, and increases its deposit liability, presum-
ably to some one of the Joint Stock Banks. In the meantime, the
gold sold to other buyers is delivered over to them by Messrs.
Rothschild, who, in the case of Reserve Bank gold, call for it at
the Bank of England, making payment by cheque on some Joint
Stock Bank, which is likewise cleared the same day and the ac-
count: of the Reserve Bank credited. The whole transaction is on
a cash basis without involving interest adjustments. The gold it-
selfsent immediately to ships or airplanes for dispatch to its
various destinations, these arrangements for rapid handling being
of the very essence of the transactions on account of the impor-
tance of interest charges in the cost of shipping gold."
CHANGES IN THE FLOW OF GOLD
The pre-war mechanism of the market was restored in all its
essentials in 1925, but the flow of gold through the market
after 1925 was not essentially like that of pre-war years. The
difference was more subtle and more profound than has some-
times been assumed. An analysis of the gold standard that632 EXPERIMENTATION
stresses corrective forces set in motion by gold gains and losses
in countries whose exchanges have been displaced by some
force from a position within gold points is not a good guide
toward forming a judgment concerning this difference, for
it runs the following serious dangers:
i)Itis likely to assume implicitly a type of money market or-
ganization in most countries of the general type of that prevailing
in London. This is natural in an analysis evolved in England and
primarily related to English experiences, but it is contrary to fact.
2)It overlooks, or at least it does not stress, the connection be-
tween the process of distribution of additions to the world's gold
supply and of the existing supply as a long run dynamic force in
the world's banking and credit system and the temporary correc-
tive shifts of gold backward and forward with which it is chiefly
concerned. These two types of gold movement, however different
their economic significance, are still intimately connected in the
actual mechanism of the money markets, and neither can be fully
understood without reference to the other.
3)It directs attention to the delicate and indeed wonderful mech-
anism in which the final balance of a world economic system, al-
ready fundamentally in equilibrium, is achieved, and is often in
danger of neglecting the deeper relationships between gold move-
ments and the great credit operations involved in long term inter-
national lending and the financing of international trade. The
credit judgments and the banking management, which enter into
each and every one of these credit transactions, are of the very sub-
stance of the environment that produces a so-called automatic,
corrective movement of gold.
Avoidance of these dangers is important in interpreting
the role of the London bullion market as a distributor of
gold after 1925.
The contrast to pre-war years was not primarily in the
type of transaction carried out in the market. After the return
to gold the market continued to satisfy the consumer demand
of the East and of the arts as it had done before the war. It
continued to offer an opportunity for gold arbitrage when-
ever the exchanges provided a prospect of profit, and many ofA D:ECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 633
the important movements during 1925—31 were of this type.
It continued to be the source through which many central
banks replenished their reserves, and to be subject to various
strategems by which gold was attracted to one country or
another for purposes connected with the monetary and bank-
ing needs of particular countries, such as:
1)Shipments carried out by gold arbitrage but induced by
changes in the costs of arbitrage transactions resulting from gov-
ernnient or central bank action, including that of the Bank of
England, in order to divert the stream of gold as a matter of high
policy;
2)Purchases made in the open market without reference to ex-
change considerations for building up bank reserves in particular
countries;
3) The use of the proceeds of foreign loans in the London mar-
ket for the purchase of gold.
Pre-war shipments of these three types were, in the aggre-
gate, an imposing total. For twenty years before the war the
Bank of England probably bought more gold at slightly above
its buying price than at its buying price. Many countries, in-
cluding Austria, Brazil, Italy, Russia, and the United States
were, upon occasion, buyers of gold in the market irrespective
of exchange rates, to strengthen banking reserves. The case
of Germany, which accumulated gold irrespective of exchange
rates. for ten years before the war, is prominent in the memory
of pre-war London money market men.23 Examples of all
three were frequent in the bullion market after 1925.24 From
1925 to 1928 the market continually felt the demand of cen-
tral banks, especially European central banks including those
of Belgium, Switzerland, Poland, and Italy, for gold to build
up their reserves. Collectively these banks enjoyed the mar-
ket Pseudonym of 'the unknown buyer,' and the presence of
the unknown buyer was evidence of what came to be called
28 This is confirmed by a special study of German gold movements, 1904—11,
carried outinconnection with these studies by Max von Zabern.
24 Cf. Ch. iG for examples of changes in gold points due to central bank
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a scramble for gold. In this scramble for gold the Bank of
England participated. As in times past, it was frequently in
the market at above its statutory price, and in addition it
strengthened its reserves directly through special purchases
from Germany, the Netherlands, Russia, and Spain.
Though the nature of the transactions carried out remained
the same, there was a great change in the relative importance
of the different types of transaction and in the general rela-
tion of the whole gold flow to banking practice in the vari-
ous countries, to the course of international trade, and to
international lending.
The return of England to the gold standard greatly
widened the area to which gold could profitably be sent as
an arbitrage transaction, but it did not widen to an equal ex-
tent the area from which gold could be taken as an arbitrage
transaction. The postponement of de jure stabilization on
gold by countries stabilized de facto whose central banks were
willing and indeed obligated to buy gold at fixed prices, the
spread of the gold exchange standard, and the impediments
placed upon gold exports by some nominally gold standard
countries, all contributed to this result. Not only was the
inter-central bank flow of gold impeded, but gold exports
and imports also had different effects upon the world's bank-
ing systems from those associated with pre-war gold move-
ments. The whole discussion of the role of gold in the
monetary systems of the United States, France, Germany, Ar-
gentina, and other countries already presented, and the discus-
sion of the English credit base and credit superstructure and
of the 'typical year' of the Bank of England still to be given,
is cumulative evidence of the infinite variety of the treatment
given to gold in gold standard countries.
Before the war gold arbitrage transactions were closely re-
Jated to seasonal fluctuations in the foreign exchanges which
were familiar to exchange traders and repeated from year to
year. Many of these seasonals reflected the movement of the
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tion. They were modified by international lending opera-
tions) particularly those of the London capital market, and
were also part of the technical method by which long run
trends in gold distribution were worked out. For example,
some countries took gold during the financing of their crops
to build up the reserves of their currency systems, and paid
it back from the proceeds of the shipments; whereas other
countries, able to finance their crop production themselves,
took gold as profit after the shipment of their crops. In either
case the amounts remaining in these countries represented
part of the long run distribution of the metal through the
London gold market. After the war gold arbitrage trans-
actions no longer reflected with the same fidelity the course
of world trade and transactions directly connected with de-
veloping and financing world trade. It was a truism of the
post-war foreign exchange markets that familiar seasonals as-
sociated with the movement of crops were nd longer to be
relied upon as a guide to trading. They were overlaid by a
mas5 of other transactions of a financial nature, chiefly the
movement of balances and securities. Only the most powerful
seasonal influences, among them the autumn weakness of
sterling, were still predictable market factors. Even the major
seasonals in the sterling-dollar exchange were modified in
various ways in 1927, 1928, and 1929 (cf. infra, Bank Rate
and the Defense of Sterling).
More important than any of these changes was the fact that
the relative importance of the London bullion market as a
whole in the world distribution of gold was less than before
the war. This was chiefly because gold distribution through
London no longer stood in its pre-war relation to interna-
tional long term lending. Before the war gold was distributed
to new and rapidly developing countries largely because of
their regular borrowings in London. These loans directly
increased deposits and circulation in borrowing countries
and therefore their requirements for gold reserves, and at the
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effective demand for gold in the London market (cf. Ch. 4).
The fact that there was a market in London whose function
was to distribute a steady stream of newly produced gold was
of the greatest importance in this connection. It distributed
the 'gold income' of Great Britain to those countries whose
exchanges were strongest in terms of sterling and thereby
acted as a first line of defense for Bank of England gold re-
serves. In combination with the strong underlying pull of
Great Britain over the exchanges this made it possible to
maintain the legal guarantees of the gold standard without
restricting the freedom of the London capital market in pro-
moting overseas development. This view has been expressed
to the writer by a man of wide pre-war experience in the bul-
lion market in the following terms:
"If England had had a static gold reserve [before the war] which
could only have been increased by getting gold from someone
else's reserve, the could never have carried out her great financial
operations."
After 1925,England'sgold income was not an additional
safeguard reinforcing a fundamentally strong underlying po-
sition, but an offset against an underlying weakness. It was
no longer an adequate defense for the gold reserves of the
Bank of England against the potential and the actual effective
demand for gold of the rest of the world. The system of stable
exchange rates of the gold standard was no longer primarily
supported by the reinvestment of international credits by
Great Britain, but by British and American lending together.
The burden of satisfying international demands for gold was
shared with the London bullion market by the American
banking system in the manner and in the proportions indi-
cated in Chapter i8. From 1925 to 1927 the Bank of England
was protected from German gold demands by the administra-
tive acts of the Reichsbank. The main burden of supplying
gold to South American countries in connection with cur-
rency reforms and as a result of trade balances was taken from
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French demand for gold in 1927 was diverted to the United
States by inter-central bank arrangements. The greatest single
change in the economic significance of the flow of England's
gold income through the London bullion market after 1925
as compared to pre-war days was that it no longer gave ade-
quate assurance that her international credit operations could
be carried out without apprehension. The protection of the
British gold standard was confided in large measure to the
American capital market, and sterling was exposed to danger
whenever America was under-lending (cf. Ch. 17,TheCondi-
tions most favorable to Exchange Stability cannot be approxi-
mated in a Decentralized System).
The gradual withdrawal of the support given the whole
systemof stable exchange rates by American lending, begin-
ning toward the end of 1928 at the same time that the attitude
of Germany and France toward the gold exchange standard
was changing, brought to the surface all the latent differences
between the flow of gold through the London bullion market
after 1925 and that of pre-war days. Finally, the redistribu-
tion of international balances following the crisis of 1929, and
the reappearance of the pre-war phenomenon that during de-
pressions gold flows from debtor to creditor countries intro-
duced a new phase in the history of the London bullion mar-
ket as a first line of defense for the gold standard in England
that will be discussed in Chapters 22—28.
The Foreign Exchange Market
THE SHIFT IN INITIATIVE IN FOREIGN EXCHANGE TRADING
Before the war London was not greatly interested in foreign
exchange dealings. The foreign exchange market, in fact, was
not an active market before 1900. The big issue houses and
the banks' bought and sold for requirements and
there was no trade in the exchanges as a separate business for
profit. Until about 1906 the joint stock banks did no foreign
exchange business at all, and the few specialists in the ex-
changes were regarded as exercising a mystery apart. After638 EXPERIMENTATION
igoo the market increased in activity, especially with the be-
ginning of trading in the exchanges by the joint stock banks,
but even then British merchants still bought and sold for
sterling and knew nothing of the foreign exchanges. That
was for the foreigner to try to understand. Pounds, shillings,
and pence were good enough for them.
For this there were two important reasons. The first and
most fundamental was the nature of British home trade.
English merchants were not in the habit of giving credit for
exports or taking it for imports. British export trade was
cash against documents. The foreigner purchasing British
goods, of course, might come to the acceptance bankers and
ask for a credit with which to get the pounds to pay the
British exporter. If his credit with these bankers was not
good, he had to buy from England on a cash basis. In any
event, the English merchant and manufacturer did not have
to know anything about the credit conditions of foreign cus-
tomers and of their country. He sold for cash. As far as im-
ports were concerned, it is obvious that the foreign shipper
to England was glad to take cash against documents and there
was so much home saving that English importers did not
have much need for credit. On the whole, they could afford
to pay cash. The foreign shipper was always ready to take his
cash payment in pounds sterling, and hence the English im-
porter did not have to bother about exchange rates.
The second reason for the inactivity of the London ex-
change market before the war was precisely that London was
the world's clearing center. Because sterling bills were the
primary instrument for financing world trade and sterling
balances were the medium for offsetting the world's debits
and credits arising from that trade, there was no occasion for
the British to initiate foreign exchange transactions. Com-
merce was often carried out between foreign countries in
pounds sterling without the transaction affecting London at
all except as a transfer of bank balances. Exports of sugar
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inpounds and the insurance policy was written at Lloyd's.
Wool tops were bought and sold in France in terms of ster-
ling, and it was possible in Amsterdam to buy and sell dollars
for sterling without the guilder entering into the transaction
at all. Probably the most important exception to the general
rule of conducting international trade in sterling was the deal-
ings in cotton before the war which were carried out in dol-
lars, but even the rate for dollars was as a rule fixed in New
York, and London followed the New York quotation.
Since it seemed unnecessary for any definite activity to be
undertaken in London to keep the exchanges steady people
in London assumed that an automatic economic process was
at work and that no one need worry about the exchanges.
But outside London, in all other countries of the world,
people were very much concerned about keeping their rates
on London steady, and it was as a result of their dealings that
they were kept steady. The idea of conscious regulation of the
exchanges according to plans laid down by monetary experts
and commissions was entirely foreign to the pre-war point of
view and experience. Yet there was an element of control that
was not very obvious and that was the result of the operation
of ordinary considerations of self-interest. It was of the type
suggested by the following hypothetical cases. Let us assume,
for eKample, that interest or sinking fund on a Peruvian loan
had to be met in London. More sterling was demanded, as a
result, than the weekly accumulation of drafts on London in
Peru could meet. The little Peruvian market was short of
sterling. Rather than let this disturb the exchange someone in
Lima who had credit in London would permit his correspond-
ent to be drawn upon in the expectation that in the following
weeks sterling would become available to pay him back. Mean-
while, an acceptance appeared in the London market which
was really drawn to supply sterling exchange and to support
the Peruvian pound. No one in London, however, had to
take any initiative in the matter and the sinking fund and
interest payments were made without affecting the exchange.640 EXPERIMENTATION
Transactions of this type, of course, were merely adequate to
bridge over temporary situations and could not meet long
term dislocations in trade relations between Peru and Eng-
land. Or, we may assume that as the result of a Brazilian loan
placed in London there was a large amount to be remitted
to Brazil as compared to the current supply of milreis. In
such a case one of the British controlled Brazilian banks would
be likely to borrow a round amount of milreis from a bank
in Brazil. It would sell the milreis so acquired to meet the
pressure arising from the remittance of the Brazilian loan
and buy them back later gradually as British credits accumu-
lated in the market for remittance to London. The exchange
would not be disturbed. No one in the acceptance or the dis-
count market, or the joint stock banks, or the Bank of Eng-
land had to worry about the matter. Furthermore, if sterling
did become weak as a result of the remittance of proceeds
abroad, an opportunity for profitable interest arbitrage would
open up to foreigners and would be taken advantage of.
These examples are hypothetical, but similar or equivalent
transactions were continually being carried out before the
war outside England, and a wonderful appearance of auto-
matic stability in the London market was the result. This
circumstance was of the utmost importance in connection
with the attitude of British underwriters in permitting bor-
rowers to utilize the proceeds of their borrowings without
restriction.
After the war the situation was altered. It had been ob-
served even before that the refusal of British exporters to
grant export credits had caused export business to be lost,
particularly to Germans who made it a point to grant liberal
export credits and even borrowed from the London discount
market to obtain the necessary means. The imperative need of
Great Britain after the war to stimulate her exports led to a
concerted effort to break down this attitude and to grant ex-
port credits. The government took an active part in this effort
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in filling a serious gap in the credit information of British
commerce. British exporters became interested in credit con-
ditions abroad and in foreign exchanges as they never had
been before.
The fact that before the war the foreign exchange rates
were as a rule managed outside England, and the active inter-
est of other markets in keeping their exchanges stable in
sterling relieved London of great responsibilities and indeed
made the gold standard a true sterling exchange standard.
In a very deep sense the transfer of initiative in foreign ex-
change trading to, or at least the sharing of that initiative by,
London was symptomatic of the whole process of decentraliza-
tion taking place in the world's international credit machin-
ery.
THE FORWARD EXCHANGE MARKET
One other important post-war change in the foreign exchange
market was a function of the instability of the exchange it-
self. This was the immense development of the market in
forward exchange contracts which was necessary to provide
hedges for merchants attempting to engage in international
trade without becoming exchange speculators. The forward
exchange contract has sometimes been described as being
governed solely by discount rates in the respective markets.
If the exchange trader can earn i per cent in London and
11/2percent in New York he may buy spot dollars and cover
his position by selling a contract to deliver dollars for sterling
in three months. He will thus secure a 1/2 per cent additional
income from the employment of his funds. To secure this
added income he will be willing to accept less sterling for
his dollars three months hence than he gives for them now.
Forward dollars will be at a discount. Were interest arbitrage
the only consideration governing dealings in forward con-
tracts, then ½ofi per cent for three months, expressed in the
rate, would, in this example, be the limit beyond which the
discount on forward dollars could not go. But during the642 EXPERIMENTATION
period of widely fluctuating exchange rates, interest arbitrage
did not dominate, and the rates for forward exchange were a
combination of three factors: (i) the interest rate differential,
(2) the genuine demand and supply for the given exchange
for the month of the contract, thespeculative attitude of
the dealers in the market with respect to the future of the
given currency.
The growth of the market in the forward exchange, espe-
cially in the sterling-dollar market, has a broad general signifi-
cance in the functioning of the international clearing system
of London. It was always true that one of the most sensi-
tive elements in the international movement of funds was the
movement of balances by traders in the foreign exchanges
from one market to another in the ordinary course of their
trading operations and usually, in large institutions, without
special intent or direction on the part of the management.
The development of the forward market on a large
scale greatly increased this part of the mobile international
loan fund. The use of the sterling bill as the instrument for
carrying out interest arbitrage operations was, after the war,
greatly reduced, and the dealings in forward exchange per-
formed the functions it formerly performed. A new technique
for the moving of balances internationally was substituted
for an old one. The generation of experts familiar with the
skillful use of the sterling bill as an instrument for moving
balances from one country to another to carry securities or
obtain a temporary advantage from interest differentials has
passed from the financial scene, and at the date of writing, its
survivors can be found only in their places of rural retire-
ment. The new technique of the forward exchange market is
not subject to the restraint present in the old technique of
bills because forward exchange contracts, unlike finance bills,
•do not have to pass the scrutiny of the market and secure the
approval of an acceptor before they can even come into exist-
ence. The international loan fund became more volatile and
less subject to control as a consequence.A DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 643
The Discount Market
THE DECLINE OF THE COMMERCIAL BILL
Professor Ohlin in The Course and Phases of the World
Economic Depression writes in a passage dealing with the
period after 1925:
"It is probable that the need for short-term banking credits for
the financing of trade and production was smaller than before the
war. Manufacturers kept smaller stocks of raw materials, and trad-
ers of finished goods. A more rapid turnover of operating capital
has been achieved in manufacture by improved technique. Sales
on credit by producers to traders, among traders themselves, and
by traders to retailers were less popular. Instalment selling, which
grew in favor, was largely financed not through direct bank credit
but by special finance companies through the sale of finance
paper. Mergers, combines and chain stores eliminated small firms,
replacing them by large corporations. They preferred the more
permanent method of raising money on bonds and stocks in order
to finance their business." 25
These generalizations record a phenomenon of common ob-
servation in the post-war years. Large business units tended
to do their foreign business through bank advances or by
means of increased working capital, instead of by bills. The
London acceptance market consequently suffered from a
shortage of supply of the genuine commercial bills that had
constituted its bread and butter business before the war.26
General Decline in the Quality of Bills. Not only was the
amount of bills coming forward declining, but their quality
25 League of Nations (Geneva, 1931), p. 27.
26 In September 1928 Mr. Spring-Rice estimated that there were about f24o
million bankers acceptances in the market, of which one-half were acceptances
of the joint stock banks; Journal of the Institute of Bankers (London) ,Sep-
tember 1928. F. W. in the Financial News (London), October 20, 1928, esti-
mated that there were only £150 million prime bankers bills in the market.
In a speech at the Mansion House on October 7, 1936, Governor Norman said
that the bills in the market "five years ago" were about £230 million as
compared to £120 million in July 1936. Bankers Magazine (London), No-
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also was deteriorating, partly because of the disturbed condi-
tion of trade and partly because many gaps in international
trade which would, under other circumstances have been
taken care of by capital exports, had to be bridged by the use
of short term credit. This provided a standing temptation to
the abuse of the bankers acceptance. The outward sign of this
deterioration in quality was the change in the drawer. Be-
fore the war the drawer of a trade bill was the seller of goods,
domiciled in a country other than that of the debtor under
the credit. The drawing of such bills was the genuine reim-
bursement credit business of pre-war days and at least as far
as the number of bills and activity were concerned it was the
backbone of the market until the beginning of the war. After
the war the drawer was often the importer, or some holding
company, or bank making use of a general acceptance credit
line. Such bills often represented goods not yet sold. Bills that
were really finance bills were also frequently disguised as
trade bills. The former clear cut distinction between the two
was lost not only by the change in the drawer but also by
the frequency of renewals. It was a rare event before the war
for a genuine trade bill to be renewed in the London market.
Such bills were paid of the proceeds of the passage of
commodities into consumption, or from bank accommodation
extended in the country of destination for storage and dis-
tribution. After the war it may be said on good money market
authority that there was a revolution in this respect in the
whole acceptance business. Only a small proportion of the
bills in the market were true commercial bills representing
the genuine financing of goods already sold. This was espe-
cially true of German bills which were often drawn for three
months but sometimes represented as much as three years'
credit. Such bills were continually renewed and changed for
others in such a way as to conceal their true underlying rela-
tion to the commodities against which they were ostensibly
drawn.
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unquestionably began to appear during the period of Restora-
tion. They reflected in some degree the competition with an-
other growing discount market and in some degree the in-
ternal competition within the London market. The growing
share of the joint stock banks in the acceptance business
resulted in an increased use of the forms of the old reimburse-
men.t credit to provide in effect working capital for cor-
respondent banks abroad. This whole tendency was im-
mensely accentuated after the war when trade was restricted
and the need for working capital increased.
The New Relation to Commodities. The traditional relation
between the acceptance houses and the actual handling of
commodities was also changing. Even after the return to gold
fou:r or five typical firms of merchant bankers were still left in
Lortdon who had built up their business by interesting them-
selves in particular parts of the world and financing certain
commodities from planting to delivery in London either as
principals or for commissions. But, in general, the consign-
ment business of the merchant bankers was already greatly
reduced before the war, and by 1925 the continuous and
close supervision over the whole process of production and
disi:ribution which the London merchant banker provided
had become a thing of the past. The relations of the accept-
anc:e houses to the commodity brokers had also changed, for
fierce competition for a restricted business obliged these
brokers to arrange intermediate financing for the producers.
For example, none of the large timber brokers for Finland
since the war had been able to arrange contracts for the sale
of the commodity unless they could also arrange to finance
it. 'The sellers were in a position to demand and to secure this
credit. The brokers had to find an acceptance house to pro-
vide funds for cutting, shaping. and preparing for shipment.
The acceptance house, in granting such credit, financed a
self-liquidating transaction, but it came into the picture at
the end of the negotiation and was much less closely related646 EXPERIMENTATION
to the commodity than were the merchant bankers in pre-
war days.
Changes in the Attitude toward Documents. The discount
market also reflected the general uncertainties and distrusts
introduced into business transactions by the war and its after-
math by taking an entirely new attitude toward documents.
This may seem a matter of small importance, but it had great
psychological significance. The whole business of handling
documents had become one of scrupulous adherence to every
term of the written contract on the part of acceptors for fear
that if an 'i' were not dotted, or a 't' not crossed one party or
the other would seize upon the technicality to get out of the
contract if some reason for doing so arose. This new attitude,
plus the general unwillingness to ship goods on consignment
or to keep bids and offers open for more than a very short
time, was a genuine new impediment to trade. It was a diver-
sion of attention from the essential services of international
finance in moving the world's goods to a meticulous pre-
occupation with details for the safeguarding of the parties
engaged in commerce against one another's bad faith. This
whole attitude marked a change in the conduct of the accept-
ance business in London. Before the war the British merchant
bankers were never very much concerned with small irregu-
larities in documents and bills of exchange. They knew the
trade and it was perfectly apparent to them why these small
irregularities should crop up. The large number of letters of
guarantee required in connection with post-war credits were
then quite unknown. The banker giving an acceptance credit
did not wish to be burdened with the details of the transac-
tion. He wanted to know that the credit was against wool and
that the credit taker was good, and not that the credit was
against 50 bales of wool, Ex. SS. so and so and marked in a
particular way.
Changes in the Bank of England's Attitude toward Various
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ances forced upon the Bank of England a reduction in its
standards in the definition of the bills it would take from
the market when the market was in the Bank. Such a reduc-
tion in standards was never made openly or willingly, but it
was a hard money market fact that the decline in the average
quality of bills and in their total amount obliged the Bank
to take under discount some bills it would otherwise not
have taken. The Bank's willingness to purchase acceptances
drawn against goods in warehouse was an evidence of this
type of relaxation in standards.
The Bank of England's attitude toward the finance bill was
modified by the fact that sale of treasury bills by tender had
created a new instrument of short term money market con-
trol of great power but also of great complexity. This has been
ably described by a writer in the Financial News (October
20, 1928)
"It will readily be imagined that the existence of such a large
volume of Treasury Bills, of which probably about £450,000,000
are:held in the market, as distinct from Public Departments, must
exercise an important effect on money and discount rates. As a
one may hazard that the volume of first-class bank paper in
the market is roughly £150,000,000,sothat about three-quarters
of the bills in which the Money Market now deals are Treasury
Bills. Inevitably, discount rates for three months' bank bills are
strongly influenced by the rates ruling for Treasury Bills, which
are of the same usance and have the backing of the British Gov-
ernment behind them. The Treasury, acting, of course, in close
co-operation with the Bank of England, is thus able to exert a
powerful effect on Money Market conditions. If, on the one hand,
it is desired to bring rates down, the amount of new Treasury
Bills offered may be reduced considerably below the amount of
the corresponding maturities. The result is that the market re-
ceives more money from the bills which are running off than it
is called upon to pay for the new bills offered. Money is plentiful,
and. rates will tend to fall. In the meantime, the Government will
finance itself, if necessary, on Ways and Means advances from
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wish to force rates higher, in which circumstances the amount of
new Treasury Bills offered may be fixed so as to take more from
the market in payment than is flowing into the market from the
bills running out. Clearly, in normal circumstances, the Bank and
the Treasury are in a position to manipulate the market to a
very considerable extent."
On this account the finance bill lost much of its importance
as an instrument of domestic credit control. Its displacement
in the field of interest arbitrage by the forward exchange
contract had diminished its value as an instrument for con-
trolling the foreign exchanges. Consequently it was no longer
so intimately related to the mechanism of adjustment to
Bank rate as it had been and it occasionally constituted un-
desirable competition for short term credit with the govern-
ment. Because of the loss of the clear line of demarcation be-
tween the genuine trade bill and the finance bill it was no
longer possible to take the attitude characteristic of some de-
partments of the market before the war that the finance bills
were the finest bills in the market. For all these reasons the
attitude of the Bank of England toward the finance bill was
less favorable than before the war.
CHANGES IN THE ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS OF THE DISCOUNT
MARKET
The decline in the volume of bankers acceptances did not re-
duce the total volume of business passing through the market,
for treasury bills took their place. However, this change in
the instrument dealt in made the discount market lose, in
part, its functions of attracting foreign balances and broaden-
ing the market for sterling exchange. The accumulation of
sterling to meet the customary requirement that acceptors
should be in funds a week in advance of due date resulted
in the constant presence in London of a substantial volume of
foreign deposits. Thoughtreasury bill offers to foreigners
an investment in sterling as attractive as the sterling accept-
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draw balances to London and maintain them there. The
larger the volume of sterling acceptances on foreign account,
the more likely the offsetting of random and seasonal ex-
change fluctuations. Therefore, the larger the volume of
sterling acceptances, the more stable the exchange rates on
London which were the key rates of the world system of ex-
change rates. Moreover, the advantages of a broad market to
whic]a the existence of a large volume of bankers acceptances
contributed were cumulative. Stability of rates encouraged
the use of sterling for other purposes than the financing of
trade and, in particular, encouraged its use as a medium for
the short term employment of funds. To all these interna-
tional effects the treasury bill contributed in much less de-
gree.
There was still another consequence of the changing char-
acter of the bills in the market of even more fundamental im-
portance. The growth in the number of acceptances bearing
the names of the joint stock banks seemed to the discount
houses to improve the quality of bills. At the same time, how-
ever, this change in names together with the predominant
importance of the treasury bill was gradually taking from
the (liscount houses their genuine economic function of mak-
ing a market for, maturing, and judging bills. There is little
need for a special type of business organization to purchase
and resell treasury bills at a small merchant's profit. The sub-
stance was going out of the business of the discount houses.
These considerations do not complete the list of significant
consequences of the rise of the treasury bill in the London
discount market. There remains for discussion the decline in
the efficiency of the market as a technical instrument for mak-
ing changes in Bank rate effective.
THE INFLUENCE OF THE RISE IN THE TREASURY BILL ON THE
TECHNIQUE OF MAKING BANK RATE EFFECTIVE
In Chapter i 1 we suggested that the rise of the treasury bill
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rate. It did so partly because it increased the magnitude of
the central banking operations needed to influence short term
interest rates and partly because changes in Bank rate affect
both borrowers and lenders on commercial bills, but only
lenders on treasury bills. These technical points concerning
the money market effects of the rise in die treasury bill, to-
gether with certain further indirect implications springing
from it concerning the distribution of the economic burdens
of a high Bank rate, have been ably set forth by Lord Brad-
bury. In his Minute of Dissent appended to the Report of the
Macmillan Committee he vigorously criticized Bank of Eng-
land policy after 1925 as insufficiently deflationary and there-
fore as responsible for the accumulation of a large volume
of short term funds in London. In the course of this criticism
Lord Bradbury said (pp. 274—5):
•. quiteapart from the undue accumulation of short money
which results from attempting to deal by means of bank rate
alone with a situation for which the proper remedy is an efllux of
gold, the volume of such money generally since the War has been
of such magnitude as to render the task of the Bank of England
in controlling the supply (as distinct from the price) of the basis
of credit extremely difficult. The main cause of this has been the
enormous amount of Treasury bills. This has resulted not only
in increasing the dimensions of the bill market (and so making
larger scale operations necessary to produce a given effect) but
also in altering its character. When the holdings of the market
were mainly commercial bills drawn on London on foreign ac-
count, a rise in bank rate diminished the supply of these bills.
Now that the market holdings are largely Treasury bills and other
Government 'floaters,' a restriction in the volume of bankers'
cash, followed by a reduction of their market money, merely
drives the 'market' 'into the Bank,' i.e., forces the Bank of Eng-
land to recreate the credit it has previously withdrawn—largely
mitigated by the fact that the general taxpayer bears a large part
—sometimes more than the whole—of the expense in the form of
a higher discount rate when the bills fall due for renewal.
Apart from the difficulty which it creates in the control of the
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Treasury bills has harmful effects of a more general character.
When credit has to be restricted the renewal of the bills comes
into competition with the demands of industry, tending to
force up the rates which industry has to pay for accommodation.
Further it encourages both directly and indirectly the accumula-
tion of liquid funds by industrial concerns. Treasury bills not
only provide a convenient and profitable vehicle for the employ-
meni: of such funds, but they enable the banks to hold large fixed
deposits at comparatively high rates of interest without risk to
themselves.
The result has been that large and wealthy concerns to a much
greater extent than formerly carry on their business by means of
accumulated funds instead of with borrowed money. The conse-
quence of this is that the pressure of credit restriction, when it be-
comes necessary, is rendered very unequal in its incidence. These
large concerns are in no way hampered by a rise in short money
rates—indeed they actually profit by it—and the whole burden is
thrown on the weaker concerns which trade with borrowed
money. Insofar as the latter may be compelled to curtail their
activities, the former can expand to fill the gap without cost to
their profit and loss account for interest charges, since the loss of
interest on the liquid funds so employed will be offset by the
higher rate on the remainder.
It thus follows that the first result of an attempt to restrict
credit is merely to transfer business from the weaker to the
stronger concerns, and before an impression can be made on the
total. volume of active purchasing power the pressure on the
weaker concerns may become so acute as to drive them out of
business altogether."
The fact that changes in Bank rate do not directly affect
the supply of treasury bills had serious consequences not only
in the London short term money market, but in the foreign
exchange market as well. The treasury bill gives foreigners a
prime short term investment. In this respect it resembles the
'call loan' in the American market or the bankers acceptance.
Changes in the yield of the British treasury bill, reflecting
changes in the Bank of England discount rate, affect the ex-
change market through attracting or repelling lenders. A rise652 EXPERIMENTATION
in the rate of discount can attract investment from abroad to
the treasury bill, as to the bankers acceptance, and therefore
strengthen the sterling exchange. A fall in the rate can repel
investment in both instruments and, by inducing the sale of
bills or acceptances held by foreigners, weaken the rate of
sterling exchange. It is within the power of the foreigner to
respond or not to respond to the change in the rate of return
offered him, and the initiative lies with him.
A rise in the discount rate can also discourage, and a fall
can attract, foreign borrowers in London who wish to arrange
to draw under sterling acceptance credits, but the amount
the British Treasury wishes to borrow on short term is very
little affected by changes in Bank rate, unless these are suffi-
ciently important to influence the government's refunding
program. Since sterling borrowed by foreigners on sterling
acceptances must be repaid, a change in Bank rate now alters
the amount of sterling foreigners are able to sell now, and the
amount they must buy later. Consequently when the accept-
ance, rather than the treasury bill, is the chief short term in-
strument, the effects of changes in Bank rate in attracting or
repelling lenders and borrowers are always counteracted or
reinforced, depending on whether the change is in the same
or in the opposite direction, by the effects of previous changes
in Bank rate on the stream of repayments that must currently
be made.
The following analysis brings out the fact that these differ-
ences between the treasury bill and the bankers acceptance
made it impossible to substitUte the former for the latter in
the discount market on a large scale without reducing the
effectiveness of foreign exchange control by changes in Bank
rate. The reaction of the London discount market before the
war to a change in Bank rate was to leave the basic volume of
commercial acceptances substantially unchanged,27 but to
27Thequalification is necessary because a high discount rate
had the effect of transferring a certain amount of borrowing from the bank-
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alter the volume of bills drawn for interest and exchange
arbitrage and other purely financial purposes. Changes in the
amount of finance bills, responding to changes in Bank rate
in this way, were under the control of the grantors of sterling
cred.it in London. It was not within the power of the foreign
borrowers from London to postpone the date of repayment of
old acceptances, which were, of course, obligations quite in-
depmdent of any changes in the terms offered to those who
wished to acquire new credits in London. Therefore, the re-
lation between the supply of sterling made available to for-
eigners by the creation of new acceptances and the demand
for sterling by foreigners to meet old acceptances at maturity
was subject to alteration by a change in Bank rate.
Furthermore, these effects were cumulative. A rise in the
discount rate, for example, by attracting foreign investors to
the sterling acceptances, increased the amount of potential
future sales of sterling exchange. By discouraging borrowing
through the London acceptance, it reduced the future de-
mand for sterling exchange for the repayment of outstanding
acceptances. Both these circumstances reinforced the effect
of a subsequent reduction in the discount rate. Such a reduc-
tion, following a previous increase, tended to make thepo-
tential supply of sterling exchange created by the purchase of
acceptances by foreigners as investments an actual supply by
inducing the sale of such acceptances. By attracting foreign
borrowers and by bringing a new supply of sterling into their
possession by the creation of new acceptances, the reduction
in the rate added further to the supply of sterling. Both these
additions to the supply were made in a market in which the
demand had already been reduced as a consequence of the
previous increase in the rate. Similarly, the effects of a de-
crease in the discount rate reinforced the effects of a subse-
increase.
When, however, the chief instrument of investment in the
London discount market is the treasury bill, then the effect
of an increase in the discount rate attracts foreign investment654 EXPERIMENTATION
in treasury bills and creates a potential supply of sterling
that may come on the market in the future. A decline in the
rate of discount may make this potential supply of sterling
actual, but this exhausts the effects upon the exchanges of
changes in the discount rate. Such changes do not, under
these conditions, have any influence upon the size of the flow
of obligatory purchases of sterling by foreigners to meet cur-
rently maturing sterling obligations. This is a far less effective
mechanism of control than that of bills.
CONSEQUENCES OF THE RISE OF THE TREASURY BILL AND THE
DECLINE OF THE COMMERCIAL BILL UPON LONDON AS AN INTER-
NATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTER, SUMMARY
In summary, therefore, it may be said that the substitution
of the treasury bill for the sterling acceptance weakened the
international effectiveness of the London market because
i)theexistence of a large volume of treasury bills increases the
difficulty of the task of the Bank of England in influencing the
cash reserves of the banking system;
2)the treasury bill does not broaden the market for sterling ex-
change in the same degree as the sterling acceptance;
3)the treasury bill does not draw deposits to London as the
sterling acceptance does;
4)the treasury bill does not multiply the effectiveness of changes
in Bank rate in the exchange market as the sterling acceptance
does;
5)the replacement of the bankers acceptance by the treasury bill
transfers to a certain degree the initiative in the control of the
sterling exchange from the grantors of sterling acceptance credit
to foreign investors in British treasury bills.
The New Issues Market
We have had frequent occasion to note that before the war
the issuers of foreign securities and the merchant bankers
made no stipulation or agreement whatever with respect to
either the expenditure of the proceeds of loans or their re-
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had to be abandoned. The war-time victory of the principle
that the proceeds of loans placed in England should be spent
in England was general and when England once more re-
turned to the gold standard, stipulations with respect to the
expenditure of the proceeds in England were the general
rule. A natural corollary of this change in attitude was the
post-war attention to the problem of providing specific British
industries negotiating or executing long term contracts abroad
with the type of financial connection long characteristic of
German finance. Proposals for providing this through a
closer relation between the joint stock banks and industry
and through the formation of special institutions were in
sharp contrast to pre-war practice. In the Macmillan Report
this new attitude is clearly stated (p. 165)
"Industry is yearly becoming more internationalised, and British
industry, if it is not to be stranded in a back-water, will find in-
stitutions closely in touch with international finance invaluable
in many ways as intermediaries. British companies in the iron and
steel, electrical, and other industries must meet in the gate their
great American and German competitors who are generally fi-
nancially powerful and closely supported by banking and finan-
cial groups, with whom they have continuous relationships. Brit-
ish industry, without similar support, will undoubtedly be at a
disadvantage. But such effective support cannot be obtained
merely for a particular occasion. It can only be the result of in-
timate co-operation over years during which the financial interests
get an insight into the problems and requirements of the industry
in question and the industrial interests learn the value of the sup-
port: which financial interests can give. The future development
of British industry, particularly in the establishment of enter-
prises abroad, is greatly dependent on co-operation of this char-
acter, since a knowledge of foreign conditions, farsighted plan-
ning and large supplies of capital will be, or may be, all required.
And in the realm of foreign investment it is primarily towards
British-owned enterprises abroad that we should wish to see our
energies and capital turned rather than merely towards subscrib-
ing to foreign Government and municipal loans, which absorb
our available foreign balance while doing little for our industry656 EXPERIMENTATION
and commerce. So far as heavy industry is concerned, we may find
ourselves cut more and more out of the world if our competitors,
advancing with combined and powerful industrial and financial
resources, develop abroad one 'tied' enterprise after another, or in
the alternative purchase from us enterprises previously 'tied'
to us."
We have already pointed out in connection with the dis-
cussion of war-time lending (Ch. 4) the fundamental incon-
sistency between this new point of view and the requirements
of an international gold standard system of the pre-war type.
This post-war control over the proceeds of new issues was
achieved by the private action of the underwriting houses
and others interested in the capital export. That was only
part, however, of the new situation prevailing in the new
issue market. Both the spacing in time and the amount of new
issues were subject after the war to a new type of control. In
his testimony before the Macmillan Committee Sir Ernest
Harvey of the Bank of England spoke as follows of the rela-
tions of the Bank to the issue business:
our relations are absolutely informal—that is to say, the
Issuing Houses that undertake the issue of the higher class of is-
sues. It is the practice for them to keep us informed; it is simply a
practice. They are under no compulsion to come, no obligation
whatever and we have no right to demand that they shall come,
but they do in practice come and tell us what their intentions are.
They come to consult us obviously, partly for their own ad-
vantage and partly for ours. It helps to the orderly issue of loans.
That is to say that too many loans of a particular character are
not thrown on to the market at any given time, and if the British
Government has an operation in view it gives us the opportunity,
without disclosing the fact in any shape or form, to exercise some
sort of restraining hand so that the operations of the British Gov-
ernment will not be prejudiced by other people coming out and
blocking the way. The relations are purely informal, absolutely
unofficial, but I think I can claim that they work pretty efficiently
and that they are really to the advantage of the community and
everybody concerned." 28
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It was the unanimous opinion of bankers consulted by the
writer in London that this statement represented entirely a
post-war point of view. It was quite common before the war
to postpone issues to prevent too many of the same type being
thrown on the market at the same time, but it would be a
euphemism to say that they were postponed out of deference
to the general interest as represented by the Treasury through
the Bank of England, or by the Bank of England itself. Issues
were postponed out of consideration for the interests of partic-
ular issuing houses. These may have been the same as the
general interest, but the things that counted were higher Bank
rate or the threat thereof, or some untoward political event.29
A few issues were dropped altogether before the war because
of the wishes of the Bank of England. Most of these were re-
lateci to the general foreign policy of the British government
and have been recorded in Herbert Feis' Europe, the World's
Banker, 1870—1914.Generalembargoes on new capital issues
of the post-war type were not necessary, for it never occurred
to anyone that England might go off the gold standard. It
was universally believed that long before any such danger
had arisen there would have been the necessary counteraction
in some part of the system or the exchanges would be recti-
fied by gold losses and the usual consequences of such losses.
Behind the informal cooperation of the post-war period in
the spacing or the dropping of issues, described by Sir Ernest
20 The manager of the issue department of an important London issue house
put the matter as follows to the writer: Bank of England was informed
of the loans in prospect through the membership on the Court of a partner
of our firm. The postponement of issues when coming at the same time as
government operations was only of the following kind: Suppose the Bank
of England had a large Indian Government loan and we, a large loan to be
issued on the same day. That would be inconvenient because, though they
did not interfere with each other because they appealed to entirely different
groups of investors, yet the simultaneous issue would cause a drain upon the
floating funds of the market and unnecessary disturbance. We would put
forward the issue a few days or wait until a few days after the India loan
had gone off. It was a purely technical question of proper timing and had
nothing whatsoever to do with the balance of payments or the state of the
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Harvey, there were certain positive sanctions. These have
been described authoritatively in the League of Nations doc-
ument already referred to in Chapter ii(pp. 12—3)
[Before the War] "the fundamental strength of England's finan-
cial and trading position rested on the fact that it had leadership
and almost monopoly in dictating the direction of foreign loans.
If over-lending happened to occur, the indebtedness so created
was rapidly extinguished by the cancellation of a few foreign
credits under the stimulus of a high Bank Rate at home, and, in
a smaller degree, by a modification in the balance of visible trade.
This picture has changed altogether since 1914.TheBank of
England, acting in the interests of the country as a whole, and
executing a duty which in most other centres devolved directly on
the Government, has on occasions placed an embargo on foreign
lending. It has of course no official or statutory authority em-
powering it to prevent foreign loans from being publicly offered
in the London market. But, it has long been the practice of the
principal financial houses of the City to notify and consult the
Bank of England before proceeding to the flotation of important
loans for foreign account. And this procedure has, if anything,
been followed even more closely since 1918. Thus, without legis-
lation or State action, the Bank of England has in fact, though not
in law, been constituted the arbiter and controller of the foreign
lending activities of the City.(It does not, however, concern it-
self with the nominally short term operations of the banks).
For the clearly expressed disapproval and discouragement of a
particular operation by the Bank is invariably respected.
A second line of defence against evasion of the Bank's dictates
exists—the strict prohibition now enforced by the Committee of
the Stock Exchange of dealings for which permission has not been
given. The financial developments of the post-war era have led to
a universal consensus of opinion that although direct intervention
by the Government in the management of a private institution
such as the Stock Exchange would be embarrassing for the Gov-
ernment as well as highly undesirable in the best interests of the
investing public, yet the protection of those interests does in fact
require close co-operation by the Committee with the Treasury
and the Bank in all matters relating to foreign loans. Apart from
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ernment a repetition of a certain pre-war intransigeance would
now be impossible."
Security Arbitrage
Among the changes in the reaction of the London money
market to changes in Bank rate none was more important
than the transformation in the role of security arbitrage.
Trading in securities having an international market in a
world in which demand and supply were more responsive to
changes in yield than in the speculative possibilities of capital
appreciation or depreciation provided an almost ideal 'cush-
ion' tending to counteract changes inexchangerates. Since
the exchange risk involved in the purchase of securities in one
market and their sale in another had to be covered immedi-
ately, small movements in the exchange were often quickly
counteracted by a transfer of part of the floating supply of
these international securities. These had a tendency to move
as a counterweight to the net balance of other items. In the
post-war world, however, as has been shown earlier in these
studies, the international movement of securities, far from
being a source of strength and stability in the exchanges, had
become one of the most disturbing of all the influences in the
market.
The Surface Pull of London over the Exchanges after
the Return to Gold
When considered individually, the changes in the various de-
partments of the London money market do not seem revolu-
tionary. When, however, they are considered cumulatively
they leave a clear impression that the techniques through
which London exercised its surface pull over the exchanges
were not so highly coordinated as before the war, and that the
effort to control the exchanges in emergencies was subject
to new dangers.
one of the most important of the pre-war techniques of ad-
just ment was the modification, to suit the needs of the mo-66o EXPERIMENTATION
ment, of the total flow of new foreign lending by the joint,
but unplanned cooperation of the long and short term capital
markets. This was in part a seasonal adjustment and in part
a coordinated response to changes in Bank rate.
Seasonal Peaks in the Discount and New Issues Markets
The writer's analysis of new foreign, colonial, and Dominion
capital applications in London before the war,3° shows that
during the forty-four years ending in 1914aseasonal distribu-
tion of new foreign loans was developing in which lending
activity was regularly greater in the first part of the year than
in the second. The seasonal peak in sterling acceptances drawn
to finance current trade was highest in the latter part of the
year. The occurrence of these lending peaks at different
periods tends to smooth out seasonal pressures on the ex-
changes. The post-war decline in the bankers acceptance,
therefore, probably had some adverse effect on the adaptation
of the whole foreign lending process to seasonal requirements.
This was, however, a minor factor compared to a change in
the way in which the market as a whole responded to changes
in Bank rate, which was sufficient in itself to justify the de-
scription of 1925—31 as a period of experimcntation in the
London money market.
The Pre-War Technique of Shifting from the Long Term to
the Short Term Shoulder in Internationa.l Lending
It is generally true of any large financial center, and was true
in especial degree of the London market before the war, that
the connections between the capital issue business and the
discount market are very close. Before the war the business of
the London issue houses was directly responsible for the exist-
ence of many short term credit instruments which provided
a means of temporary employment for the funds of large
investors, both institutional and individual. The business of
the issue houses also contributed very substantially to the
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supply of funds available for investment in bills or other short
term instruments. This is only another way of saying that the
London money market, both short and long term, functioned
as an integrated whole.
The offer of short term obligations in anticipation of long
term issues was a regular feature of the discount market.
Though there was no guarantee that long term issues would
be forthcoming to provide funds for their redemption, such
obligations were freely purchased because the honor and
reputation Of the issue houses arranging the short term financ-
ing were really bound up in a strong implied obligation to
relieve the discount market in due course. Foreign treasury
bills also were regularly placed in the market, not, as was
often the case after the war, to support the exchanges, but
simply because London was temporarily unwilling to absorb
long term loans on favorable terms.
Many short term obligations were placed privately with in-
surance companies, banks, and wealthy individuals. Canadian
bills, for example, were regularly placed by the Bank
of Montreal directly with the big banks. Occasionally bills
were drawn upon the issue houses for acceptance in anticipa-
tion of the proceeds of long term loans. If a merchant banker
had an issue coming forward for a foreign borrower and the
borrower wanted part of the proceeds at once, the merchant
banker might allow the borrower to draw upon him for 90
days. The discount market eagerly took such bills, since they
bore a prime name, and were certain to be provided for at
maturity by the proceeds of a new long term issue. This was
not a usual transaction, for it was seldom necessary, but since
there were no rules in the English system, and the business
was safe and legitimate, there was no reason why such bills
should not be drawn, and they are mentioned here primarily
to indicate the flexibility of the arrangements in the market,
once the initial decision to extend credit had been reached.
Because this anticipatory borrowing assumed so many forms,
it is impossible to estimate its amount from published pro-662 EXPERIMENTATION
spectuses, yet these afford some indication of its frequency. As
a byproduct of the writer's compilation of pre-war foreign
capital applications, 47 cases were noted between 1892 and
1914 in which the new issue was itself a short term loan of
one sort or another, or was a long term loan the proceeds of
which were to be used to retire temporary advances of various
kinds.
The continuity of British lending abroad was thus greatly
facilitated by the ability of the market as a whole to shift from
long to short term as occasion arose. It was usual for the
anticipatory borrowing to be considerably less than the long
term loans, which ultimately took up the short term instru-
ments. The immediate need of the borrowers was satisfied
by an advance of a portion of the total amount required, and
the system was given great flexibility. The men in the London
money market most experienced in these matters agree that
the market was never entirely closed to foreign borrowers.
THE RESPONSE OF THE NEW ISSUES MARKET TO CHANGES IN BANK
RATE
Borrowersin London before the war did not have the ready
alternative of going elsewhere to satisfy their requirements.
Consequently changes in Bank rate had the effect of altering
the timing rather than the amount of foreign borrowing, and
largely determined the shifts between the long and short term
markets. Since the yield on securities was closely associated
with changes in Bank rate as shown by the classic inverse re-
lation between Bank rate and the price of consols, the issue
houses were deeply interested in the probable future course
of that rate. Large and expert buyers of securities, such as the
investment trusts and the insurance companies, would not be
eager purchasers of foreign bonds priced on the basis of a
market rate of interest that was expected soon to change in
favor of the buyers. Conversely these buyers, whose knowledge
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ing changes in Bank rate were nearly as great as that of the
issue houses themselves, would be encouraged if they ex-
pected an early reduction in the rate. The new issue business
was therefore geared to anticipated changes in Bank rate.3'
This was, however, almost exclusively due to the effect of ex-
pected changes on lenders. It would have been to the interest
of borrowers to try to take advantage of the relatively favor-
able interest rate basis existing prior to an expected increase
in Bank rate, and to hold off in expectation of a fall, but in
practice they could not do so. Interest rates were in general
lower in London that elsewhere, except in Paris where the
foreign loan market was subject to strict regulation by both
the Treasury and the Foreign Office. Moreover, the prices at
which new loans were issued in London were sufficiently low
so that ½percent more or less in the interest rate did not
matter very much to the borrowers. Borrowers in fact needed
money and had to pay the price whatever it was.
An increase in Bank rate from 3½to4 per cent had a much
greater effect in postponing new issues than an increase from
2 to 21/2 per cent. A 4 per cent Bank rate meant the existence
of a more serious pressure on Bank of England reserves,
greater strain upon the exchanges, and a smaller available
surplus for lending abroad. In the days before the statistical
calculation of totals of the items in the international balance
of payments, merchant bankers and other issuers felt that it
did not look right and was not right to bring out large capital
issues for foreign account when Bank rate was 4 per cent or
over. There were not many such issues. Temporary financing
by treasury bills or otherwise was then the order of the day.
The borrower could get part of his requirements by this
means if he was willing to pay the price, and for the rest he
had to be content to wait for a better market. The effect of an
expected rise in Bank rate on the long term market, there-
Astatistical proof of this generalization has been prepared by me for the
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fore, increased the amount of short term instruments offered
in the discount market. At the same time it reduced, though
only very slightly, one element in the demand for such instru-
ments.
Because of certain customary practices in the new issues
market, the funds of British savers in the course of being sent
abroad as capital exports halted for a period of temporary
employment in the London discount market, as did the funds
of foreigners in the course of being returned to British savers
in the form of interest and sinking fund payments. Borrowers
in London before the war normally left the proceeds of their
loans with the issue houses until they were required. Even if
they were needed at once for remittance abroad, the banks
that acted as agents for the borrowers 32wouldretain sterling
assets, while placing the borrower in possession of bank credit
abroad, rather than depress the exchanges by making large
and sudden offers of sterling in the foreign exchange market.
Moreover the proceeds of foreign loans were almost always
made available to borrowers gradually through payment by
the investor in installments. Therefore, a certain volume of
sterling deposits, which represented the proceeds of loans
awaiting disposal by borrowers or held by foreign banks and
agencies for gradual sale abroad, was always in existence in
the London market. The postponement of new capital issues
in response to expected or actual changes in Bank rate dimin-
ished this supply of funds available for short term investment.
It did not, however, do so abruptly, for the proceeds of issues
placed in the past continued to become or remain available
because of the operation of the installment system and the
administrative acts of the banks through which remittance
abroad was accomplished.
It was also a practically binding custom for the remittance
32 the Bank of Montreal for many Canadian, the 'exchange banks' for
Far Eastern, and the London and Brazilian or Anglo-South American banks
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of sinking fund and interest payments to be in the hands of
the paying agencies in London for specified periods in ad-
vance of the date on which they were due. Before the war
sinking fund money was regularly brought to London and
placed with issue houses a month or six weeks in advance,
often by contractual arrangement. It was for this reason that
the Bank of Montreal, for example, was long a substantial
lender in the London discount market, and ceased to be so
when Canadian borrowing was transferred to New York. The
issue houses definitely expected, as additional compensation
for their services in making capital issues, that this arrange-
ment should be followed, and that interest should be on hand
possibly a week in advance. So important was this source of
forelign funds in London that a good money market author-
ity has suggested the possibility of actually calculating the
average amount of such funds that had to be in London at
all times during the year.33
The funds of British savers awaiting remittance abroad,
and the funds of foreign borrowers awaiting the due date of
sink:ing fund and interest payments had to find employment,
and were the source of a steady demand for bills which was,
in the short run, relatively insensitive to changes in Bank rate.
THE RESPONSE OF THE SHORT TERM MARKET TO CHANGES IN
BANK RATE
Changes in Bank rate did not alter either the willingness of
London banks to extend acceptance credit on good commer-
cial risks or the demand for such credit. They shifted a small
portion of trade financing to or from bank advances; but in
The procedure suggested is to calculate the interest and sinking fund pay-
ments due during the year on foreign loans outstanding. This would give the
minimum amount of foreign funds that had to be I)rougbt to London. If
a minimum period, such asweeks [or sinking Fund money and iweekfor
interest money, is taken to represent the time during which these funds were
held in London, the average amount that had to be on hand at all times can
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the main did not interfere with the financing of genuine com-
mercial transactions by bills. Acceptance houses did not re-
fuse to accept good bills because the exchange rate was mov-
ing against London, nor did commercial borrowers change
long-standing credit lines and banking connections for tempo-
rary interest advantage. The response of the finance bill, how-
ever, to changes in Bank rate was quite different. Many bills
were drawn on the acceptance houses for the sole purpose of
taking advantage of low interest rates in London. For ex-
ample, one of the regular methods of placing blocks of Ameri-
can securities in the London market involved the use of such
bills during the period of accumulation and marketing. Bills
were continuously being drawn to move funds from one mar-
ket to another, especially between Paris and London. All such
transactions were very delicate and, unlike trade borrowing,
were sensitive to changes in differential interest rates.
While some borrowers were eliminated wholly or in part
from the long term market because they could not borrow
when Bank rate was rising, others were eliminated from the
short term market because they did not wish to borrow under
these conditions. In contrast to the situation in the new issues
market there was no lack of short term lenders. The influence
of an expected increase in Bank rate in contracting the de-
mand for bills arising from the technical procedures of the
capital market was slight compared with its influence in at-
tracting to London a part of the mobile international bill
portfolio.
The so-called 'foreign banks' in London and the private
bankers in general that did a foreign business regularly kept
a portfolio of foreign bills. This was moderate in amount and
largely continental in character, including French bons de
tresor and acceptances on Germany, Belgium, the Nether-
lands, Switzerland, and France. A few American and other
acceptances were also held, as well as deposits in American
banks which were sometimes substantial. Conversely banks of
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sterling bills. These were much greater than the British port-
folio of foreign bills and had continually to be replaced at
maturity. Ordinary business prudence dictated that when
Bank rate was expected to rise and the chances of re placing
bills at a better price in the near future were good this port-
folio should run down. This did not drive funds in substan-
tial amounts from London, but it hastened the adjustment of
the market rate of discount to the expected change in Bank
rate. When this adjustment had taken place, and Bank rate
was raised, a demand came into the bill market not only to
meet replacement requirements, but also to increase the for-
eign portfolio of sterling bills. At the same time the British
'foreign banks' sold part of their foreign portfolio and bought
sterling bills. This consideration applied also, mutatis mu-
tandri, to a reduction in Bank rate.
THE COORDINATED RESPONSE
The supply of short term instruments in the London market
had two components—a stable base made up of bills drawn
to finance trade and a sensitive superstructure, made up of
finance bills. The demand for such instruments also had a
stable base—the need for secondary reserves and for outlets
for short funds made available by the techniques of the new
issues market—and a flexible superstructure—the shifting
ownership of the international bill portfolio. An increase in
Bank rate reduced the amount of finance bills drawn, left the
amount of commercial bills and the stable elements in de-
mand very little changed, and increased the flexible elements
in demand. It therefore made room for the additional short
term securities offered to take care of the temporary needs of
prospective long term borrowers. Its effect on the market as a
whole was to reduce the total of long and short term securities
offered for sale, but to distribute the, reduction in such a way
as not to shut down entirely on foreign applicants for long
terni credit, and not to contract legitimate commercial credit
line.s needed to carry on international trade.668 EXPERIMENTATION
The Loss of Integration in the Money Market's Response to
Changes in Bank Rate, Summary
Before the war the raising of Bank rate postponed new capital
loans for foreign account, and it did so the more effectively
the higher the level from which the rate was raised. The post-
ponement of new foreign lending and the prudent manage-
ment of the remittance abroad of the proceeds of foreign
loans placed in the recent past and still being paid in London,
while income from abroad for interest and sinking fund pay-
ments on past loans continued as before, increased the de-
mand for sterling relative to the supply. Meanwhile, the dis-
count market was required to take over part of the burden
of new foreign lending from the new issues market. But this
increased new short term foreign lending was less than the
decrease in new long, term foreign lending resulting from the
postponement of new issues. At the same time sterling bills
drawn for speculative purposes with the intention of remit-
ting the proceeds abroad were reduced more than new short
term lending taken over from the capital market was in-
creased. The amount of sterling made available to foreigners
as a result of new short term loans was therefore reduced on
balance. In addition, the demand of foreigners for investment
in sterling short term instruments was increased in response
to the higher interest yield. The whole process of adjustment
in the discount market reinforced and was harmonized with
the response of the new issues market to a higher Bank rate.
An instantaneous and double adjustment in both markets
brought about a new demand for and decreased the supply of
sterling in the foreign exchange and market.
After the war the great and direct interest of the govern-
ment in the state of the capital market and in the interest rate
because of its unprecedented refunding problems; the new
elements of direct control in the market for foreign issues;
the new attitude of British lenders toward the employment of
the proceeds of new issues; the substitution of the treasuryA DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 669
bill :in large measure for the genuine commercial bill in the
discount market; the substitution of the mechanisms of the
forward exchange market for the technique of interest ar-
bitrage through bills; the increasingly conscious regulation
of the foreign exchanges; and the fact that sterling had to be
persistently defended during the process of returning to gold
and after the return to gold—all combined to break down this
remarkable integration in the response of the London money
market as a whole to changes in Bank rate.
New Dangers in the Market
In contrasting the pre-war and post-war situations, two other
circumstances must be stressed. In the first place, when there
are two or more large and willing lenders in the world's
international banking system, the situation may arise in
which an increase in Bank rate in one of the two lending
centers does not redistribute the capital loans in that center in
time, but definitely drives the borrowers from one market to
the other. Sinking fund and interest on old loans may be
pouring into one center while new loans are going out of the
other. This almost certainly will accentuate the interest dif-
ferentials between the two centers, disturb the exchange rates,
and increase gold movements; in addition, it will make the
genuine time-bridging function of capital loans very much
more difficult to accomplish. Such a situation prevailed from
1925 to 1929 when New York and London were competing
for prestige as the world's banker.
In the second place, the use of the pre-war techniques of
adjustment were subject to new dangers arising from changes
in the distribution and amount of internationally mobile
funds in the London market and the increased importance
of private security transactions. These tended to create new
prol)lems and to diminish the effect upon the market as a
whcrle of the type of adjustment just described. Because of the
position of her international payments Great Britain found
herself obliged to pay for imports in part by her promises to670 EXPERIMENTATION
pay of one kind or another. She would buy, for example,
Argentine meat and Argentina would pay out the sterling
received to meet her own obligations, and through the inter-
national clearance in the foreign exchange markets this ster-
ling claim would lodge in the possession of other important
creditor countries, particularly France and the United States.
These countries would use the sterling to buy the only British
exportable article that appealed to them, since British goods
were still too dear, namely, British promises to pay, particu-
larly balances, treasury bills, and war loans. This created a
type of international debt with which the London market
had not previously had to deal. Many countries not indebted
to Great Britain acquired claims on London, whereas many
countries that were indebted to Great Britain were unable
to maintain the substantial sterling balances and sterling
portfolio they had held before the war.
UNFAITHFUL BALANCES
This new type of distribution in the ownership of foreign
funds in London was in conflict with the traditional view
that the presence of foreign balances was merely an inter-
national application of the ordinary banking principle by
which customers are required to maintain average balances in
banks.84 London bankers had always been confident that
when such balances were withdrawn they would be passed on,
through the system of international clearance, to others who
required sterling and would find a lodgment once more in
the London market. For this reason many of them felt that
the figures published by the Macmillan Committee concern-
ing the short term indebtedness of London gave a greatly
exaggerated impression of the vulnerability of the market.
They maintained that borrowing short and lending long is
banking and that the normal condition of a creditor country
is to be a short term debtor. In this they were partly justified.
Even at the time of the publication of the Macmillan Report
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balances amounting to perhaps £150 million were in London
as a result of the deposit-compelling power often referred to
in these studies, and could not be withdrawn unless foreign
banks proposed to stop doing business in London altogether.
The position was, nevertheless, new. Internationally mobile
balances in London, such for example as those kept afloat by
the British oil and tobacco monopolies and other big indus-
trial 'corporations, were very much larger, and foreign balances
were both larger and less diversified. Before the war small
volatile balances moved in waves over the surface of the ocean
of foreign balances in London. After the war these waves
upon the surface were much deeper.
After England returned to the gold standard, therefore, the
London market was subject to the withdrawal of balances on
such a scale as to raise the question of 'unfaithful money.'
Large movements of balances were, however, very often the
result of security transactions, and the shifting of deposits as
such frequently assumed a disproportionate share in the dis-
cussion of this problem.
UNFAITHFUL SECURITIES
After 1925 the Bank of England kept a high Bank rate as part
of the technique of defending sterling. Consequently prime
British securities, including the war loans, sold on a favorable
yield basis and were attractive to foreign purchasers. The
nationals of many countries that had placed loans in London
also bought the sterling issues of their own countries freely
for, as before the war, they liked the combination of their
own country's credit and a sterling claim. These foreign
hold ings of sterling securities were far more important than
foreign deposits. As expressed to the writer in London 'ready
money is tiny compared to securities.' If we enlarge the usual
connotation of the phrase 'unfaithful money' as applied to
money markets after the war to include investments by for-
eigners as well as their deposits, then the true magnitude of
the ]?roblem is apparent. After the war an adverse British bal-672 EXPERIMENTATION
ance of payments was offset by large foreign holdings of both
•sterling securities and deposits, but Great Britain obtained
these foreign funds because she paid for them, not because
foreigners had to have sterling assets. It was the difference
known to every banker between live and active and idle de-
posits held by Great Britain for her customers.
New Criteria for Bank of England Policy
The evidence takenbeforethe Macmillan Committee
abounds in references to the question whether under these
circumstances the old criteria of action were still adequate
guides for the Bank of England. On the other hand, this evi-
dence also includes several direct statements by Mr. Norman
and Sir Ernest Harvey to the effect that the Bank of England
continued after the war and after the return to gold to be
guided in its formulation of credit policy solely by the be-
havior of the short term market and of the exchanges. These
statements seem to contain a certain element of nostalgia, for
there is no doubt that during the long interregnum of '9 '4—
25 the 'semi-conscious' elements of management of pre-war
days35 had been developed into a direct and conscious grap-
pling with the problems lying behind money market phe-
nomena in all their various aspects, and that this new attitude
was continued after the return to gold. The Bank of England
was not accustomed before the war to assign to itself or to the
public definite economic reasons for the various steps of poi-
icy upon which it embarked. It was in intimate contact with
the daily 'feel' of the market and in possession of a great fund
of experience. This was the basis of its conduct, and policies
formed in this way were justified by their practical success.
But after the war something more was needed. The discount
market had, as a matter of hard fact, lost its paramount sig-
nificance as the nerve center of the whole money market sys-
This expression came to the writer from an excellent London money market
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tern and the infallible guide to policy. Not by accident did the
Bank of England greatly develop its own agencies of statisti-
cal research after the war and seek the advice of its own eco-
nomic experts drawn from outside the ranks of the practition-
ers of the market.
These changes were at bottom due to the fact that the
money market was operating in a new environment in which
the defense of sterling was a continual preoccupation. Their
immediate explanation lay in the first place in the technical
changes described, particularly the loss of integration in the
response of the money market to changes in Bank'rate. In
the second place, the relations growing up between the Bank
of England and other central banks required an ever increas-
ing c:ontrol of the domestic market. Sir Ernest Harvey gave
testimony before the Macmillan Committee that, as part of
the arrangements made with other central banks, assets
bought by the Bank of England for such banks could be
offered to the Bank of England for discount, and could be
turned into Bank of England deposits at Though in
pracl:ice the balances of foreign central banks were steady
because the Bank required free balances as compensation for
its expenses in rendering various services to them,87 neverthe-
less what amounted to a new form of contingent liability was
created, of which the Bank had to take account in formu-
lating policy. New and vital relations had also been estab-
86Duringthe hearings held by the Macmillan Committee Mr. McKenna tried
to get Sir Ernest Harvey to admit that these were really demand deposits not
induded in the statement of the Bank, and held that, unless shown, the real
obligations of the Bank of England to foreign central banks were understated
(Minutes of Evidence, I, i6, questions 217—9).Mr.McKenna seemed to ask
for the inclusion in the Bank's balance sheet of an item similar to that of
the Federal Reserve banks showing their contingent liability for bills bought
for foreign correspondents, but Sir Ernest Harvey held that item to be
misleading because the Federal Reserve banks do not publish the amount
of government securities they purchase for foreign central banks (ibid., p. 17,
question231).
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lished between the Bank and the Treasury, not only in the
administration of the public funds but also in so regulating
rates as not to impede refunding operations. In particular,
the problem of refunding the £2,000 million 5 per cent War
Loan was always a market factor. The Bank probably did not
gain full liberty of action with respect to interest rates until
after the great national effort to refund this issue was corn-
pleted in 1932 (cf. Gb. 31).Finallythe Bank's relations with
the joint stock banks had changed. The Bank took a new
interest in obtaining direct information from them concern-
ing the needs of industry, and did, in practice, recognize their
increased importance in all money market matters, and its
own greater dependence on their cooperation in making its
rate effective. This was partly due to the new weapons by
which the joint stock banks could resist Bank of England
pressure exerted upon them indirectly through the discount
market—the non-renewal of their investment in treasury bills,
the use of gold held outside the Bank, the willingness to
allow their ratio system to vary. It was partly due to the fact,
brought out by the Macmillan Committee, that the joint
stock banks after the return to gold played a much greater
direct role than formerly in attracting foreign deposits to
England because they accepted such deposits at interest rates
that did not always vary with the market rate of discount.
Cooperation by the joint stock banks was therefore impor-
tant to the Bank of England, and was in the main forthcom-
ing. At the same time the Bank relied more heavily upon its
own direct initiative in influencing the credit base, depend-
ing less upon the indirect effects of changes in Bank rate upon
the discount market. In view of the increased volume of pub-
lic transactions it was possessed of great potential power to
do so by working in close cooperation with the Treasury in
the management of the 'public deposits,' and in the Currency
and Bank Notes Act of 1928 it quietly took power to prevent
its policies from being opposed through private gold trans-
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in the position of the Bank in the London money market and
its criteria of action is not complete without a consideration
of that Act.
The Final Legal Form
of the British Gold Bullion Standard
The Currency and Bank Notes Act of 1928
Great Britain's position in the international gold standard
syste:rn was, after 1925, in substance different from her pre-war
position in the various respects analyzed above. The changes
in the external form of her adherence to the gold standard,
begun in the Currency and Bank Notes Acts of 1914andcon-
tinued through the administrative decrees of the war period,
the Gold and Silver (Export Control) Act of 1920,andthe
GolãStandardAct of 1925,werecompleted by the Currency
and Bank Notes Act of 1928. From a broad international
viewpoint this Act, which finally completed the legal frame-
work of the post-war British gold bullion standard, could
properly and logically have been treated in Part II. This
would, however, have removed from its proper setting the
discussion of certain techniques of credit control practiced
in Great Britain during Experimentation which were inti-
mately related to, and indeed, the expression of, long range
polides laid down by the Cunliffe Committee in igi8 as an
integral part of the British program not only of returning to,
but also of maintaining the gold standard.
The Cunliffe Committee in its Interim Report of igi8
recommended:
i)Theamalgamation of the Currency Note Issue and the Bank
of England note issue and a return to the basic principles of the
Peel Act of 1844;
2)Amethod of determining the future size of the fiduciary issue
after the amalgamation had been carried out;
Apolicy to be pursued in anticipation of and in preparation
for that amalgamation;
4)Completecentralization of British gold reserves.676 EXPERIMENTATION
The first recommendation contained three elements set
forth in paragraphs 21, 32, and 33 of the Report (our italics)
i)"....itis, in our judgment, imperative [to protect the gold
standard against domestic inflationary tendencies] that the issue
of fiduciary notes shall be, as soon as practicable, once more lim-
ited by law, and that the present arrangements under which de-
posits at the Bank of England may be exchanged for legal tender
currency without affecting the reserve of the Banking Department
shall be terminated at the earliest possible moment. Additional
demands for legal tender currency otherwise than in exchange
for gold should be met from the reserves of the Bank of England
and not by the Treasury, so that the necessary checks upon an
undue issue may be brought regularly into play. Subject to transi-
tional arrangements which we propose ... werecommend that
the Note Issue...shouldbe entirely in the hands of the Bank
of England."
2)".... Weare of opinion that the principle of the Act of
1844 should be maintained, namely that there shall be a fixed
fiduciary issue beyond which, subject to emergency arrangements
which we recommend below, notes should only be issued in ex-
change for gold."
".... Weare of opinion that the provisions of the cur-
rency and Bank Notes Act of 1914underwhich the Bank of
England may, with the consent of the Treasury, temporarily is-
sue notes in excess of the legal limit should be continued in force.
It should be provided by Statute that Parliament should be in-
formed forthwith of any action taken by the Treasury under this
provision by means of a Treasury Minute which should be laid
before both Houses. The Statute should also provide that any
profits derived from the excess issue should be surrendered by the
Bank to the Exchequer. It will of course be necessary that Bank
rate should be raised to and maintained at a figure sufficiently
high to secure the earliest possible retirement of the excess issue."
Since, in view of future changes in total note circulation,
it was technically impossible to estimate the size of the fiduci-
ary issue that would be appropriate to the situation prevailing
at the time of the proposed amalgamation the Committee
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i)theprocedure of fixing upon a desirable central gold reserve
and deriving the size of the fiduciary issue from it be followed.
2) on the basis of a pre-war Bank of England gold reserve of £38
million and a pre-war gold reserve of £123millionin the pocket
of the people, "the normal minimum amount of the central gold
reserve should be £150,000,000."
3)when the exchanges were working normally on the basis of a
minimum reserve of £150millionthe position should again be
reviewed in the light of the dimensions of the fiduciary issue as it
then existed.
4) when the fiduciary position of the issue was reduced to the
amount which experience showed to be consistent with the main-
tenance of a gold reserve of £150millionin the Issue Department
of the Bank, the outstanding Currency Notes should be retired
and Bank of England Notes of low denomination substituted,the
Ban:k of England fiduciary issue being simultaneously increased
by an amount equal to the issue of Currency Notes covered by
government securities.
The Committee dealt with the policy to be pursued pend-
ing the amalgamation in the following terms (sec. 43 and 44,
our italics)
i)'Therewould be some awkwardness in transferring the issue
of Currency Notes to the Bank of England before the future
dimensions of the fiduciary issue have been ascertained. We there-
fore recommend that during the transition period the issue should
remain a Government issue, but that such post-war expansion
(if any) as may take place should be covered, not by the invest-
men.t of the proceeds of the new notes in government securities as
at present, but by taking Bank of England Notes from the Bank
of England and holding them in the Currency Note Reserve, and
that, as and when opportunity arises for providing cover for the
existing fiduciary portion of the issue, the same procedure be
followed. The effect of this arrangement would be that the de-
mands for new currency would operate in the normal way to re-
duce the reserve of the Banking Department of the Bank of
would have to be restored by raising money rates
and encouraging gold imports."
2) 'We should then in the course of time have a Currency Note678 EXPERIMENTATION
Issue covered partly by the £28,500,000 of gold at present held
and partly by Bank of England Notes covered by gold in the Is-
sue Department, the balance, forming the Fiduciary part of the
Issue properly so-called, being covered by Government securities."
This policy for the transition period was, as shown in
Chapters 9—10, put into practical effect in its essential mean-
ing if not in the precise accounting form suggested by the
Committee. Expansion of the note issue was provided for
after the war "by taking Bank of England Notes from the
Bank of England," and putting them into actual circulation
instead of transferring them to the Currency Note Reserve
Account as backing for new Currency Notes (some notes
were transferred in this way). The effect was identical, ex-
cept that an intermediate term, an increase in Currency Note
reserves and Currency Notes in circulation, was dropped out.
The system "under which deposits at the Bank of England
may be exchanged for legal tender currency without affecting
the reserve of the Banking Department" was terminated. The
Committee's recommendations did not include a correlative
proposal that the arrangements under which legal tender
might be exchanged for deposits at the Bank of England with-
out affecting the reserve of the Banking Department should
be terminated. Quite the contrary. The Committee recom-
mended that, as, and when opportunity arose for providing
cover for the existing fiduciary portion of the Currency Note
Issue Bank of England Notes should be transferred to the
Currency Note reserve. Such an opportunity arose with the
return flow of currency in 1920—22. Here again the policy
was carried out in substance rather than in form. Instead of
withdrawing Bank of England Notes from circulation and
transferring the resulting increase in the reserve of the Bank-
ing Department to the Currency Note reserve, Currency Notes
were retired. The effect was the same, the only difference
being that an intermediate transaction—an increase in Notes
in the Banking Department and their transfer to the Cur-
rency Note reserve—was omitted.A DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 679
The Cunliffe Committee Report confined itself to the ef-
fect of the administration of the dual system of note issue on
the reserve of the Banking Department, leaving its effect on
'bankers balances' to be inferred. The increase in circulation
from 1919 to 1920 put pressure on both the Bank's own re-
serve and 'bankers balances at the Bank.' The decline in cir-
culation during 1920—22 relieved neither. It failed to relieve
'bankers balances,' however, only because of the employment
of another technique—that of keeping 'public deposits'
steady without recourse to additional Bank of England credit
in spite of the drafts made upon them to redeem Currency
Noi:es.88 By this second technique seasonal fluctuations in the
total note issue were prevented during the first three and a
half years after the return to gold from having any appreci-
influence on 'bankers balances' at the Bank of England.
In these ways the technical details of the plan to reduce
the fiduciary element in the note issue and prepare for the
amalgamation became part of the domestic policy of deflation
followed by stability that played so great a role in the world
drama of England's effort to return to and maintain the gold
standard.
Concerning the policy of concentration of gold reserves
the Cunliffe Committee made the following recommenda-
tioris (sec. 24, 25, and 44, our italics)
i)"...whileit is a necessary condition of an effective gold
standard that the import of gold should be free from all restric-
tions it is not necessary to allow gold coin and bullion obtained
otherwise than from the Bank of England to be exported. In view
of the fact that it is convenient for the Bank of England that the
Bank of England have cognizance of all gold exports we think it
desirable that the export of gold coin and bullion should be
subject to the condition that such coin or bullion has been ob-
tained from the Bank of England."
2)"...inview of the withdrawal of gold from circulation, it
is, we think, desirable that the gold reserves of the country should
be held by one central institution, and we recommend therefore
88Ch. io, The Administration of the Dual System of Note Issue.68o EXPERIMENTATION
that all banks should transfer any gold now held by them to the
Bank of England except such small amounts as they may require
• to keep for the convenience of travellers."
"... Duringthe transition stage the greater part at any rate
of the demand for gold for export will fall upon the Bank of
England, since currency notes are not likely to be presented to
any large extent for actual payment in gold, but will be paid in
by the banks which collect them to the credit of their accounts
with the Bank of England, the balances thereby created being
used when necessary to draw gold from the Bank of England for
export in the ordinary way. We accordingly think that it will be
desirable that Bank of England notes should likewise be sub-
stituted in the currency note reserve, either immediately after
the war or from time to time by instalments, for the £28,500,000
gold now held by that reserve, so that when the time is ripe for
the final transfer the whole of the gold reserve may be in the
hands of the Bank."
The second recommendation was carried out in February
1920 under circumstances in which the interests of the banks
coincided strongly with the recommendation of policy(cf.
Ch. 9), and the third was acted upon immediately on the
return to the gold standard. The first amounted to a proposal
to direct the whole international flow of gold through Lon-
don through the Bank of England, thus transferring to the
Bank the major functions of the bullion market. It was not
put into effect as suggested, but its central aim was attained
by certain provisions of the Currency and Bank Notes Act of
1928 and by the inconspicuous procedure of carrying out the
customs formalities concerning gold at the Bullion Office of
the Bank of England.
The Report of the Committee on Currency and Bank of
England Note Issues, upon whose recommendations England
acted in returning to gold in April 1925, took "as its natural
starting point" in dealing with the amalgamation of the note
issues the recommendation of the Cunliffe Committee that
the Currency Note Issue should be transferred to the Bank ofA DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 68i
England when it had been ascertained by experience what
fiduciary issue was consistent with the maintenance of a cen-
tralized reserve of £150million(sec. 4). That figure, it re-
called, was based upon the assumption that gold circulation
within the country was not to be resumed, and was, indeed, a
luxury not essential to a modern gold standard (sec. 41,43,
and 44).Inview of the establishment of a gold bullion stand-
ard, it considered the actual date of the amalgamation of the
note issues not of vital importance, and therefore merely
recommended a continuation of the policies laid down by the
Cunliffe Committee (sec. ag). It held that the experience
needed to determine the size of the fiduciary issue should
have been obtained by 1927, and that since about a year
would be required to establish the machinery for the transfer,
steps should be taken at once to prepare the technical details
(sec. 49). It suggested that the actual amalgamation might be
effected early in 1928 or even before (sec. 50).
In March 1925 the £27 million gold remaining in the Cur-
rency Note Reserve Account was transferred to the Bank of
England in exchange for Bank of England Notes as recom-
mended by the Cunliffe Committee, and public deposits con-
tinued to be so managed as to prevent seasonal fluctuations in
the currency from greatly influencing bankers balances.
On July 2, 1928 the Currency and Bank Notes Act was
passed, carrying into effect the long maturing and carefully
prepared program for a return to normal techniques in the
administration of the note issue, subject to the changes re-
quired by the transition to a gold bullion standard and with
the addition of a legislative substitute for the old-fashioned
pra.ctice of suspending the Bank Act under a Letter of In-
dernnity in times of emergency. This Act was a tribute to the
consistency of the fundamental British monetary policy car-
ried out over a whole decade, 1918—28, characterized by such
remarkable changes in other respects. It provided
i)forthe amalgamation of the two note issues through the issue
ofandio s. Bank of England Notes having legal tender power682 EXPERIMENTATION
and payable only at the head office of the Bank of England, the
transfer of the assets of the Currency Note reserve to the Bank of
England, and the assumption by the Bank of England of the
obligation to meet outstanding Currency Notes pending their
exchange for Bank of England Notes (sec.i, par. i and 3, and
sec. 4 and 5);
2) the fixing of the fiduciary issue at £260 million to consist of
securities appropriated by the Bank to the Issue Department, in-
cluding silver coin not in excess of £51/2million(sec. 2, par. i,
and sec. 3);
theprovision of elasticity in the note issue by giving the
Treasury the right to (a) reduce the fiduciary issue at the request
of the Bank for periods determined by the Treasury (sec. 2, par.
2); (b) increase the fiduciary issue to a specified amount at the
request of the Bank for periods not to exceed six months with
three renewals; i.e. a total period of not exceeding 2 years unless
Parliamentary authority for a further extension was secured
(sec. 8);
4) the payment of profits earned by the Bank on the fiduciary
issue to the Exchequer (sec. 6);
5) the modification of the form of the Bank statement as agreed
upon by the Bank and the Treasury (sec. io);
6) the granting of power to the Bank of England to compel the
sale to it of gold held in England outside the Bank as long as the
gold bullion standard remained in effect (sec. 1 i).
The provisions under headings 1—4 were all in strict accord
with the technical recommendations of the Cunliffe Commit-
tee. The gTanting of the power to the Bank to commandeer
gold was in harmony with, though it did not go as far as, the
recommendations of that Committee in centralizing control
over gold in the hands of the Bank. The text of this provision
(sec. ii, par. i and 2, our italics) reads:
"With a view to the concentration of gold reserves and to the
securing of economy in the use of gold, the following provisions
of this section shall have effect as long as subsection (i) of section
one of the Gold Standard Act, 1925, remains in force.
Any person in the United Kingdom owning any gold coin or
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shall, on being required so to do by notice in writing from the
Bank, forthwith furnish to the Bank in writing particulars of the
gold coin and bullion owned by that person, and shall, if so re-
quired by the Bank, sell to the Bank thewholeor any part of the
said coin and bullion, other than any part thereof which is bona
fIde held for immediate export or which is bona fide required for
industrial purposes, on payment therefor by the Bank, in the case
of coin of the nominal value thereof, or in the case of bullion at
the rate fixed in section 4 of the Bank Charter Act of 1844."
The functions of the bullion market were in this way con-
tinued undisturbed, but the Bank was armed against any
interference in its policies by privately accumulated gold
hoards or gold reserves.
on November 21, 1928 the amalgamation was successfully
carried out, and the Bank's first statement in its new form
published. As a result of the transfer of assets from the Cur-
rency Note reserve a certain amount of foreign exchange
was for the first time included in the assets of the Issue De-
paritment of the Bank of England under the head 'other
securities,' but this was restricted to the currencies of coun-
tries with a free gold market.38
The English Credit Base during Experimentation
The preceding discussion of the experiment of defending
sterling, and indeed the whole treatment of the international
gold standard in these studies, forms a background against
which the behavior of the English credit base and credit
superstructure after the return to gold may be examined
statistically, and which gives a rich historical and technical
significance to the bare figures.
The return to the gold standard in April 1925 marked
the end of a little over three years of stability in the 'reserve
of notes and coin' in the Banking Department of the Bank of
England (Chart 14),butit did not on that account inaugu-
rate a period of instability in the credit base of the commer-
39SirErnest Harvey's evidence before the Macmillan Committee (Minutes of
Evidence, I, 14,answerto question 156).684 EXPERIMENTATION
cial banking system. The whole course of Bank of England
credit policy was designed to prevent domestic currency
movements and international gold flows from influencing di-
rectly the balances of banks at the Bank of England while the
treasury bill technique, described in Chapter io, prevented
these balances from being directly influenced by the flow of
public revenue.
The Reserve of the Bank of England
The range of fluctuation in the 'reserve of notes and coin' of
the Banking Department of the Bank of England was very
much wider after the return to gold than before owing to the
Li
CHART38
United Kingdom, J'Tote Cir-
culation, 1925-1931,lastweek
of each month
joint influence of the renewed contact established between
the bullion market and the Bank of England by the Gold
Standard Act of 1925andof the amalgamation of the note
issues by the Currency and Bank Notes Act of 1928. They
were not affected by the transfer of gold to the Bank from the
Currency Note Reserve Account in March 1925 (Chart 39),
for this was offset by a corresponding increase in Bank of
England Notes. These were transferred to the Currency Note
Reserve Account, and the total note circulation was also un-
changed (Chart 38). Until the amalgamation, the reserve of
the Banking Department was not influenced by major seasonal
fluctuations in total circulation, for these continued to take
place in the Currency Note component (Ap. TableB and
Chart 38), but after November 1928 this was, of course, no
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longer possible. Throughout the period changes in gold coin
and bullion of the Bank of England once more reflected the
Bank's participation in the international distribution of gold.
In combination with the Bank of England note component
of total note circulation, with the one exception noted, they
determined the fluctuations in the 'reserve of notes and coin
of the Banking Department.' After November 21, 1928, for
the first time since 1914,fluctuationsin the reserve of the
Bank of England reflected fully the changes in the domestic
circulation, and for the first time since the adoption of the
gold standard, it became a simple statistical task to separate
and measure the influence of changes in the domestic circula-
tion and of international gold flows upon the Bank of Eng-
land reserve. Before the war it was necessary, because of the
wide use of sovereigns, to eliminate the domestic gold flow
from total gold movements at the Bank, and to combine it
with changes in notes in circulation in order to separate the
domestic and international influences playing upon Bank of
England reserve,40 and from August 1914toNovember 1928
the Bank of England reserve was influenced only by a frac-
tion:, and by no means a considerable or a constant fraction,
of the fluctuations in the domestic circulation.
The joint influence of these two factors on the reserve of
the :Banking Department may be shown by using the method
of graphical presentation employed in dealing with the dual
system of note issue in Chapters 9 and io (Charts 5 and i6).
To bring out the effects of the amalgamation of the note is-
sues the periods 1925 to November 1928 and December 1928
to 1931arepresented separately in ChartThefigures for
the last Bank of England statement of each month are used in
order to emphasize the seasonal factors. Until the amalgama-
tion of the note issues the reserve of the Banking Department
fluctuated in close correlation with gold holdings—except for
the transfer of gold from the Currency Note reserves in March
40Mr.Smit has carried out daborate computations of this sort in the pre-war
part of these studies.686 EXPERIMENTATION
1925 which was neutral as far as the Banking Department was
concerned—but a gradually declining trend in total note cir-
culation was reflected in a decline in Bank of England notes
in circulation, and consequently gave regular relief to the
reserve of the Banking Department. This is reflected graphi-
CHART 39
Bank of England, Factors affecting the Reserve of the
Banking Department, 1925-1931,lastweek of each month
cally in the gradual coming together of the gold and bullion
line and the reserve line. From December 1928 to August
1931themain pattern of the fluctuations in the reserve of
the Banking Department was determined by the gold move-
ments. As in the preceding years a declining trend in the cir-
culation gave relief to the reserve, which appears graphically
in the tendency of the reserve line to rise above the gold coin
and bullion line. But upon these relations were now super-
imposed sharp seasonal fluctuations in the note issue resulting
chiefly from the introduction of Li and io s. notes. The
seasonal movements of the reserve were in close and inverse
correlation with those of the note issue. These relations were
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interrupted in August 1931byan increase of £'5 million in
the reserve due to the increase in the fiduciary issue made to
meet the emergency of that time, but were thereafter resumed.
l'he course of the reserve of the Banking Department for
the whole period of Experimentation is shown in Chart 40,
which is a continuation of Chart 14andis plotted from aver-
age monthly figures.
Bank of England Credit
The declining trend in the note circulation up to 1930, which
accounted in part for the behavior of the reserve of the Bank-
ing Department was itself partly a consequence of the type of
credit superstructure built upon the reserve, the major char-
acteristic of which was stability imposed by Bank of England
policy. In Chart 40 the course of 'government securities' held
by the Bank of England, plus the 'securities' component of
the balance sheet item 'other securities,' is plotted. The set-
tled policy of offsetting the influence of changes in the reserve
of the Banking Department upon the English credit base is
clearly revealed by inspection of the relation of this line to
that showing fluctuations in the reserve. This is not so readily
apparent from an inspection of the components of the secur-
ity holdings of the Bank, shown separately in Chart 4'. The
net, effect of these offsetting operations upon total Bank of
England credit is seen when 'total securities' held by the
Bank of England and the 'reserve of the Banking Depart-
ment' are combined (top line of Chart 40). No trend of any
kind appears in this line. As a consequence, any growth in
total Bank of England credit had to come from changes in
the 'discounts and advances' of the Bank if it was to come at
all,. It is at this point that the maintenance of a steadily high
Bank rate throughout the period by discouraging applications
to the Bank for discounts and advances exerted its maximum
effect. 'Discounts and advances,' plotted separately in Chart
40, showed no rising trend. On the contrary, its trend was
slightly downward, if anything.688 EXPERIMENTATION
Bankers Balances at the Bank of England
The distribution of Bank of England credit between 'public
deposits,' 'other accounts,' and 'bankers balances' (Chart 40)
indicates that the full force of this restrictive policy was





































the behavior of Bank of England deposits is the stability of
the three components. Public deposits, in spite of all the stir-
ring events of the period, fluctuated within the range of £10
to £20 million. This was a great achievement when the size
and complexity of the financial transactions of the British
government are considered. It was mainly the result of the
treasury bill technique previously described. The amalgama-
tion of the note issues transferred the task of offsetting the
effect on 'bankers balances' of seasonal changes in the circula-
CHART 40
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to that of Bank of England open
market operations. No trace of this transfer appears in the be-
havior of 'public deposits,' but it is clearly evident




Bank of England, Bankers Balances and Discounts and Advances








serve line, which after 1928
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included as a component the
seasonal changes in the circulation
From 1925 to1931 'bankers balances' at the Bank of Eng-
land gradually declined, though the gold reserves of the coun-
try rose. Their fluctuations corresponded closely in size, and
in the main in direction, with the fluctuations in 'discounts
TABLE 51
Bank of England, Bankers
1923-1931,changescumulated
Balances and Discounts and
monthly (millions of pounds)
Advances
1923 192419251926 1927 1928 1929 19301931
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DISCOUNTS AND ADVANCES
Compiled from Ap. Table 3 A
and advances,' as seen in Chart 42, in which monthly changes
in 'bankers balances' and 'discounts and advances' are plotted
cumulatively from June 1923 to June 1931. The seasonal pat-
tern of the fluctuations was almost exclusIvely a reflection of
the visits of the market to the Bank in connection with mid-
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The British banking system was subject to a well defined
technique of credit control, not only from year to year, but
within each year. This is evident when the 'typical year' of
the Bank of England for the decade 1922—31 is compared
with the 'typical years' of pre-war decades analyzed by Mr.
Smit.
The Typical Year of the Bank of England, 1922—1931
Inhis analysis Mr. Smit has carried forward by decades up to
1911 a method first used by Jevons. The typical year for each
decade is arrived at by adding the amounts of each major
balance sheet item for the first week of each of the ten years,
and then dividing by ten to get the value of that item for the
first. week of the 'typical year,' and repeating this operation
for the second, third, and all succeeding weeks throughout
the year. For example, the figure for 'total securities' for the
first: week of the 'typical year i 902—1 1' is the average of 'total
securities' appearing on the balance sheet in the first weekly
statement of each of the ten years in this decade. In Charts 43
and 44 Mr. Smit's 'typical year 1902—11' is plotted by the side
of the 'typical year 1922—31.' To make the pre-war and post-
war decades comparable the items for the 1922—31 decade are
given in accordance with the form of the Bank of England
balance sheet regularly published before November 21, 1928,
with the exception of 'notes in circulation.' In view of the
amalgamation of the note issues within the period, the figure
presented for the post-war decade is for total notes in circu-
lation which, after the amalgamation, became identical with
Bank of England notes in circulation.
Chart inwhich the typical year is plotted on semi-
logarithmic paper, shows that the seasonal fluctuations in
many individual items in the post-war period were propor-
tionately of the same order of magnitude as in the pre-war
period, notably 'total securities,' 'other deposits,' 'public de-
posits,' and the 'reserve of the Banking Department,' whereas
this was not true of 'government securities' and 'gold coin andCHART 43
TheTypical Year of the Bank of England
1902-1911and1922-1931(semi-logarithmicscale)
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bullion.' 'Note circulation' appears as nearly a straight line in
both decades. One would expect seasonal forces affecting
bankers balances at the Bank of England to express themselves
in changes different in absolute amount but similar in pro-
portion, especially at the year end and the half year, when
the total means of payment and volume of monetary trans-
actions in the country had greatly increased. This expectation,
however, would not be justified in the case of 'government
securities' which is only one component of 'total securities,'
while the gold concentration policy and the transition to a
gold bullion standard so increased 'gold coin and bullion'
and 'notes in circulation' as to rob proportionate changes in
these items of significance. Large seasonal fluctuations in the
note circulation resulting from the elimination of gold in
hand to hand payments and the amalgamation of the note
issues appear as insignificant proportionate changes in 'total
circulation' after the great increase in the fiduciary issue. The
importance of seasonal changes in 'note circulation,' and to
a less degree in 'gold coin and bullion' is therefore not sug-
gested in this chart. Furthermore the same proportionate
changes in the various items, being very different in absolute
amount in the 1922—31 decade as compared to pre-war, no
longer had, in combination, the same effect upon the reserves
and deposits of the Bank. The effect of the change in the
total means of payment in England upon the technical prob-
lems of Bank of England credit control is entirely obscured by
presenting the typical year figures on ratio paper. But plotting
on ratio paper brings out the fact that some changes in the
problems confronting the Bank of England were due to the
persistence of old, and in many cases, routine elements in the
operation of the banking system subsequent to a period of
credit expansion. Chart 43, therefore, serves a useful purpose,
but the detailed comparison with the pre-war position is made
from the absolute changes in the figures in Chart 44.
The notable features of the typical year 1902—1 1were:
i) The marked inverse relation between public and privateA DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 695
deposits, which Mr. Smit found to be characteristic of earlier
decades, does not appear. 'Other deposits' did not decline
sharply in the latter half of the first quarter when government
revenues were flowing in and 'public deposits' were being
built up, nor did they increase gradually toward the end of
the year corresponding to a gradual decline in public de-
pos ii:s.
2) 'Public deposits,' however, continued to show an increase
toward the last half of the first quarter and then declined
gradually until nearly the end of the year.
3) Though this was not reflected directly in 'other deposits,'
it afforded the Bank of England a grip upon the market, for
'other deposits' were built up in the first quarter partly by a
seasonal increase in gold and bullion, but largely by an in-
crease in 'other securities.' Throughout the year 'other securi-
ties,of which the chief constituent was undoubtedly 'dis-
counts and advances,' representing accommodation sought by
the market at Bank rate, fluctuated with the variations in
'public deposits,' except for the two seasonal peaks at the end
of the half-year and of the year. 'Government securities,' on
the other hand, remained practically constant throughout the
year.
4) The 'reserve of the Banking Department' during this dec-
ade was high during the last half of the first and second
quarters and during the entire third quarter, and declined
seasonally in the final quarter of the year. This was due to
a combination of the international gold flow and an internal
movement of circulation of a type similar to that observable
in the figures for the post-war decade, described below. Con-
sequently when 'public deposits' were being built up by the
inflow of the revenue in the first quarter, the need of the
market to apply to the Bank for accommodation was reduced
but not eliminated. The general strength of the 'reserve' from
about the eighth to the fortieth week built up 'other deposits,'
but these were brought under pressure in the last quarter. It
was this autumn pressure that first led Jevons to undertake6g6 EXPERIMENTATION
the analysis here continued, but by the decade 1902—1 iits
severity had been much reduced.41 Though 'other deposits'
were reduced in the autumn, the market does not seem to
have been forced heavily into the Bank.
From this examination of the figures of the typical year
1902—1 1it is clear that before the war the seasonal patterns
in 'public deposits' and 'Bank of England reserve' were both
active forces playing directly upon 'other deposits,' that is,
chiefly upon bankers balances, and that they were not offset in
any degree by the open market operations of the Bank. It is
also clear that the influence of the seasonal flow of public
revenue upon 'public deposits' early in the year continued
to put the Bank in a strategic position to make Bank rate
effective during the rest of the year.42
In contrast, the typical year 1922—31 clearly shows a new
technique of credit management:
1)Duringthis decade the collection of the bulk of the pub-
lic revenue in the first quarter of the year did not impress
a pattern on 'public deposits' and 'other securities' through-
out the year. Its influence on the Bank of England balance
sheet was concentrated in the thirteenth week, the last week
of the first quarter, during which there was a sharp peak in
'public deposits' and in 'other securities,' and also a sharp
trough in 'other deposits.' Throughout the year 'public de-
posits' did not exhibit any general seasonal pattern. There
were larger and sharper fluctuations than in the pre-war dec-
ade owing to the increase in government transactions, but the
influence of the treasury bill technique in keeping the general
level of 'public deposits' stationary is clearly apparent.
2) Fluctuations in the 'reserve of the Banking Department'
41 This may have been due to a gradual mastering of the seasonal influence
of cotton bills upon the exchanges. The writer was told in interviews in
London that just before the war the actual remittance for cotton had been
so spread over the year that it would in any event soon have ceased to
exercise a dominant seasonal influence on the exchanges.
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were accentuated as compared to the pre-war decade, but in
spite of all the changes that had taken place, including the
amalgamation of the note issues, the seasonal pattern was
about the same. The separation of the influence of domestic
circulation and the international gold flow in the two figures
'notes in circulation' and 'gold coin and bullion' during this
decade indicates that the general seasonal factor in the reserve
followed approximately the following course.43 During the
first quarter a return flow of notes from circulation in the
early weeks was supplemented by imports of gold from
abroad, owing to seasonal strength in the exchanges, and the
reserve rose. Early in the second quarter gold imports con-
tinued, but a larger increase in domestic circulation pulled
down the reserve somewhat. A peak in note circulation at
the mid-year coincided rather closely with a seasonal peak in
gold imports, but soon after the middle of the year a declin-
ing note circulation coincided with seasonal gold exports.
These two influences were about offsetting until the begin-
ning of the fourth quarter. Reserves therefore did not de-
cline until the fourth quarter when seasonal gold exports
were greater than the decline in note circulation. Finally,
toward the end of the year a rapid seasonal increase in circu-
lation and continued gold loss combined to put severe pres-
sure on the reserve.
]nsharp contrast to the pre-war decade 'government Se-
curities' in the post-war decade showed a clear inverse corre-
lation with fluctuations in the 'reserve of the Banking De-
part ment.'The most noteworthy feature of this relation
was the sharp increase in 'government securities' in Novem-
ber when the fall in the reserve was most rapid.
48Thefact that during the greater part of the decade seasonal fluctuations in
were largely eliminated as an influence on reserves subjects this gen-
to an unavoidable margin of error.
There seem to be two exceptions of importance, the first in the 6th and
7th week when there wasshiftfrom 'public' to 'other securities,' the second
in the 2srcl week (middle of May) ,whena sharp increase in 'public securi-
ties' led to an increase in 'other deposits.'698 EXPERIMENTATION
4) 'Other securities' no longer exhibited a seasonal pattern
connected with the seasonal of 'public deposits' or of 'reserve,'
except for the sharp increase in the thirteenth week. Their
chief seasonal characteristic was the half-year and year-end
expansion due to the building up of balances by the banks
for their periodic public statements.
5) The movement of 'total securities' therefore did not coin-
cide in its general configuration with the movement of 'other
deposits,' because of the inverse correlation between 'govern-
ment securities' and the 'reserve,' but with the exception of
the thirteenth week it corresponded closely with the move-
ment of 'other deposits' in its week to week changes. This
was a reflection of the correspondence between 'bankers
balances' and 'discounts and advances' (Chart 42).
Our examination of the typical. year 1922—3 1therefore
confirms and illustrates statistically the change from a semi-
automatic to a deliberately planned method of credit control.
It also illustrates the persistence of many of the most charac-
teristic features of. the life of the money market of pre-war
days—notably in the preservation of the general seasonal pat-
tern of the behavior of the reserve of the Banking Depart-
ment, of the semi-annual visits of the market to the Bank,
and of the Bank's advantageous position in the market, re-
sulting from the collection of government revenue in the
spring.
The English Credit Superstructure during
Experimentation
Upon the stable credit base established before the return to
gold and maintained thereafter a credit superstructure was
built that was stable but not static. It deviated sufficiently
from the pattern established in 1922to allow a substantial
but steady expansion. This may be seen from an examination
of the behavior of the assets and liabilities of the London
clearing banks (Ap. Table 3 D).
Ch. 12,TheEnd of the British Campaign for Parity with Gold.A DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 6gg
Assets and Liabilities of the London Clearing Banks) 1925—
1932
45 A in which the major balance sheet items of the
London clearing banks from i925to 1931areplotted in the
same form as in Chart 19Aindicates that while 'cash and at
the Bank of England' was throughout practically constant,
yet from the middle of 1926 to the end of 1928 'total deposits'
rose steadily. This increase in 'total deposits' was chiefly the
reflection of a steady growth in 'advances,' which had begun
to be noticeable at the close of 1923 and was not interrupted
until the crisis of 1929.InNovember 1923'advances'of the
London clearing banks were £718 million; in March 1929,
£969 million, an increase of £250 million, or 35 per cent, in
just under five and one half years. It is evident that the de-
flationary pressure upon the British economy during these
years was considerably less than would be suggested by an
examination of Bank of England figures alone. The be-
havior of the 'advances' of the London clearing banks gives
support to views of the type expressed by Lord Bradbury in
his Memorandum of Dissent to the Report of the Macmillan
Committee (Report, p. 277)
"Generally speaking, apart from the export industries and in-
dust:ries (including agriculture) directly exposed to foreign com-
petition in the home market profits were [from 1925to1929]
abovethe normal, and this notwithstanding the burden of taxa-
tion, unemployment and high money rates. This to my mind
proves that the trouble was due not to a shortage but to an ex-
cess of money and credit which had the effect of raising prices
wherever prices could be raised and raising costs generally, in-
clud:ing those in the exports industries and in industries in which
prices could not rise because of foreign competition."
From 1923 to 1926 the increase in 'advances' was largely
offset by a decrease in 'investments,' and 'total deposits' re-
mained steady, but thereafter 'investments' were maintained
at just under £300millionand 'total deposits' began to grow.700 EXPERIMENTATION
More reserves were therefore needed, and since 'cash and at
the Bank of England' could not be increased, the secondary
reserve, 'money at call and short notice,' was expanded
steadily from 1923 until it reached about £'5° million in
1927. In 1928 the third line of reserve, 'bills discounted,' be-
gan to grow slightly. These increases in reservesof course
CHART 45


















added to the general rise in deposits. The position at the be-
ginning of 1929, when evidence was being taken before the
Macmillan Committee, was not substantially altered during
the next year, but by spring 1930 a new position began to
develop connected with the onset of the world depression.
'Advances' began to decline and were replaced by 'invest-
ments,' while 'bills discounted' and 'total deposits' both rose
sharply. At the same time the very gradually declining trend
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of 'cash and at the Bank of England' was replaced bya
definite increase. The interpretation of these events, how-
ever, is part of the general history of the depression period
(Ch. 27, The English Credit Base and Credit Superstructure
under Emergency Measures).
CHART 46
English Joint Stock Banks, Principal Assets
Total Deposits, 1894-1933























—the most striking feature of Chart45 A—could not have
taken place had not a certain flexibility remained in the ratio
system of the banks. This appears clearly in the divergent
movement of the ratio, 'cash and at the Bank of England' to
'total deposits,' as compared with the ratio, 'moneyat call
and short notice' to 'total deposits,' and the divergentmove-
merLt of the ratio, 'investments' to 'total deposits,' as corn-
The Ratio System of the Joint Stock Banks., 1925—1931
Thegrowth in 'advances' of the London clearing banks in
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pared with the ratio, 'advances' to 'total deposits.' From
1925 to 1930 the clearing banks were allowing their cash
ratio to decline slightly but steadily. Up to 1928 they were
increasing their ratio of 'money at call and short notice' to
TABLE 52
English Joint Stock Banks, Principal Assets as Percentages of Total
Deposits, 1894-1913, Januaryand July
CASH AND ATMONEY AT DISCOUNTS
BANK OF CALL ANDINVESTMENTS AND TOTAL
ENGLANDSHORT NOTICE ADVANCES
1894 134 10.5 26.7 66.6 117.2
11.2 13.4 21.7 62.9 109.2
1895 13.4 13.2 24.8 61.9 113.3
(Aug.) 14.0 18.5 20.1 65.7 118.3
r8g6 13.1 13.0 24.2 64.9 115.2
10.4 15.4 24.6 65.9 I i6.
1897 12.4 13.5 22.1 62.6 no.
12.8 21.8 60.5 109.3
1898 14.1 12.9 23.2 60.3 110.5
12.8 13.3 22.3 62.1 110.5
1899 13.0 14.2 21.9 61.4 110.5
13.2 12.4 21.6 62.7 109.9
1900 14.5 11.1 22.3 62.4 110.3
14.4 11.3 21.4 62.4 109.5
1901 15.3 11.1 21.3 63.2 110.9
15.0 13.1 21.0 61.3 110.4
1902 15.3 12.4 21.5 60.7 109.9
15.5 ii.6 20.6 60.7 108.4
1903 15.8 13.2 20.9 60.3 110.2
15.6 12.9 ao.8 6,., 110.4
1904 (Feb.) i6.o 12.0 20.2 64.4 112.6
15.2 13.3 19.1 63.0 no.6
1905 15.3 13.9 19.6 61.7 110.5
15.2 14.7 19.1 58.2 107.2
igo6 15.5 15.4 i8.o 62.1 111.0
15.2 13.7 19.1 62.0 110.0
1907 15.7 13.9 18.5 63.2 111.3
(Aug.) i6.i 10.4 19.0 64.8 110.3
1908 (Feb.) i6.o 13.0 i8.6 63.7 111.3
15.9 13.7 18.5 6i.8 109.9
1909 16.2 13.4 19.3 6i.8 110.7
15.8 14.4 18.7 67.7 iz6.6
1910 ,6.o 14.1 19.3 6o.8 110.2
15.9 13.3 18.3 62.4 109.9
1911 15.7 12.7 i8.i 63.1 109.6
15.7 13.7 i6.g 63.2 109.5
1912 15.2 13.0 ,6.8 64.2 109.2
15.1 13.0 16.4 64.0 107.2
1913 15.4 12.5 15.5 64., 107.5
15.3 11.9 14.8 67.2 109.2
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'tot;iI deposits.' A change in the relative importance of pri-
mary and secondary reserves was in progress. At the same time
the ratio of 'investments' to 'total deposits' fell while that of
'advances' to 'total deposits' first rose, then remained nearly
stat:ionary with only a very slight rising tendency. The be-
hav:ior of these two ratios was a simple consequence of the
fact that the major element in the rise of 'total deposits' was
an increase in 'advances.' These relations are clearly shown
in Chart 45 B. By the middle of 1929 a point of equilibrium
seems to have been reached. The ratios of both 'investments'
and 'advances' to 'total deposits' were then in close accord
with pre-war practice. The proportion of primary and second-
ary reserves to 'total deposits' seemed to have become settled
at a lower point than before the war, and to have established
new customary norms.
The contrasts and similarities between the pre-war norms
and those of 1929, as well as the process by which they were
established, is brought out in Charts 46 and 47. In Chart 46
the ratio figures of the London clearing banks after the war
are plotted, together with pre-war joint stock bank figures
collected by Mr. Smit. In most of the pre-war statements 'dis-
counts' and 'advances' were not separated and the combined
ratio is therefore plotted for the entire period. For the war
period the figures of 'discounts and advances' and 'invest-
merits' presented in Chapter 5 are plotted. This chart indi-
cates an apparently steady decline in the ratio of 'investments'
to 'total deposits' before the war. This does not, however,
seem to have been related to any general factor, such as a
more rapid growth in 'deposits' than in 'capital.' From 1896
to 1904 the decline in this ratio was offset by a rise in the
cash ratio. Cash reserves were being strengthened relatively
at the expense of investments. From 1904 to 1909 the ratio
of 'investments' to 'total deposits' did not show any trend.
From 1909 to 1913 it declined, but this decline was offset by
an increase in the ratio of 'discounts and advances' to 'total
deposits,' a relationship to be expected in times of active704 EXPERIMENTATION
business and repeated from1923 tO 1929. The chart clearly
indicates, the disturbing effect of thewar on the ratio system
and the gradual adjustment to a new 'normal.' Thecontrasts
and similarities between
systems are brought out in the accompanying
RATIOS (PERCENTAGES)
i)'Cash and at the Bank of
England' to 'total deposits'
2) 'Money at call and short
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figures compiled by Mr. Smit for those few banks that re-
ported 'discounts' and 'advances' separately. In view of the
smallness of the sample and the fact that the same banks are
TABLE53
CertainEnglish JointStock Banks,Deposits,Discounts,and
Advances, and the Percentages that Discounts and Advances constitute
.of Total Deposits, 1894-1913,Januaryand July
PERCENTAGE
(2)is is
DEPOSITS DISCOUNTS ADVANCES of (r) of
(x) (2)
(thousandsof pounds)
1894 83,928 18,594 36,060 22.2 43.9
67,662 8,946 33,924 13.2 50.2
1895 105,019 21,313 42,982 20.3 40.9
62,451 8,247 27,479 13.2 44.0
i8g6 101,777 21,090 40,901 20.7 40.2
131,265 24,916 54,727 19.0 41.7
1897 80,187 10,051 42,894 12.5 53.5
84,741 9,194 43,747 io.8 51.6
1898 92,057 11,139 48,411 12.1 52.6
94,414 10,250 48,832 10.9 51.7
1899 105,936 12,178 53,872 11.5 50.9
158,080 25,738 73,174 16.3 46.3
1900 155,55! 23,177 74,361 14.9 47.8
162,357 23,638 79,479 14.6 49.0
1901 124,822 15,023 66,ooo 12.0 52.9
170,341 25,677 83,528 15.1 49.0
1902 131,183 20,428 63,854 15.6 48.7
168,782 21,350 86,366 12.7 51.2
1903 185,215 25,076 92,507 13.5 49.9
182,501 23,035 94,761 12.6 51.9
1904 133,874 12,448 76,704 9.3 57.3
125,794 11,074 69,534 8.8 55.3
1905 141,148 15,269 75,275 io.8 53.3
178,793 24,041 8g,i8i 49.9
igo6 151,278 16,314 82,290 10.8 54.4
197,690 24,515 101,975 12.4 51.6
1907 155,845 15,703 87,979 9.4 56.5
161,669 21,505 85,012 13.3 52.6
rgo8 79,022 7,574 43,104 9.6 54.5
215,372 30,787 106,845 14.3 49.6
1909 228,525 31,715 115,457 13.9 50.6
75,244 10,750 35,999 14.3 47.9
1910 266,378 38,755 129,888 14.6 48.8
277,040 38,582 140,939 13.9 50.9
1911 278,142 38,423 145,504 13.8 52.3
289,846 46,354 146,855 i6.o 50.7
1912 311,385 47,688 162,327 15.3 52.1
306,031 42,356 160,640 13.8 52.5
1913 205,865 35,970 110,009 17.5 53.4
297,810 47,737 162,879 i6.o 54.7
Compiledby C. J. Smit frompublished balance sheets in TheEconomist706 EXPERIMENTATION
not included in the series throughout, the correspondence
is remarkable (see the accompanying table).Theratio figures
AVERAGEAVERAGE JULY 1, JULY JULY
RATIOS (PERCENTAGES)1894—19031904—Il 1913 1919 1929
i)'Discounts' to 'total de-
posits' 14.7 13.1 i6.o 14.0 13.1
2)'Advances' to 'total de-
posits' 48.3 52.4 54.7 39.4 55.8
(i) plus (2) 63.0 65.5 70.7 53.4 68.9
for July 1913 and July 1929 measure the permanent decline
in the reserve ratios. When considered in the light of the
tendency of the clearing banks to keep 'advances' down to
about 55 per cent of 'total deposits,' as shown in Chart 45 B,
and of the evidence of Mr. Hyde of the Midland Bank before
the Macmillan Committee 40 to the effect that this figure rep-
resented a maximum for his bank, they also bring out the very
important fact that the flexibility in the ratio system of the
joint stock banks, which had made possible an expanding
superstructure in England upon a stable credit base from
1923 to 1929, had reached its limit. This view is further con-
firmed, by the statements made by Governor Norman to M.
Moreau in May 1927.
Bank Rate and the Defense of Sterling
At the outset of our account of the experiment of defending
sterling, the annual average exchange rates between London
and New York were presented as prima facie evidence of the
changed position of the pound. The underlying circumstances
were such that Great Britain's position as a gold standard
country had to be maintained .by unorthodox methods pend-
ing a reduction in her costs and a redistribution of her pro-
ductive powers. These methods involved the artificial main-
tenance of a stable credit base. It was, indeed, the contention
of the Macmillan Committee that the Bank of England could
not have increased the credit base and at the same time have
maintained the gold standard from 1925 to The
46Minutes of Evidence (Macmillan Committee) ,I,56, answer to question 877.
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tendency of the joint stock banks to take full advantage of
the flexibility still remaining in their ratio system indicated
that such a policy, at a time when production was expanding,
was at least restrictive, if not actually deflationary. The new
methods also involved the relegation of Bank rate to a sub-
ordinate role as an instrument of credit policy. A relatively
high rate was in harmony with the general policy of restrict-
ing the growth of credit but was not the essential force in
brin.ging about such a restriction. It was, however, a neces-
sity in the exercise of London's surface pull over the ex-
changes. A brief statement of the sequence of events in the
gold. and foreign exchange markets brings out its role in the
defense of sterling and also gathers many of the threads in
the history of the Experimentation period that have been
followed in dealing with other countries.
In order to facilitate this summary Charts 48 and 49, show-
ing the course of interest rates in London and New York, are
presented here together with two charts specially constructed
to bring out certain aspects of the relation between exchange
rates and the London price of gold.
The first(Chart 50) shows the London market price of
gold, weekly, from May 1925 to September 1931together
with the sterling-dollar exchange rate for the day for which
the gold price is given whenever that rate was a factor in the
bullion market. Paul Einzig gives the gold export point from
London to New York as 4.8525/32 when the London price
of gold was 84 s.10 d. and as 4.85%2 when the London
price of gold was 84 S. 111/2 d. per fine ounce.48 These gold
prices correspond roughly to the buying and selling prices of
the Bank of England. Whenever the sterling-dollar rate was
above 4.8525/32 the statutory bid of the Bank of England for
gold was above the dollar-parity price, and the market would
sell to the Bank rather than to America. Whenever it was
below 4.855/32, gold could be taken from the Bank of Eng-
land for shipment to New York as an arbitrage transaction.
48 International Gold Movements (London, Macmillan, 1929), p.107.708 EXPERIMENTATION
Therefore 4.85%2wasthe Bank of England gold export
point and 4.852%2 was the market gold export point. When-
ever the rate was between these points, the American bid for
gold in the market was higher than the Bank of England bid,
but not high enough to take gold from the Bank. Therefore
if the gold prices and the sterling dollar exchange rates are
plotted on scales in which the interval between 84 S. 10 d. and
84 S.1 '½d.is equal to the interval between 4.8525/32 and
4.85%2 the appearance of New York as a competitive bidder
for gold in London can be graphically portrayed. Gold points,
however, are variable. Those given by Einzig are for the end
of 1928, and if applied throughout the period a major source
of error would be introduced. This can be partly eliminated,
for Einzig states that in 1925 the rate at which gold could be
taken from the Bank of England for shipment to New York
was 4.842%2.49 This was the 1925 Bank of England gold ex-
port point, and the corresponding market gold export point
is 4.8517/32. If these export points are used for the first part
of the period, and the 1928 export points for the latter part
of the period a fairly accurate result is obtained. This is done
in Chart 50.
Chart 51 shows the monthly average sterling-dollar rate
from May 1925 to August 1931. In order to indicate its gen-
eral position in relation to the gold points, lines have been
drawn depicting the Bank of England gold export point and
the bullion market gold export point, that is, the range in-
cluded in Chart 50, and also the gold import point. In this
chart no correction for changing gold points is attempted,
and the 1928 figures are used. A line is also drawn at mint
par, 4.8665. The gold export points fall much nearer to the
mint par than the gold import point, because the Bank of
England gold export point is based on a gold price of 84 S.
11.4545 d. and the Bank of England gold import point is
based on a gold price of 84 s. g.8i8 d., whereas mint par is
calculated on the basis of 84 S. 11.4545 d. On the other hand,
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the Bank of England gold import point and the market gold
export point are both based on a gold price of 84 S. 9.818 d.
These are the working gold points of the London bullion
market, and therefore Samuel Montagu and Company, in
thcdr weekly exchange letters, give as the pre-war working
gold parity, not 4.8665, but 4.8744—the parity based on the
price, 84 s. 9.8 i8 d. A line is drawn in Chart 51 at this point
because it provides a more accurate dividing line between
strength and weakness of the dollar in London than does
4.8665. To make the graphical presentation in this chart
consistent with that in Chart 50, strength of sterling is repre-
sented by a declining line and weakness of sterling by a rising
line.
These two charts, in conjunction with Charts 48 and 49
and Chart 40 showing the behavior of the reserve of the Bank
of England, provide the basis for a clear view of the relation
of Bank rate to the defense of sterling, from 1925 to 1931.
At this point only the period from the return to gold to the
financial crisis• of 1929 will be considered.
The general weakness. of sterling from 1925 to 1929 is
abundantly clear from even a casual inspection of Charts 50
and 51. Almost the whole range of fluctuation of the sterling-
dollar rate was below the working gold parity. The London
market price of gold, moreover, showed a persistent tendency
to remain at or near the Bank of England selling price. The
occasions on which the Bank's buying price for gold was an
effective bid in the market were infrequent and of short
duration. Because of this and because of the numerous occa-
sions when the London price of gold was at or near 84 S.
1 1½d.when the New York rate was not a factor in the mar-
ket, Chartgives a clearer picture of the general weakness
of sterling than Chart 51. Both charts show very plainly that
the sterling-dollar rate was a factor in driving up the London
price of gold to the Bank of England selling price in the au-
tumns of 1925, 1926, and 1928, and was not a factor in the
bullion market during the rest of those years. This normal710 EXPERIMENTATION
seasonal phenomenon, however, was not present in 1927 and
1929, when the situation was indeed almost exactly reversed.
The American bid for gold was competitive in the early part,
but not in the latter part of these years. Clearly very powerful
forces were then obliterating the usual seasonal influences.
This circumstance provides natural dividing points between
various phases of this part of the history of the role of Bank
rate in the defense of sterling.
May 1925toDecember 1926
GreatBritain returned to the gold standard with Bank rate
at 5 per cent. Market rate was close to Bank rate, and was
above both the 60—90 day and the acceptance rates in New
CHART 48










York.This was the result of inter-central bank cooperation
preceding the return to gold (cf. Ch. 12). On several occa-
sions in May and June the market had to borrow from the
Bank, but in general the trend of interest rates in London
was downward, partly owing to the attraction of funds from
the continent for employment in sterling bills at attractive
rates, and partly to an abundance of domestic funds seeking
employment as a result of the decline in prices and reduction
in the cost of imports which followed the rapid rise of theA DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 711
pound to par. It was also due partly to gold imports and the
policy of the Bank with reference to them. From May to July
England was gaining gold, not because of inherent seasonal
strength of sterling in the exchange markets, for the price of
gold did not fall to the Bank of England buying price, but
because of special shipments received from Russia and the
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ings were not fully offset by open market operations (Charts
39 and 40,particularly the line in Chart 40 showing 're-
serves plus securities,' which rises rapidly in Juneand July
and remains at a high level until September). Consequently
1925 was the only year after the return to gold inwhich the
mid-year expansion in bankers balances at the Bank of Eng-
land took place without an increase in discounts and ad-
vances (Chart 42) .Thecharacteristic post-1925 market
credit control policy had not yet been fully developed.
In the summer of 1925 Bank rate began to lose touch with
the market The gold accumulations seemed to be sufficient
to meet the normal autumn drain, and on August 6 Bank
rate was lowered from 5 to 4½percent. The declining trend
of open market rates continued during the next two months
and Bank rate was again reduced, on October i, to 4 per
cent. Meanwhile, the trend of interest rates in New York712 EXPERIMENTATION
was upward. As a result, the differential interest rate rela-
tionship between the two markets was reversed (Chart 49).
New York was being placed in a more and more favorable
position to bid against London for foreign funds, especially
for French balances offered competitively to the two markets,
and large balances were in fact transferred from London to
New York.5°
Late in August the open market price of gold once more
began to hold steadily at 84 S. 111/2 d. In September, when
seasonal forces added to the pressure on sterling, New York
became a competitive bidder in the London bullion market,
and early in October, in spite of a gentleman's agreement,
entered into at the time of the return to gold, not to with-
draw American balances accumulated in London, and the
diversion of large foreign loan operations from London to
New York 51asa result of continued restrictions in the new
issues market in London, sterling declined below gold export
point. A heavy gold arbitrage movement to New York began,
followed by an arbitrage movement to the Netherlands..
These gold movements had the effect of tightening interest
rates in London and the market had to borrow from the Bank
twice in October. The reduction in Bank rate on October i
did not, therefore, mean any further spread in the differen-
tial interest rates between New York and London to the dis-
advantage of London. The London market, however, was
influenced by apprehensions that Federal Reserve rediscount
rates might be raised and that the Bank of England would
follow. In fact it acted first. On Decemberafterthe Lon-
don gold price had been for three months almost continu-
ously at- 84 S. 11½ d., Bank rate was raised to 5 per cent and
market rate immediately followed. Sterling was improving
seasonally in New York and the American gold bid fell just
below the Bank of England gold export point (Chart 50).
5OFederal Reserve Bulletin, June 1926, p.
NotablyAustralian financing and the refunding of German sterling credits
maturing in London in withdollar credits (Brown, op. cat., pp. 295—6).
The embargo was lifted in November 1925.TAB:LE 54:Ban/cRate and Market Rate for Three Mont/i Bankers
Bills in London, 1919-1932
BANKRATE
1919 1925 1930
Priorto Nov. 6 5 March 5 Feb. 6 44
Nov. 6 6 Aug. 6 March 6 4
Oct. i
42 March20 34





64 All year 5 July 23 34
June 23 6 July 30 44
July 21 54 1927 Sept.21 6




April 21 Allyear 44 March 17 34
June 15 34 April 21 3
July 13 3 May 12 24 1929 June 30 2
1923 Feb.7 54
July 5 4 Sept. 26 64
Oct. 3' 6
1924 Nov.21 52
AU year 4 Dec. 12 5
MARKET RATE FOR THREE MONTH BANKERS BILLS (average of
highest daily rate)
1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925
Jan. 3.50 5.62 6.63 3.65 2.32 3.37 3.86
Feb.
.3.53 5.76 6.73 3.30 2.52 3.57 3.89
March 3.56 5.79 6.42 3.31 2.33 3.22 4.52
April 3.5! 6.28 6.09 2.67 2.15 3.10 4.34
May 3.50 6.77 5.66 2.38 2.07 3.09 4.62
June 3.26 6.76 5.54 2.42 2.14 3.07 4.48
July 3.42 6.68 4.98 2.01 3.28 3.63 4.40
Aug. 3.65 6.73 4.76 2.32 3.23 3.82 3.99
Sept. 3.72 6.77 4.27 2.56 3.22 3.82 3.73
Oct. 4.50 4.05 2.44 3.20 3.77 3.63
Nov. 5.64 6.72 4.10 2.57 3.33 3.76 3.96
I)ec. 5.69 6.78 3.59 2.58 3.37 3.77 4.73
1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932
Jan. 4.81 4.20 4.2! 4.34 4.11 2.28 5.48
Feb. 4.35 4.24 4.22 5.09 3.85 2.60 4.68
March 4.42 4.38 4.14 5.34 2.79 2.63 2.69
April 4.36 4.09 4.06 5.27 2.48 2.59 2.20
May 4.44 3.95 4.01 5.23 2.19 2.26 '.50
June 4.28 4.38 3.83 5.34 2.33 2.10 1.05
July 4.30 4.38 4.01 5.39 2.38 2.60 0.93
Aug. 4.49 4.37 4.31 5.57 2.22 4.32 0.78
Sept. 4.58 4.37 4.25 5.61 2.09 4.82 0.69
Oct. 4.71 4.36 4.34 6.14 2.10 5.78 o.88
NOV. 4.76 4.38 4.38 5.38 2.19 5.91 0.93
I)ec. 4.58 4.36 4.39 4.78 2.33 5.96 1.09
souRcE: StatisticalAbstract of U.K., 1932,pp.213,215714 EXPERIMENTATION
TABLE 55
Short Term Market Rates of Interest in Xew rork, 1925-1932
Highest for Month
60-90 DAY TIME LOANS
1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932
Jan. 34 5 44 44 7* 5 24 4
Feb. 4 5 44 44 74 44 24 34
March 44 5 44 44 84 44 24 31
April 44 44 44 5 9 44 24 a
May 4 4 44 54 94 34 24 2
June 4 41 44 6 9 34 '4 '4
July 44 44 44 6 84 3 1* 11
Aug. 44 5 44 64 9 2* '4
Sept. 44 5 44 74 24 2
Oct. 5 54 44 74 94 24 44
Nov. 5 44 41 7 64 24 4 1
Dec. 5 44 41 7* 5 24 4 4
90 DAY BANKERS ACCEPTANCES
Jan. 34 34 34 34 54 44 2 34
Feb. 34 34 34 3* 54 4 Xj 24
March 34 34 34 38 54 34 24
April 34 31 3* 4 54 3* '4 24
May 34 34 34 4* 54 24 14
June 34 34 34 44 54 24
July 34 34 34 44 54 2 4
Aug. 34 4 34 44 54 2 I 4
Sept. 34 4 34 44 54 2 4
Oct. 34 4 34 44 54 2 4
Nov. 34 4 34 44 44 2 34 1
Dec. 34 4 34 44 4* 2 *
SOURCE: Statistical Abstract of U.S., 1926,p. 1928,p.295; 1930,p.298-9; 1932,
p.279; '933, p. 263
The market price of gold fell, but the Netherlands continued
to take gold heavily in December, apparently not on an ar-
bitrage
For the first nine months of 1926 the sterling-dollar rate
was outside the range of competitive bidding for gold in Lon-
don (Chart 50) though never very far below it (Chart 51).
The general strength of sterling against all exchanges was
sufficient to make the statutory buying price of the Bank of
England effective in the gold market in May, July, and Au-
the elements of management in these Dutch gold movements cf. Brown,
cit., pp. 291—2.A DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 715
gust. From open market purchases and other sources the
Bank was able to add to its gold holdings in March and from
May to September. There was no repetition of the 1925
po:licy in which 'normal' pre-war reactions to such a situation
were approached. Gold imports were fully offset by open
market operations(Chart 40)and Bank rate was kept
steadily at 5 per cent. The New York Federal Reserve Bank
rate was raised to 4 per cent on January 8, but market rates
did not respond. Funds were attracted to London and the
spread between market rate and Bank rate was widened by
a strong continental demand for sterling bills. In May a
31,4percent rate was reestablished by the Federal Reserve
Bank and for a brief moment London rates again ruled above
New York (Chart 49). Hopes were raised for a reduction in
Bank rate but the prospect of easy money in London was
destroyed by the revival of speculative activity in America.
American interest rates began to rise again in June and
London rates followed. The New York Reserve Bank raised
its rate to 4 per cent, and London acceptance rates once more
assumed a position between the 60—90 day time rate and the
acceptance rate in New York (Chart 49). In September the
sterling-dollar rate reappeared within the range of competi-
tive bidding in the bullion market, but the American bid
was not effective at the Bank of England until October. In
October and November gold began to move to the United
States and also to Germany,53 but the exports were small, and
when, in December, the autumn pressure was over, sterling
began to improve.
From the return to gold until December 1926, in somewhat
greater degree than was usual before the war, the exchange
and bullion markets had been influ'enced by special trans-
actions. Until the beginning of 1925 the inflow of newly
produced gold was cut down by retention of gold in South
Africa for currency purposes. The deficit was made up by
58Forthe special inducements offered to gold arbitrageurs, London to Ger-




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8TABLE 56:LondonPrice of Cold, 1925-1931,weekly
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1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931
Jan. 4.78 4.85* 4.851 4.874 4.85* 4.874-44.85+






4.761 4.86* 4.87.444.85k4.86 4.85f-4
4.74* 4.86* 4.858 4.87444.854-44.86 4.85!
4.874-4
March 4.77 4.851 4.854 4.871 4.86k4.851




April 4.7714.86k 4.884 4.85* 4.864
4.78 4.86k4.85! 4.851 4.8617w4.85!
4.784 4.864 4.88! 4.86!4.86k
4.8014.86k 4.88 4.85! 4.861
4.8444.86k
May 4.854 4.851 4.8544.87ff4.854-44.851 4.86+




June 4.86k 4.85ff4.88k4.844-44.851 4.86*
4.8644.86! 4.854-44.884 4.84444.8514.86k
4.86k4.86* 4.851-44.88 4.844-44.85444.86k
4.864 4.8614.85! 4.87444.844-44.86 4.86k
4.85*
July 4.86ft4.85444.854 4.8744.84ff4.861 4.864




Aug. 4.851 4.864 4.854 4.85444.85-h4.874 4.85*
4.851 4.86 4.86 4.85k4.85ñ4.874 4.851
4.851 4.86 4.864 4.854 4.851 4.874 4.854
4.851 4.85 4.86 4.85 4.844-44.87 4.86
4.
Sept. 4.8514.86k4.8544.84ff4.86
4.84i 4.8514.86k4.85 4.84ff4.864 4.8544
4.844 4.854 4.86 4.85k4.84ff4.86 4.86
4.84 4.85k4.86* 4.844-44.85 44.86k4.''
4.85* 4.86 3.92





Nov. 4.85* 4.84 4.87k4.844-44.874 4.851-4
4.84* 4.85 4.874 4.844-44.87*4.85i 3.784
4.844 4.8444.87h4.85k4.87k4.85443.774
4.844-44.874-44.854 4.874-44.85 3.62
Dcc, 4.85 4.844-44.88 4.85 4.8844.85-s3.35
4.854 4.844-44.884 4.85 4.88k4.854-43.284
4.854 4.85 4.88 4.8544.88k4.85443.464
4.85 4.85* 4.88444.85 4.88 4.851-43.39
4.854 4.8544.88ff 4.858 3.40
Annual
average4.83.h4.85ff4.86 4.86fi4.854-44.864 4.514
SOURCE: The Economist720 EXPERIMENTATION
special shipments from Russia and the Netherlands. The
National Bank of Austria and other central banks had been
in the market to replenish their reserves, while Indian de-
mand had been abnormally stimulated by the speculative
possibilities contained in a possible reduction of the rupee
rate from is. 6 d. tois. 4 d. London interest rates were
unusually sensitive to changes in New York and the difficulty
of reducing the generally high level of rates in London had
been demonstrated. Nevertheless, the normal seasonal in-
fluences familiar before the war were still strong enough
to dominate the period as a In 1927, however, this
was no longer true.
1927
Therecovery of sterling from its seasonally low point in the
autumn of 1926 was very slight. Far from ceasing to be a
factor in the bullion market the New York rate was just
under gold export point from the Bank of England in Janu-
ary and February, and New York was buying gold in the
open market. The unknown buyer was also active. The price
of gold remained at or near 84 s. 11½ d., and the Bank of
England continued to lose gold in moderate amounts. The
dominant causes of the unseasonal weakness of sterling were
the interruptions and distortions introduced into the course
of trade by the British coal strike. These, however, were
gradually being eliminated. In March and April sterling
was slightly stronger, and the gold price fell pan passu with
the weakness of the dollar (Chart 50) .InApril the Bank
was able to buy gold in the open market and increased its
gold holdings sufficiently to offset the losses experienced
since September
Having passed through a major economic crisis without
substantial gold losses, the Bank of England ventured to re-
"For a more detailed analysis of gold distribution through London in 1925
and1926cf.Brown, cit., pp. 280—96.
These included special shipments of sovereigns to Spain in March 1927in
connection with customs payments.A DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 721
duce its rate, which had now stood at 5 per cent for i6
months, to 4½percent on April 21, 1927. At this moment
French demand for gold made itself felt for the first time.56
Small but unseasonable gold exports took place. That some
of these were for France created great apprehension in Lon-
don and led to a sharp rise in the open market rate (Chart
48). At the same time Argentina began to draw gold both
from South Africa direct and from the Bank of England
(cf. Ch. 14), for the market price of gold had returned in
the middle of May to 84 s. 111,4 d. (Chart so). Meanwhile,
the New York bid for gold was hovering only a little below
the market, for sterling showed no substantial recovery in
New York (Chart 51). Receipts of gold from South Africa
were being reduced by direct shipments not only to Argen-
tin.a but also to India, and a steady demand from the unknown
buyer was expected to continue. Germany had already begun
to enter into a transition from the gold exchange to the gold
bullion standard, and in the summer of 1927 she also seemed
likely to become an effective bidder for gold in London.s7
Under these circumstances, and in view of the certainty of
increasing pressure upon sterling in the autumn, it was ap-
parent that unless something very exceptional occurred,
England could not long remain on the gold standard with
a 41/2 per cent Bank rate.
Something very exceptional did occur—the inter-central
bank agreement of June 1927 for shifting French gold de-
mand to the United States and for inter-central bank co-
operation in support of sterling in other ways. Not only was
French demand diverted, but the appearance of Germany as
a gold buyer was postponed for almost a year. In August
1927, for example, Germany discouraged gold shipments
from London in contrast to the opposite position taken in
November 1926. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Cf.Ch. 15,TheDc Facto Adherence to the Gold Exchange Standard and
the Realization of Potential Elements of Strength, and Ch. i8, The Critical
Decisions of 1927ifltl1eir Inflationary Setting.
Ch. i6, The Modification of the Principle of Gold Economy, 1928.722 EXPERIMENTATION
directly supported sterling in June, July, and August 1927,
and took the initiative in restoring the inter-market interest
differential in favor of London for the third time since 1924.
This was accomplished by a reduction in the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York buying rate for acceptances on July 29,
and a reduction in its rediscount rate to 31,4 per cent on
August 5, while the open market rate in London gave every
CHART 51
Sterling-Dollar Exchange
May 1925—August 193!, average monthly rates
Dollars
4.84
I T. . T IT
1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 193.0 1931






Bank of England Gold
Poini (19a8)
evidence of being peggedclose to Bank rate, at about 4.37
per cent (Chart 48).
During the first half of 1927 sterling had been weak, even
as. compared with the first half of 1926,andhad remained
close to the gold export point. As a result of the 4critical
decisions' of the summer of 1g27,'however, the whole situa-
tion was altered. Beginning with the third week in July
sterling began to rise in New York, and rose uninterruptedly
until it reached 4.8825/32 in the last week of December. The
New York rate ceased to be a factor in the gold market and
68TheEconomist in its Commercial History and Review of 1928, p. 9, says:
"in the first week of January (1928) the market broke away from the 'con-
trolled' discount rate of 4%6% on three months bank bills tacitly enforced
by the Bank during the preceding autumn. ...";cf.Ch. 15,TheMoreau-
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the price of gold no longer clung tenaciously to 84 s. 11½ d.
The usual autumn seasonal was completely wiped out. In
December 1927 the first gold shipment of importance from
the United States to London since the return to gold was
TABLE 58
Sterling-Dollar Exchange, 1925-1931,averagemonthly rates














made. During the entire year there were fewer fluctuations
in the gold holdings of the Bank of England than in any
other year from i925to 1931.
1928
During the first six months of 1928 sterling fluctuated in
general within a range slightly above the 'working gold par-
ity,' and in June was sufficiently strong to make possible
heavy gold arbitrage imports from New York. The Bank of
England was able to add steadily to its gold holdings through-
out this period, especially in January, and in June and July
when the market price of gold was down very close to the
statutory buying price.59 This steady gold import movement,
in combination with domestic seasonal influences, had the
effect of easing money rates in London, though until June the
Bank was offsetting gold imports by open market operations.
])uring April and March 1928 there were large gold exports to France,
representing simply the physical transfer of gold previously acquired by the
Bank of France. They did not represent current purchases and were not a
factor in the money markets. The Economist, March io, 1928, p. 484.724 EXPERIMENTATION
These, however, ceased in June (Chart 40). Hopes of an
immediate reduction in Bank rate were revived, and the open
market rate dropped toper cent. But once more the mar-
ket was disappointed. The easing tendency of interest rates in
London had been running parallel with rising rates in New
York owing to increasing speculative activity. The rate of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York had been raised three
times, and when it finally reached 5 per cent on July 13,00the
interest differential in favor of London, so carefully recon-
stituted in the summer of 1927, was completely reversed
(Chart 49).Thegrave secondary results of the 1927 decisions
were beginning to be felt. A world-wide flow of funds toward
New York was setting in, and in July sterling began to
weaken. Though it did not fall enough to. bring New York
into the gold market until September, and England was still
gaining gold in July and August, the downward trend of
interest rates in London was checked. This was partly be-
cause of the transfer of funds to New York and partly because
the Bank of England sold securities in July and August well
in excess of the additions to its gold holdings (Chart 40).
The flow of funds to New York for speculative purposes
continued throughout the late summer and autumn, and
added greatly to the normal seasonal pressure on sterling
which began in September. In August the price of gold re-
turned to 84 S.1 11/2 d. and remained at that level almost
continuously for the rest of the year (Chart 50). England
began to lose gold heavily to the United States, to Germany,
and to the unknown buyer, but these gold exports were not
allowed to reduce the credit base, being offset by Bank of
England open market operations (Chart 40).
The technique of the defense of sterling during 1928 was
in remarkable contrast to that of 1927. In 1927 the gold re-
serves of the Bank of England were nearly constant. To keep
them so inter-central bank cooperation on a grand scale was
called into play. Active intervention by the Bank in the
60Cf.Ch. i8, Credit Restriction, January to June 1928.A DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 725
course of interest rates, both directly through changing Bank
rate and indirectly through pegging the market rate, was
the most conspicuous feature of British credit control policy.
In 1928, though its reserve fluctuated widely, the Bank did
not alter its rate or intervene in the determination of open
market rates. Open market operations became the major in-
strument of credit control, and the departure from pre-war
practice in this respect was even more complete than in 1925
and 1926.
Quite apart from all considerations of domestic credit con-
trol technique, the impression given by Chart 50 that 1928
was a 'normal' year because the customary seasonal forces
once more seemed to dominate the gold and foreign exchange
markets is to a large degree deceptive. The international dis-
tribution of gold was dominated from 1925 to 1928, as from
1919 to 1924, by the process of returning to gold, and the
central banks of the world were still actively engaged in
strengthening their reserves as part of the general preparation
for operating a world-wide international gold standard sys-
tem. In this sense 'a scramble for gold' was in progress, and
1928 this increased in intensity. A general feeling of ap-
prehension was spreading in Europe concerning impending
trouble in New York, which gave new point to the desire of
central banks to attain a high degree of international liquid..
ity. American speculative excesses, therefore, not only weak-
ened sterling and made London the cheapest market in which
gold purchases could be carried out, but also led to a feeling
of distrust which intensified the demand. At various times in
1928 the Belgian, Swiss, Swedish, and Polish central banks
bought gold in London to strengthen their reserves, and in
October, November, and December the outstanding feature
of the London bullion market was a heavy movement of gold
to Germany which caused grave anxiety in London.
In a sense the German purchases were unique, because
the strength of the reichsmark, which made them possible,
was due wholly to a flood of American foreign lending which726 EXPERIMENTATION
began in June 1928 when the partial checks interposed up
to that time by the intervention of the German authorities
were removed (cf. Ch. 16). Germany's effective demand for
gold in London in 1928 was actually a direct consequence of
the' methods adopted in 1927 to defend sterling. In another
sense, however, Germany's demand for gold was typical of
the general policy of central banks of strengthening their gold
reserves. Up to 1928 German gold imports had been carried
out by the Reichsbank, which was therefore free to choose
the market from which it took gold. But in 1928 the Reichs-
bank abandoned its policy of keeping a fixed proportion of
its reserves in devisen, and when the mark reached gold im-
port point, allowed gold to flow to Germany as a gold arbi-
trage transaction. That meant that Germany was buying gold
in the cheapest market to the full extent allowed by the
strength of her exchange. The cheapest market was London,
now no longer protected by an international gold redistribu-
tion policy.
In the latter half of 1928 France was a conspicuous excep-
tion to the general policy of strengthening gold reserves. But
this was only in appearance, and only because the Bank of
France was passing through a particular phase of the technical
heritage left by the de jure stabilization of 1928—that of ac-
cepting settlement of forward exchange contracts in foreign
currencies.6' This phase of French policy with respect to gold,
however, was from its very nature temporary. The threat of
renewed French demand for gold in London was a serious fac-
tor in the background at the beginning of 1929 as it had been
at the beginning of 1927.
1929
Theyear 1929 resembled 1927 in this respect: sterling was
persistently weak in the first part of the year and strong in the
late autumn, a complete reversal of the usual seasonal tenden-
61Cf.Ch. '5, The Technical Heritage.A DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 727
cies.In the first part of 1927 the underlying weakness of
sterling had been accentuated by a special cause, the coal
strike, and as a consequence special demands for gold from
various countries in connection with the still incomplete proc-
ess of returning to gold seemed likely to be concentrated
upon London and to become a menace to the gold standard
in England. A planned redistribution of these special ele-
ments in the demand for gold appeared to be the logical in-
ternational solution of the problems raised by such a situa-
tio:ri. The weakness of sterling in the first part of 1929 was
due to the fact that the forces let loose by that policy had not
been, or could not be controlled, and that in the presence of
these forces the attitude of the gold standard world toward
measures of gold economy had changed.
1:n January and February the New York rate for bankers
acceptances began to adjust itself to the high level of time and
call money rates, and the disparity between interest rates in
New York and London continued to widen (Chart 49).
Funds continued to be attracted to New York, and at the end
of January gold was taken from London for New York on an
arbitrage basis. On February 7 the Bank of England raised
Ba:nk rate from 4½to51/2percent, and the London market
rate immediately followed. For a time this stopped the gold
drain from England. German demand had fallen off early in
the year and in March disappeared from the market, for the
German exchange also was adversely affected by the New
York speculation for reasons given by Carl T. Schmidt in
German Business Cycles, 1924—1933(pp.49—50):
"Germany'sposition as a heavy borrower of foreign capital made
its economy sensitive to changes in the international money mar-
kets which were especially marked in the twelve months after the
middle of 1928. Several factors tended to reduce the volume of
German borrowings from abroad, and, for a time in the spring of
evenled to heavy net withdrawals of foreign funds. Chief
among these factors were the extraordinary speculative activity728 EXPERIMENTATION
in New York, which until the autumn of 1929attractedmoney
from all parts of the world and tended to tighten the market for
long-term investments; in addition, the uncertainty of the pro-
tracted negotiations on reparation payments tended to discourage
long-term loans. The United States, which had provided most of
the long-term funds invested in Germany and a large share of the
short-term loans, now changed its position from lender to bor-
rower in the international markets. The withdrawals of Ameri-
can funds in Germany during the autumn of 1928 were offset by
new loans from various European countries. In the late winter of
1928—29 and in the spring of 1929, however, there was a net Out-
flow of foreign funds from Germany, accompanied by a transfer
of domestic funds abroad."
With continental competition temporarily eliminated the
London price of gold receded from the Bank of England sell-
ing price pan passu with a slight weakening of the dollar in
London (Chart 50), and England was, for about three months,
able to gain gold. In March some gold was imported from the
Netherlands but most of the acquisitions were South African
gold bought in the open market by the Bank of England
which as early as January 3 ibeganto pay well above its statu-
tory buying price. On March 8, for it paid 84 S.
1o7/8 d. per ounce for gold, a price characterized by The
Economist as "a little too near the Bank's selling price for
comfort." 02Duringthese months the American bid was ac-
tively competitive in the bullion market (Chart 50). Interest
rates in New York were still mounting and the differential
against London was growing even wider. In April, May, and
June the general level of time and call rates in New York was
between 8 and 9 per cent. At these high rates Europeans were
borrowing in London for the purpose of lending in New
York, especially since the flood of new American foreign
loans had stopped. Sterling went below gold export point in
June, and gold again moved to New York. At the same time
Germany reappeared in the gold market and took gold until
02March9, 1929,p. 486.A DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 729
September. The prospect of a new reparation settlement had
caused a return flow of funds to Germany that more than
made up for the previous outflow.63 In addition, the German
exchange was strengthened by a $50 million credit obtained
in New To these sources of demand upon British gold
supplies a new and powerful demand from France was added
in July. French balances in London were remitted home in
JuI.y and August in connection with income tax payments.
These transfers coincided with a large tourist demand for
francs. At the same time French banks began to realize bal-
ances accumulated before the stabilization in order to meet a
domestic demand for francs. These forces expressed them-
selves in the form of a French demand for gold rather than in
an increase in Bank of France foreign exchange holdings, be-
cause the stabilization law of June 1928 no longer permitted
the Bank of France to issue notes against foreign exchange,
and the liquidation of the Bank's forward exchange contracts
was completed.
IJnder this pressure interest rates in London rose rapidly.
The gold losses were not fully offset by the Bank in July
(Chart 40) and, as in 1927, market rates went above Bank
rate. This rather unusual relation may occur for two reasons:
(i) the market may anticipate a rise in Bank rate in the ex-
pectation that by the time its holdings of bills have been con-
verted from long to short maturities it will be able to sell
short bills at a profitable price; (2) the Bank may, at a given
moment, be very particular about the bills it takes. The sec-
ond reason was responsible for the appearance of this phe-
nomenon in 1927. Both were probably present in 1929. Un-
63Schmidt, cit., p. 50.
04 The Berlin correspondent of The Economist wrote on June25,1929: "The
recent money market stringency waslargelydue to the need of the Republic
caused by the old cash deficit. Here the position has been improved by the
granting of a credit of 210 million marks (to the government) by a banking
syndicate led by Mendelssohn and Co. against which the syndicate is to get
an equivalent one-year dollar credit from an American group." The Econo-
misI, June 29,1929, p.1453.Copyright. 1940, by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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TYPOGRAPHY, PRINTING, AND BINDING IN THE U. S. A. BY
KINOSPORT PRESS, INC., KINGSPORT, TENNESSEECHAPTER 20
The Experiment of the Gold Exchange Standard
without a Focal Point
At the culmination of the American speculative boom, as at
many other points, the history of the two experiments—creat-
ing an international money market in New York and
ing sterling—was interwoven with the history of the
ment of operating the gold exchange standard without a focal
point.
The Gold Exchange Standard as a Gold Economy
Measure
The Genoa Principle of Gold Economy
In the account in Chapter 1 1 of the cooperative aspects of the
return to gold the stress laid by the Genoa Conference on the
principle of gold economy was emphasized. The resolutio:is
of that Conference recommended a widespread extension of
the pre-war practice of the gold exchange standard as a meas.
ure of gold economy. This proposal, however, was hedged
about by a series of elaborate safeguards, namely, special
guarantees of the safety and freedom of movement of inter•
central bank deposits; development of a system of forward
change markets; and the coordination of the demand for gold
and stabilization of credit in such a way as not only to keep
currencies at par but also to prevent undue fluctuations in the
value of gold which might result from the efforts of so many
countries to return to gold at the same time.
In putting forward these suggestions the Genoa Conference
went far beyond the immediate problem of accelerating the
return to gold without incurring the dangers of an
73I732 EXPERIMENTATION
strained inter-central bank competition for the metal, and
stated principles of general application to the international
gold standard system as a whole. It recognized first and fore-
most that stable internal credit conditions were the prerequi-
site of a system of stable exchange rates, especially in the gold
centers holding the reserves of other countries. In so doing it
gave expression to the most fundamental thesis running
through the whole analysis of the international gold standard
presented in these studies. Though of general application,
these principles were of peculiar importance at a time of
world-wide development of the gold exchange standard under
conditions in which there was no longer a single focal point
where gold exchange balances could be employed, transferred,
and offset. The writer is in complete agreement with the
judgment of Dr. Blessing in 1932, that if the recommenda-
tions of the Genoa Conference had been applied in toto, the
defects noted in 1927—31 would not have reached their actual
dimensions.'
The Geographical Spread of the Gold Exchange Standard
In our account of the completion of the gold standard facade
in Chapter 14 we state that early in 1926 39 countries had
stabilized their currencies in terms of gold either de jure or
de facto. Of these, 5—Nicaragua, Honduras, Salvador, Costa
Rica, and Guatemala—were Central American republics of
no international financial importance. The other 34 may be
classified on the basis of the legal provisions then in force or
subsequently adopted: 2
In i i countries—the United States, Canada, the United
Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa,
1 The Gold Exchange Standard, B.l.S. Monetary and Economic Department
(C. B. 6o, Basle, Oct. 26, 1932). The clarity, balance, and condensation of
this memorandum, and the harmony of its point of view and condusions
with the views of the writer at most points have led to perhaps an undue
use of this source.
2 Based on Federal Reserve Bulletin list(August 1928, p. 562), except for
New Zealand, Yugoslavia, Canada, Cuba, the Philippines, Mexico, India, and
Siam, which are notA DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM
the Netherlands, Dutch East Indies, Sweden, Switzerland, and
Lithuania—there were no legal provisions permitting the
clusion of anything except gold in the reserves of
banks.
In the other 23 countries foreign exchange in some form
and in some amount could be legally included in central bank
reserves against notes or against notes and deposits. Of these,
i6 were countries in which stabilization programs of what
may be called the typical post-war kind had been partly or
completely carried out: Germany, Austria, Hungary, Czecho-
slovakia, Danzig, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, and
Bulgaria in Europe; Chile, Colombia, Bolivia, and Venezuela
in South America. In addition, British India, Siam, and
had retained or returned to sterling exchange standard sys-
tems developed long before the war; Cuba, Mexico, and the
Philippine Islands were dollar or dollar exchange countries.
These were once more brought under the common rubric of
gold exchange standard countries after Great Britain's return
to gold. Finally, Russia, though separating her domestic cu:-
rency from international influences (cf. Ch. 14),stillcounted
foreign exchange as part of her legal central banking reserve.
To the i6 countries mentioned as carrying out typical
war stabilization programs and permitting foreign exchange
to form part of the legal reserves of their central banks were
added from 1926 to 1928 4 European countries—Italy, Po-
land, Belgium, and Greece; and 2 South American countries,
Ecuador and Peru. It was by this group of 22 countries that
the gold exchange standard was most generally regarded as
primarily a measure of gold economy. To the iicountries
mentioned as not allowing anything other than gold to count
as gold reserve of central banks were added from 1926 to 1928
one European country, Norway, and two South American
countries, Argentina and Brazil. These years also included the
all important episode of the temporary adherence of France
to the gold exchange standard.
In summary, until the end of 1928 the gold exchange stand..734 EXPERIMENTATION
ard spread to at least 31 countries. Every conceivable type of
gold exchange standard was included within this group, and
to explore these in detail would lead to a prolonged, and for
the purposes of these studies, sterile examination of central
banking statutes and monetary laws. The simple enumera-
tion just given points with sufficient clearness to the world-
wide sources of the growth in the central money markets of
foreign balances connected with the gold exchange standard,
and defines the boundaries of the area in which the desire
for gold economy was a dominating motive in its adoption.
This is far from painting the whole picture. Not only was
the motive of gold economy of very different importance in
different gold exchange standard countries, but the central
banks of the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada
were practically the only ones that were not substantial hold-
ers of foreign exchange. The use of sterling balances by the
central banks of the Dominions was of the essence of the
management of the Empire exchanges, and the central banks
of the Netherlands, the Dutch East Indies, Sweden, Switzer-
land, and Norway all held substantial foreign exchange port-
folios. In spite of its legal forms the Argentine system was
essentially a sterling exchange standard, modified by a series
of special transactions in New York. Finally, one important
country not mentioned in any of these lists, Japan, was con-
tinuously supporting its exchange by the sale in the central
money markets of large centrally controlled stocks of foreign
exchange.
The Definition of the Gold Exchange Standard
Clearly no very satisfactory results can be obtained from dis-
cussing the experiment of the gold exchange standard with-
out a focal point by using any definition of the gold exchange
standard found in legal enactments. Dr. Blessing has ad-
mirably stated the problem of definition in the opening
words of the Memorandum upon which such heavy drafts
are being made in these sections:A DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM
"Theessential feature of the gold standard is the maintenance of
a fixed relationship between the national currency unit and gold,
whichin turn practically implies a fixed relationship with the
currency units of other gold currency countries. In regard to the
machinery employed for the maintenance of the fixed relatior'.shf?
with gold and with the currency units of the other gold currency
countries, three different forms of gold standard may be
guished —
a)the pure gold standard with free coinage rights, gold coiins
circulation and bank-notes redeemable in gold;
b) the gold bullion standard with a circulation of notes, not nec..
essarily redeemable in gold, but with the obligation of the Cen••
tral Bank to buy and sell gold bars without restriction at fixed
prices;
c)the gold exchange 5tandard with a circulation of notes,
ingold, but with the obligation of the
Central Bank to ensure the value of the national currency unit
in relation to other gold currency countries by buying and selling
foreign exchange at approximately the gold parity.
The above three forms accordingly differ in the method by
the exchange rates are kept stable and in the composition of the
currency reserves. In practice the systems described do not exist,
or exist only rarely, in an unadulterated form; in most cases they
overlap. The reserves of those banks of issue which are under
ligation to buy and sell gold bars at a fixed price consist for the
most part of foreign exchange as well as gold bars, and purchases
and sales of exchange frequently play a more important part that,
purchases and sales of gold. Inversely, those Central Banks which
maintain the stability of their currency by buying and selling ex••
change also hold gold in the form of bars and coins.
So far as the individual currency laws are concerned, a
tion may be drawn between two main forms of the gold exchange
standard: the form which allows of holding the legal minimum
reserve entirely in foreign exchange and the form which pre..
scribes that a given percentage of the legal minimum cover must
consist of gold, while the remainder may be composed of foreign
exchange. In general the currency laws allow considerable free..
dom to the individual Central Banks in the choice of their736 EXPERIMENTATION
serves; in particular they make no mention of 'free reserves' and
it was just these free reserves over and above the legal minimum
which in the past played so significant a part. No appreciation of
the gold exchange standard, therefore, can rely on the legal pro-
visions alone; the de facto attitude of the Central Banks is a much
more important factor.
When reference is made below to the gold exchange standard,
the term is not only employed in its narrower sense, in accordance
with the above definition; it rather includes all those questions
which have their origin in the holding of foreign exchange re-
serves by Central Banks, irrespective of whether these belong to
the legal minimum reserve or to the free reserve."
It is in the sense defined by Dr. Blessing that the term 'the
gold exchange standard' will hereafter be used in these
studies.
The Foreign Exchange and Gold Reserves of European
Central Banks
The published figures of the foreign exchange holdings of
central banks do not disclose the full extent of their holdings;
the outstanding example, of course, being the accumulation
during 1925 and 1926 of foreign exchange by the Bank of
France, carried under the head of 'divers' on its balance
sheet. Yet an examination of the published figures is very
rewarding. They have been compiled for Europe as of the
end of December from 1924 to 1930, and quarterly for 1931
andfor the first three quarters of 1932, and expressed in
millions of Swiss francs by Dr. Blessing. In order to bring
out certain special points the countries included in Dr.
Blessing's tables have been divided by the writer into four
groups: I France, Germany, and Italy, whose central bank
gold and foreign exchange holdings fluctuated most widely;
II Austria, Danzig, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Holland, Sweden, and Switzerland, which stabilized their
currencies de jure before or at nearly the same time as Great
Britain; III Belgium, Bulgaria. Czechoslovakia, Denmark,A DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM
Greece,Norway, and Poland, which stabilized their curren••
cies between Great Britain's return to gold and the crisis of
1929; IV Yugoslavia, Portugal, Roumania, and Spain, in
which stabilization was still 'unfinished business' in 1929. In
Table 59 the monetary gold stock and foreign exchange
holdings of the central banks, the sum of these two items
representing their total reserves, and the percentages the
foreign exchange holdings are of the totals are given for
each country and for each of the four groups.
From this table certain conclusions can be drawn concern-
ing the gold exchange standard as a gold economy
in Europe. In the first place the gold and foreign exchange
holdings of the central banks of countries that did not carry
out stabilization programs before 1929 (Group IV) and of
countries that stabilized before or together with Great Brit-
ain (Group II), and the proportions between gold holdings
and foreign exchange holdings in these two groups were very
stable. Most of the large gold holdings of Group IV were
Spanish;they were practically immobilized and did not play
an important role in European finance(cf. Ch. 28). The
foreignexchange of this group fell steadily from 1925 to
1928, owing to losses by Yugoslavia, and were increased
1929 with the attempted stabilization in Roumania, buc
were quantitatively unimportant. The banks in Group IL,
which includes important creditor countries, especially the
Netherlands,added substantially to their foreign exchange
holdings in 1925, but not to their gold holdings. The
ings of the group as a whole of both foreign exchange and
gold remained virtually unchanged during 1926 and 1927.
In 1928 these banks began to strengthen their position, but
the ratio of foreign exchange to gold varied remarkably littk
in 1928 and 1929.
The characteristic feature of Group Ill—the banks of
countries carrying out stabilization operations afteri 925—-
was the dominant influence of the Polish and Belgian sta•
bilizations. The group as a whole lost foreign exchange inTABLE 59
Reserves of Various European Central Banks, December 1924—September 1932
AMONETARY GOLD STOCK (millions of Swiss francs)
CENTRAL BANKS
OF 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930
DECEMBER
Group I, Total 7,753 8,311 9,372 9,08710,91312,68615,056
France 5,545 5,548 5,549 5,545 6,465 8,45 I10,876
Germany 938 1,491 2,261 2,302 3,070 2,819 2,735
Italy 1,270 1,272 1,562 1,240 1,378 1,416 1,445
Group II, Total 1,999 1,904 1,977 2,138 2,204 2,306
Austria 8 Ii 38 62 123 123 156
Danzig 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Finland 43 43 43 4! 40 39 39
Hungary 37 53 153 178 182 148 147
Latvia 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Lithuania i6 17 ib 17 i8 z8 20
Netherlands 1,051 923 861 833 905 932 888
Sweden 329 319 312 320 328 340 334
Switzerland 506 467 472 517 533 595 713
Group III, Total1,114 1,151 1,334 1,554 1,72! 1,985 2,083
Belgium 272 274 447 518 651 847 989
Bulgaria 40 41 44 48 50 52 54
Czechoslovakia 140 141 141 154 178 193 237
Denmark 291 29! 290 253 240 239 239
Greece 64 66 70 76 37 43 34
Norway 204 204 204 204 204 204 203
Poland 103 134 i38 301 36! 407 327
Group IV, Total2,902 2,912 2,947 3,004 2,954 2,994 2,683
Jugoslavia 72 76 86 89 9! 95 99
Portugal 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
Rournania 247 251 256 263 256 285 288
Spain 2,535 2,537 2,557 2,604 2,559 2,566 2,248
Grand Total 13,76814,21615,55715,62217,72619,86922,128
BFOREIGN EXCHANGE HOLDINGS (millionsof Swiss francs)
GroupI, Total 2,287 2,154 2,404 3,180 8,951 7,694 7,439
France 570 564 405 535 6,657 5,286 5,315
Germany i,6o8 1,261 1,189 583 652 1,003 944
Italy 109 329 8io 2,062 1,642 1,405 x,i8o
Group II, Total 1,174 1,767 i,617 z,688 1,792 i,88g 2,239
Austria 348 407 458 477 458 417 522
Danzig 29 27 39 34 43 42 46
Finland 72 162 '4! i68 98 8g 122
Hungary 182 313 225 x88 85 72 6i
Latvia 41 20 2! 49 72 49 36
Lithuania 33 17 20 27 24 41 45
Netherlands 233 514 390 350 459 458 514
Sweden 189 281 288 366 299 368 542
Switzerland 47 26 35 29 254 353 35!'93' 1932
MARCH JUNE SEPT. DEC. MARCH JUNE SEPT.
15,711 14,675 15,141 16,654 18,221 19,243
11,394 11,457 12,050 13,905 15,601 Ib,67o Ib,7S8
a,868 1,754 i,6o6 1,215 1,085 1,027 983
1,449 1,464 1,485 1,534 1,535 1,546
2,243 2,532 3,755 4,816 4,885 5,257 5,383
15b 156 138 138 131 109 109
0 0 22 22 39 22
39 39 39 40 40 40 40
114 101 95 92 91 88 88
9 9 9 17 i8 21 2!
20 20 20 26 26 26 25
929 1,036 1,463 1,848 1,832 2,042 2,1
333 331 27b 286 286 286 2
643 840 1,699 2,347 2,439 2,606 2,637
2,131 2,131 2,880 2,969 2,919 2,838 2,876
1,037 1,034 1,796 1,837 1,812 1,849 i,86i
55 56 57 57 57 57 57
237 236 234 253 252 252 254
239 239 228 200 201 i86 185
34 33 33 58 48 4 37
203 203 202 215 216 208 198
326 330 330 349 333 282 284
2,838 2,889 2,745 2,754 2,769 2,774 2,777
99 141 151 i6i i6i i6z i6i
48 48 40 46 65 66 65
271 274 277 300 293 292 294
2,420 2,426 2,277 2,247 2,250 2,255 2,257
22,239 22,227 24,521 27,193 28,794 30,112 30,386
6,686 6,757 5,582 4,988 3,116 1,770 1,504
5,336 5,317 4,610 4,183 2,523 1,232 958
232 370 171 213 175 ibo 1b4
1,118 1,070 801 592 418 378 382
1,926 1,841 1,163 565 646 53! 599
474 324 147 93 44 31 2
37 34 26 26 2
124 112 84 53 94 66 57
23 g 6 21 11 10 10
31 22 22 13 14 12 12
37 35 28 17 8
454 476 456 170 176 143 i49
419 409 45 68 156 185 247
327 420 349 104 107 58 6iTABLE 59—Contznued
Reserves of Various European Central Banks, December 1924—September 1932
BFOREIGN EXCHANGE HOLDINGS (millions of Swiss francs)—Continued
CENTRAL BANKS
OF 1924 £925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930
DECEMBER
Group III, Total 715 578i,o8, i,68g 1,776 1,488 1,708
Belgium 30 30 322 378 408 416 699
Bulgaria 37 19 25 42 104 43 30
Czechoslovakia 103 183 321 374 385 349 376
Denmark 68 124 38 135 159 126 139
Greece i86 167 175 248 167
Norway 37 65 85 65 57 8i 56
Poland 254 3 125 520 415 306 240
Group IV, Total 479 462 388 387 311 564 222
Jugoslavia 385 367 335 347 231 268 120
Portugal 94 95 53 40 8o 87 48
Roumania 209 54
Spain
GrandTotal 4,655 4,961 5,490 6,944 12,83011,63511,608
CFOREIGN EXCHANGE PLUS MONETARY GOLD (millions of Swiss francs)
Group I, Total 10,04010,46511,77612,26719,86420,38022,495
France 6,115 6,112 5,954 6,o8o 13,122 13,737 i6,igi
Germany 2,546 2,752 3,450 2,885 3,722 3,822 3,679
Italy 1,379 i,6oi 2,372 3,302 3,0202,82, 2,625
Group II, Total 3,173 3,609 3,521 3,665 3,930 4,093 4,545
Austria 356 418 496 539 581 540 678
Danzig 29 27 39 34 43 42 46
Finland 115 205 184 209 138 128
Hungary 219 366 378 366 267 220 208
Latvia 50 29 30 58 8z 58 45
Lithuania 36 44 59 65
Netherlands 1,284 1,437 1,251 1,183 1,364 1,390 1,402
Sweden 6oo 6oo 686 627 708 876
Switzerland 553 493 507 546 787 948 1,064
Group III, Total 1,829 1,729 2,415 3,243 3,497 3,473 3,791
Belgium 302 304 769 896 1,059 1,263 i,688
Bulgaria 77 6o 6g 90 154 95 84
Czechoslovakia 243 324 462 528 563 542 613
Denmark 359 415 328 388 399 365 378
Greece 250 220 237 251 285 210 202
Norway 241 269 287 269 261 285 259
Poland 357 137 263 821 776 713 567
Group IV, Total3,38! 3,374 3,335 3,39! 3,265 3,558 2,905
Jugoslavia 457 443 421 436 322 363 219
Portugal 142 143 101 88 128 135 g6
Roumania 247 251 256 263 256 494 342
Spain 2,535 2,537 2,557 2,604 2,559 2,566 2,248







































































































































































































































































































Reserves of Various European Central Banks, December 1924—September 1932
DFOREIGN EXCHANGE AS PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL FOREIGN EXCHANGE PLUS
MONETARY GOLD HOLDINGS
CENTRAL BANKS
OP 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930
DECEMBER
Group 1 22.8 20.6 20.4 25.9 45.1 37.8 33.!
France 9.3 9.2 6.8 8.8 50.7 38.5 32.8
Germany 63.2 45.8 34.5 20.2 17.5 26.2 25.7
Italy 7.9 20.6 34.2 62.5 54.4 49.8 44.9
Group II 37.0 49.0 45.9 46.! 45.6 46.2 49.3
Austria 97.8 97.4 92.3 88.5 78.8 77.2 77.0
Danzig ioo.o 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Finland 62.6 79.0 76.6 80.4 71.0 69.5 75.9
Hungary 83.1 85.5 59.5 51.4 31.8 32.7 29.3
Latvia 82.0 69.0 70.0 84.5 88.9 84.5 8o.o
Lithuania 67.3 50.0 55.6 61.4 57.! 69.5 69.2
Netherlands 18.2 35.8 31.2 29.6 33.6 33.0 36.7
Sweden 36.5 46.8 48.0 53.4 47.7 52.0 61.9
Switzerland 8.5 5.3 6.g 5.3 32.3 37.2 33.0
Group III 39.1 33.4 44.8 52.! 50.8 42.9 45.1
Belgium 9.9 9.9 41.9 42.2 38.5 32.9 41.4
Bulgaria 48.1 31.7 36.2 46.7 67.5 45.3 35.7
Czechoslovakia 42.4 56.5 69.5 70.8 68.4 64.4 61.3
Denmark i8.g 29.9 ii.b 34.8 39.9 34.5 36.8
Greece 74.4 70.0 70.5 69.7 87.0 79.5 83.2
Norway 15.4 24.2 28.9 24.2 21.8 28.4 21.6
Poland 71.1 2.2 47.5 63.3 53.5 42.9 42.3
Group IV 14.2 13.7 ii.6 11.4 9.5 15.9 7.6
Jugoslavia 84.3 82.8 79.6 79.6 71.7 73.8 54.8
Portugal 66.2 66.4 52.5 45.5 62.5 64.5 50.0
Roumania 42.3 15.9
Spain
Grand Total 25.3 25.9 26.! 30.8 42.0 36.9 34.4
SOURCE: The Gold Exchange Standard, B. I .S. Monetary and Economic Department
(C.B. 6o, Basic, Oct. 26, 1932)1931 1932
MARCH JUNE SEPT. DEC. MARCH JUNE SEPT.
29.9 31.5 26.9 23.! 14.6 8.4
31.9 31.7 27.7 23.1 13.9 6.g
7.5 17.4 g.6 x4.9 13.9 13.5
43.6 42.2 35.0 27.8 21.4 19.7
46.2 42.1 23.7 10.5 11.7 9.2 110.0
75.2 67.5 51.6 40.3 25.1 22.1
ioo.o Ioo.o 6i.g 54.2 58.5 29.1 54.2
76.! 74.2 68.3 57.0 70.! 62.3 58,8
i6.8 8.2 5.9 i8.6 io.8 10.2 10.2
77.5 71.0 71.0 43.3 43.8 36.4 36.4
64.9 63.6 58.3 39.5 33.3 27.8 24,2
32.6 31.5 23.8 8.4 8.8 6.6 6.5
55.7 55.3 14.0 19.2 35.3 39.3 46.3
33.7 33.3 17.0 4.2 4.2 2.2 2.3
42.1 39.5 15.5 12.1 8.g g.8 1L7
38.8 37.9
28.6 25.3 16.2 14.9 12.3 12.3 9,5
58.8 55.6 43.6 39.2 32.3 39.0 40.3
31.1 25.! 18.3 10.7 6.r 8.8 29.!
81.7 8o.o 79.1 55.0 23.8 84.6 40,3
20.! 12.9 7.8 7.3 7.3 2.8
40.5 38.! 30.5 26.2 25.2 24.5 22.0
9.5 9.4 14.4 13.7 13.2 13.2
46.8 37.6 24.9 19.5 13.4 14.8 i6.6
50.0 44.2 73.0 70.3 62.2 59.! 59.6
15.4 20.6 15.1 3.2 3.3 1.7 3,5
4.7 ii.8 10.1 11.1 11.0 11.5
31.3 31.6 24.0 19.1 '3.4 9.1 8.8744 EXPERIMENTATION
1925, owing to the failure of the first Polish stabilization
effort; and in 1926 and 1927 gained both foreign exchange
and gold substantially, owing tO the Belgian stabilization and
the second Polish stabilization. Belgian and Polish accumu-
lations of gold were continued in 1928 but on a relatively
small scale. The ratio of foreign exchange to gold seems to
have been established for this group at about 50 per cent in
1928, but in 1929 it dropped sharply owing to the develop-
ment of new influences connected with the speculative boom
in New York and the approach of an economic depression
which necessitated the sale of foreign assets by many central
banks.
The behavior of the gold and foreign exchange holdings of
the i6 banks in Groups II and III, 1924—30, is shown in the
accompanying tabulation. For these banks as a group the
Sixteen Central Banks





Foreign exchange as % of
Total 37.743.945.448.948.044.647.4
gold exchange standard, as a gold economy measure, seems to
have reached a sort of norm. From the end of 1925 to the end
of 1930 the percentage of their foreign exchange to their total
foreign exchange and gold holdings did not vary over 5 per
cent. During 1928, after the vicissitudes of returning to gold
were over, the percentage for the group as a whole hardly
fluctuated, and for the banks within the group the variations
were slight. In 1929, a year of financial crisis, foreign exchange
reserves had to be parted with, but the ratio of 1927 and 1928
was reestablished in 1930. The stability of the great interna-
tional financial centers, and of the international gold standard
as a whole was not subject to any serious danger arising from
changes in the proportions in which these banks, as a group,
chose to keep their gold and foreign exchange holdings.A DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 745
Beginning in 1928, however, the central banks of creditor
countries began to gain, and those of debtor countries to lose
foreign exchange, a tendency which after 1929 became very
important for the gold exchange standard as a gold economy
device. This is not brought out in the grouping thus far
adopted. In Table 6o therefore the countries are arranged
in the order of the gains or losses of gold and foreign exchange
TABLE 6o
Sixteen European Central Banks
Net Changes in Foreign Exchange Holdings, 1928-1930
1928 1930 1928-1930
(millionsof Swiss francs)
Switzerland +225 +99 —2 +322
Belgium +3° +8 +283 +321
Sweden —67 +6g +74 +176
Netherlands +'°g —I +56 +164
Austria —19 —4i +105 +45
Lithuania —3 +17 +4 +i8
Danzig +9 —' +4 +12
Denmark +24 —33 +13 +4
Czechoslovakia +1' —36 +27 +2
Greece +73 —81 +1 —7
Norway —8 +24 —25 —9
Bulgaria +62 —61 —13 —12
Latvia +23 —23 —13 —13
Finland —70 —9 +33 —46
Hungary —103 —13 —II —127
Poland —105 —109 —66 —280
SoURcE: Table 59 B
by their respective central banks for 1928—30; the changes
in each of these three years are also given. The tendency
toward a concentration of foreign exchange holdings in the
hands of the central banks of a few creditor countries is
very clear. After 1928 the persistence of the gold exchange
standard as a gold economy measure was coming to be more
and more subject to the discretion of those central banks
whose motives for economizing gold were weakest.
The forces leading to this result were not, however, of
major importance until the crisis of 1929. Until that time,
and especially before 1928, the gold exchange standard was
being successfully used in the spirit of the Genoa resolutions746 EXPERIMENTATION
by this group of countries as a measure of gold economy de-
signed to accelerate the general restoration of stable exchanges
by mitigating the competition of central banks for gold.
From 1924 to 1929 the i6 central banks of Groups.II and
III increased their gold holdings a little more than one mu-
hard Swiss francs ($207,668,000) and increased their foreign
exchange holdings a little less than one and a half milliard
Swiss francs ($287,184,000). Less than half the increase in
their reserves was in gold, and the annual increases in both
gold and foreign exchange were quite regular. When one
considers the figures of gold distribution in Table 48 and an
annual average production of new gold of 131/2 million ounces
($278 million)for the British Empire and of '9 million
ounces ($391 million)for the world, itis clear that an
annual import of $4 1½ million in gold by these i 6 countries
was not in itself a menace to the stability of the gold dis-
tributing centers. An annual increase of million in
foreign exchange held by these central banks did not in itself
present a serious problem of unfaithful money or greatly
complicate internal credit control in the financial centers,
even though these figures were very large judged by the pre-
war practice of the gold exchange standard.
When Group I is examined the gold exchange standard
takes on a different aspect. The transactions were much larger
and the proportions of gold and foreign exchange held by
the central banks of this group were subject to great varia-
tion. The three countries are grouped in order to show their
predominant role in the gold exchange standard in Europe,
not because of any similarity in their relation to that standard.
The foreign exchange accumulations of Italy in 1926 and
1927, behind which was the full force of the fascist state (cf.
Ch. 14), were far greater than those of any other centra'
bank of Europe, except the Bank of France. The dominating
motive was gold economy, but the methods of accumulation
were not typical of those employed by gold exchange stand-
ard countries in general. The foreign exchange holdings ofA DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM
the Reichsbank, which, following the stabilization of
were by far the largest of any central bank in we:e
rapidly drawn down in 1925 and again in 1927. The
exchange standard in Germany was less and less dominated
by the principle of gold economy—from the beginning
was regarded as a half-way house.8 The Bank of France
1926 and 1927 accumulated by far the largest stock of
eign exchange of any central bank in the world, and was the
dominantinfluence in the whole gold exchange standard
tern, but the motive leading to these accumulations was the
prevention of an unwanted appreciation of the franc,
adherence to the system was never regarded as more than a
temporary expedient.4 These three banks at the end of 1928
held more gold and foreign exchange than all the other
tral banks of Europe combined.
EndofDecember 1928
(millionsof Swiss francs) GROUPI GROUPS II, UI, IV
RANKS) (20
Foreign exchange 8,951 3,879
Gold 10,913 6,813
CONTRAST TO PRE-WAR
From the figures given by Dr. Blessing and analyzed above,
together with his estimates of the pre-war foreign exchange
holdings of central banks in Europe, the contribution of the
spread of the gold exchange standard in Europe after the
to the growth of short term foreign funds in the
money markets can be estimated. Dr. Blessing has estimated
the foreign exchange of nine large European central banks
before the war in American Adding to these figures
estimates for undisclosed balances and balances of smaller
banks he reaches an estimate for all European central banks
Cf. Ch. i6, The Principle of Gold Economy; also, The Modification cf
Principle of Gold Economy, 1928.
Ch. '5, De Facto Adherence to the Gold Exchange Standard,
1926 to June 1928, and the Realization of Potential Elements of Strength.
0/?. cit.,4.748 EXPERIMENTATION
MILLIONS OP DOLLARS
RussianState Bank July 27,1914 72
Reichsbank Average 1905-13 33
Austria-Hungary " 1903-13 12-30
Belgium " 29-30
Holland " 6
Switzerland " 1907-13 io.6
Italy End of '913 33
Sweden 1905-13 19
France 1906-13 4
of$250 to $400million.The contrast is striking when the





i6 European banks, Groups II and III 364 788 324
Italy 21 316 295
Germany 310 125 —185
France g8 1,284
AllEurope 899 2,487 1,585
Dr. Blessing's estimate of foreign exchange holdings of
central banks before the war for the whole world was $400
to$6oo million. It is not probable that the post-war spread
of the gold exchange standard outside Europe added very
substantially to the total foreign exchange holdings of cen-
tral banks. In spite of agitation against the gold exchange
standard in India, the Indian currency system continued to
be managed on pre-war lines through the Council Bill sys-
tem. The Argentine system was not profoundly altered, and
Dominion and Colonial balances in London tended to be
small. The large foreign balances held by the Japanese gov-
ernment and the Bank of Japan at the end of the war had
been greatly drawn down by 1925,andby 1929 had practi-
cally disappeared(cf. Ch. Butthough the main and
striking contrast between the pre-war and post-war gold ex-
change standard systems lay in the growth of the foreign
exchange holdings of European central banks, the cross cur-
rents set up in the international movement of funds between
the central money markets by its spread throughout the
world added a new complexity to the post-war problems.A DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 749
The Gold Exchange Standard as a Credit
Control Device
It is of the essence of the gold exchange standard as a gold
economy measure that a given amount of gold held in a 'gold
center' shall serve as reserve not only against notes and de-
posits in the country in which it is held, but in a second
country as well. Unless the building up of reserves by central
banks in the form of foreign exchange makes possible an
increase in credit in the markets of the central banks possess-
ing the exchange without a corresponding reduction of credit
in the market upon which the exchange represents a claim,
there is no gold economy. As Dr. Blessing has pointed out,
it was upon the "undeniable tendency to credit expansion in
the gold exchange standard" that the experts of the Genoa
Conference relied in making their recommendations.° The
gold exchange standard was not, however, universally adopted
as a gold economy measure. In some countries, notably
France, the accumulation of large foreign balances by central
banks was a byproduct of exchange pegging operations fol.-
lowing stabilization. In debtor countries adopting the gold
exchange standard as a gold economy measure, the actual
size of the gold exchange holdings was a byproduct of the
great pegging operation by which the international gold
standard as a whole was maintained—the flow of American
foreign credits. The rapid growth in foreign exchange hold
ings by central banks from 1924 to 1929 was Composite in
its origin and was much greater than had been contemplated
by the Genoa experts. Once accumulated, these balances
gave to central banks great powers of intervention in the for..
eign exchange markets, and both the accumulation and sub..
sequent use of these balances presented to them a series of:.
specialproblems of internal credit management.
Direct intervention in the foreign exchange markets had
long been part of the pre-war technique of central bank ad.-
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ministration, as admirably summarized by Dr. Blessing (op.
cit., pp. 5—6):
"In the view of the European Central Banks, the maintenance of
exchange reserves was a sound means of regulating exchange rates
without being obliged in every case to have recourse to measures
of discount and credit policy. In particular they thought it neces-
sary to avoid gold movements for which seasonal reasons or other
temporary causes(foreign loans, etc.)were responsible. They
accordingly bought exchange when the rates were favourable and
sold it when they were unfavourable. They further held that a
foreign exchange policy enabled them to obtain more stable dis-
count rates, by the omission of changes in those rates which sea-
sonal gold movements would otherwise have necessitated.
Furthermore, they looked upon exchange holdings as a conven-
ient working fund which could be employed at any time for the
regulation of daily exchange rates, while, last but not least, the
circumstance that foreign exchange, unlike gold, is an interest-
bearing asset carried great weight."
The influence of the international movement of the central
banks' foreign balances upon the volume of credit in gold
exchange standard countries was not greatly stressed and its
influence upon the volume of credit in the world as a whole
was not considered at all. This was no longer true after the
war, for the pre-war relationships between the control of
the foreign exchanges by central bank intervention in the
market and control of the domestic credit system by discount
and open market policy had undergone a profound change
simply because of the increase in the size of foreign exchange
as compared to gold reserves. The behavior of gold exchange
reserves became intimately bound up with the behavior of
the credit system as a whole in many countries, and attention
began to be directed to the influence of the gold exchange
standard upon the stability of the world credit structure.
In retrospect the gold exchange standard has been held
responsible for many of the weaknesses in the world financialA DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 751
structure from 1924 to It has frequently been said that
the gold exchange standard is ineffective as a mechanism
for setting in motion corrective forces essential to permanent
exchange stability because the expansion and contraction of
credit that follow changes in the foreign exchange reservcs
of central banks in gold exchange standard countries do not
necessarily entail opposite changes in the gold centers, as is
the case when gold moves. Consequently, it is contended,
the persistent tendency of these balances to increase after
1924 introduced a very strong inflationary influence into the
world credit system. In discussing the international flow of
gold through the London bullion market we have stressed
the dangers of using the theory of corrective forces as a guide
to the interpretation of the causes and effects of international
gold movements after the war. Quite aside from the fact that
the history of gold movements shows that these provide no
simple standard of comparison, many additional pitfalls lie
in wait for those who attempt to judge the effect of the in..
ternational flow of central bank foreign exchange holdings
by using the theorem of the one-sided, non-reciprocal effects
of such movements in the various money markets. The muL
tiplicity of these pitfalls may be brought out by reverting
briefly to the type of abstract statement employed in Chapters
4 and 17.
Pitfalls
In the first place, a sharp distinction must be made between
the effects of increases or decreases in central bank holdings
of foreign exchange upon the domestic credit structures of
countries that use chiefly notes and of those that use chiefly
deposits as a means of payment. This is true of central bank
gold holdings also, and failure to recognize this distinction
7E.g.,speech of the French Minister of Finance in the Chamber of Deputies,
Dec. 15,1931, quotedin M. G. Myers, Paris as a Financial Center (London,
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is one of the pitfalls into which those who reason upon the
international effects of gold movements solely on general
principles often fall. It is, however, particularly important
in the case of the gold exchange standard, for gold exchange
standard countries in general made less use of deposits than
did Great Britain and the United States.
As the banking system of a country that depends mainly
upon deposits as a means of payment acquires balances
abroad, whether because the country is experiencing a fa-
vorable balance of trade or is borrowing heavily abroad or
for any other reason, its domestic deposits also increase. If
the increased foreign balances are then sold to the central
banks there is merely a change in the form of the assets of
the commercial banks from foreign balances to deposits with
or to notes obtained from the central banks. The increased
commercial bank deposits remain in the system, and in addi-
tion the commercial banks have secured a further multiple
potential lending power. The foreign balances of the com-
mercial banks are unchanged, their reserves and deposits
have increased. These are precisely the effects that follow
gold imports made through commercial banks. However, po-
tential lending power increases only if the new foreign bal-
ances aresoldto a central bank, whereas in the case of gold
imports it increases whether the new gold is sold to a central
bank or not. If the foreign exchange is sold to a central bank,
and is counted by that central bank as legal reserve, an addi-
tional potential lending power comes into existence at the
central bank. However, in the case of gold acquired by a cen-
tral bank this result follows without question, whereas in the
case of foreign exchange it is dependent on whether, and in
what proportion, the particular type of foreign exchange
bought is regarded as legal reserve by the central bank.
Conversely, as the banking system of a country that de-
pends mainly on deposits as a means of payment loses bal-
ances abroad, whether because the country is experiencing
an unfavorable balance of trade or is being called upon toA DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 753
makelarge capital payments abroad, or for any other reason,
its domestic deposits also decline. If the decrease in foreign
balances is made good by purchase of foreign exchange from
the central bank, there is merely a change in the form of the
assets of the commercial banks—their foreign balances are
restored to their previous condition, but their deposits with
the central bank or their note holdings are reduced. The
reduction in commercial bank deposits continues, and in
addition the commercial banks have experienced a pressure
for a further multiple contraction of deposits due to the
duction in their reserves. These are precisely the effects that
follow gold exports by commercial banks. However, poten-
tial lending power declines only if the decrease in foreign
balances is made good by purchase from central banks, and
not by some other means such as borrowing abroad, whereas
in the case of gold exports it declines whether the gold is
obtained from the central bank or not. If the foreign
change is bought from central banks, and has been previousily
counted by them as part of their legal reserve, then an addi.
tional pressure for multiple contraction of central bank
credit comes into existence. However, in the case of gold
obtained from the central bank this result follows without
question, whereas in the case of foreign exchange it is de-
pendent on whether, and in what proportion, the particular
type of foreign exchange sold has been counted as legal re.-
serve.
In the case of banking systems of countries in which credit
is extended chiefly in the form of notes different results fol..
low the acquisition and loss of balances abroad. The acquisi-
tion of foreign balances by such a banking system is accom
panied by payment of notes to exporters or other holders of
foreign claims. This means a reduction in commercial bank
reserves and an increase in notes in circulation rather than
an increase in commercial bank deposits. If the increased
foreign balances are sold to the central banks, then the com-
mercial banks replenish their cash reserves by obtaining754 EXPERIMENTATION
notes from the central banks, and their position is restored
to what it was in the first place. The central banks, however,
have increased foreign balances and an increased liability
for notes in circulation. If these foreign balances are con-
sidered by the central banks as legal reserve, a further mul-
tiple potential lending power at the central banks is intro-
duced into the system. These are the effects of gold imports
also, but in the case of gold imports, the deflationary pres-
sure of the increase in circulation upon the commercial
banks would be overcome whether the gold were sold to
central banks or not, whereas in the case of foreign exchange
it could be avoided only by selling the foreign exchange to
the central banks. Further, in the case of gold imports the
potential multiple expansion in lending power at the central
banks would follow without question, whereas in the case of
sales of foreign exchange to the central banks this would be
dependent upon whether, and in what proportion, the par-
ticular foreign balances bought were considered legal reserve.
Conversely, as the banking system of a country that de-
pends mainly on notes as a means of payment loses foreign
balances, whether because the country is experiencing an
unfavorable balance of payments or for any other reason,
its note holdings increase because payment is received for
its foreign balances in the form of notes, and notes in circu-
lation are reduced. If the decline in foreign balances is
made good by purchase of foreign exchange from the central
bank, then the increase in reserves is canceled by payment
to the central bank and the commercial banks are restored
to their previous position. The central banks, however, have
reduced their foreign exchange holdings and their liability
for notes in circulation. If these foreign balances were con-
sidered by the central banks as legal reserves, then there is
a pressure upon the central banks for a further multiple
contraction of central bank credit. These are the effects of
gold exports also, but in the case of gold exports, the poten-
tial increase in commercial bank lending power due to theA DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM
increasein their note holdings would have been offset whether
gold had been purchased from the central banks or ncr,
whereasin the case of foreign exchange it would be offset
only if foreign balances had been obtained from the central
banks. Further, in the case of gold exports the pressure for
a mutiple contraction of credit at the central bank woud
follow without question, whereas in the case of foreign
change this would be dependent on whether, and in what
proportion, the particular form of foreign exchange sold had
been considered legal reserve.
These abstract considerations may be made the basis
several general observations concerning the gold exchange
standard as a credit control device:
i) As a credit control device the gold exchange standard
more dependent upon centralization of reserves than the
gold standard. When a country choses to accept payment
a favorable balance in foreign exchange instead of in
the increase in its balances abroad will replenish the reserves
of its commercial banks and promote primary expansion
credit only if these balances are sold to central banks.
is not true of gold imports.
2) The influence of an increase in the foreign exchange
holdings of central banks upon the commercial banking
tern varies with the extent to which credit is extended by
that system in the form of notes or deposits. The more
portànt the use of notes, the less potential lending power
introduced into the commercial banking system
foreign exchange purchases by central banks. This is true
gold imports also.
3) The influence of increases in the foreign exchange
ings of central banks in adding to their potential lending
power (i.e., in promoting secondary expansion of credit)
certainly less than that of increases in their gold holdings
because, in almost all gold exchange standard countries,
all the foreign exchange holdings of central banks are
sidered legal reserve.756
Two other general observations can be made on the basis
of the difference in the transaction that brings gold or foreign
exchange to central banks:
i)Whenthe exchanges of a gold standard country are suffi-
ciently strong to bring in gold it is usually imported by an
arbitrage transaction. When the exchanges of a gold ex-
change standard country are sufficiently strong to bring the
rates to a point where central banks are willing to buy, for-
eign exchange is passed to the central bank by the commercial
banks by the simple process of selling it in a market in which
the central bank is the principal buyer. This transaction is
much simpler than gold arbitrage. It requires no capital.
More banks can take part in it. The motives that lead to it
are quite different. Though both transactions have the effect
of bringing home foreign balances previously held or cur-
rently acquired by commercial banks, the profit of the ar-
bitrageur is the motive and the remittance home a conse-
quence in one case, whereas in the other, the remittance
home is the direct motive. Under circumstances otherwise
quite similar the amounts of these remittances may be quite
different.
2)Theease with which the commercial banks of gold ex-
change standard countries may acquire notes from or de-
posits at the central banks by simply selling them foreign
exchange is a standing temptation to use that method of
avoiding deflationary pressure at home and to get the ad-
vantages of an elastic banking system where elasticity is not
otherwise provided. Under the gold exchange standard sys-
tem this can be done either by borrowing abroad, which
would probably be impossible were the proceeds of such
borrowings to be remitted in gold, or by a simple variation
in the size of balances held abroad.
These five generalizations are made upon purely technical
grounds without any assumptions concerning the general
credit control policy being pursued by the central banks
while their foreign exchange holdings are being increased asA DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 757
a result of their intervention in the exchange market. These
general policies obviously can be, and often were, directed
toward offsetting the direct effects of the increase in their
foreign exchange holdings upon the reserves and deposits of
commercial banks or upon the volume of notes in circula-
tion. Central banks, moreover, need not, and often did not,
allow their own increased potential lending power to become
actual. On the other hand, the opportunity is open to them,
of course, to allow the potential internal inflationary effects
arising from increased foreign exchange reserves to have their
full effects, and even to supplement them by domestic credit
control policy.
Among the instruments of domestic control policy opei
to central banks of gold exchange standard countries is their
power to take the initiative in the purchase arid sale of for..
eign exchange. By selling foreign exchange they can reduce
the reserves of the commercial banks while adding to their
foreign balances, and by buying foreign exchange they can
add to the reserves of commercial banks while reducing their
foreign balances. When, for example, a central bank takes the
initiative in buying foreign exchange in the market the re-
sulting increases in its foreign balances are clearly not related
functionally to any effort by the commercial banks to remit
home balances acquired abroad as the result of a favorable
balance of payments. From the point of view of their
banking effects these purchases are open market operations
pure and simple.
Similar generalizations could be made, mutatis mutandi,
to describe the factors that would have to be taken into ac-
count in interpreting the meaning of losses of foreign
change by the commercial banks or the central banks of gold
exchange standard countries. Enough, however, has been said
to show that no safe ground can be found in general princi-
ples for an interpretation of the gold exchange standard as
a credit control device in gold exchange standard countries
after 1924. Even less confidence can be placed on general758 EXPERIMENTATION
statements of its effect on the world credit structure, for
that is dependent also upon the treatment of their interna-
tional responsibilities by the gold centers. In the words of
Dr. Blessing "on theoretical grounds alone, it is impossible
to judge whether and to what extent the gold exchange
standard [after the war] led to an expansion of credit; every-
thing depends on what actually happened." 8
WhatActually Happened
The effects of purchases and sales of foreign exchange by
central banks upon the domestic credit structures in the gold
exchange standard countries themselves were wholly con-
ditioned by their extremely diverse banking and currency
arrangements, by the varied nature of their economic prob-
lems, the divergent policies of their monetary authorities,
and their individual relationships with the central money
markets, London and New York. Each gold exchange stand-
ard country has to be considered separately, as was done for
several in Chapters 14—16.
Every situation described in the above generalizations was
illustrated in practice in the post-war period. The first was
not of great importance but has been included both for the
sake of theoretical completeness and because in fact the
principle of concentration of gold reserves with central banks
was not fully carried out on the continent after the war.
Dutch banks, for example, kept gold in their own vaults,
reporting the amount regularly to the Netherlands Bank,
and the large French banks all held gold that was not re-
corded separately in their statements but was included in
'cash.' In 1932 the amount held outside the Bank of France
was estimated at from two to two and a quarter milliard
francs, of which the Credit Lyonnais held perhaps a milliard
and the Societe Générale 8oo million francs. The possibility
of publishing these figures if there should ever be a run on
these banks was felt to be a sort of 'psychological reserve.'
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An equivalent amount of foreign balances, though a ready
means of obtaining cash, would not have been considered
actual cash and would not have had the same effect upon the
]ending policies of the banks.
The situation described by the second generalization
of outstanding importance and was illustrated in the
perience of France and many other countries. While France
was de facto on the pure gold exchange standard the
striking feature of her currency and banking system was the
so-called 'closed circuit.' From August 1926 to August
theextraordinary increases in notes in circulation due to
purchase of foreign exchange by the Bank of France merely
filled up an equally extraordinary gap in the internal circu-
lation created mainly by the repayment of advances received
from the Bank by the government, and by the accumulation
of large public deposits. But from August 1927 to June 1928
continued purchases of foreign exchange threatened to do
more and to produce an expansion in the note circulation.
To avoid this, the Bank of France resorted to the essentially
temporary expedient of buying forward exchange.9 The
falling due of these contracts in July and August 1928 did
not lead to a corresponding increase in the note issue, for part
of the exchange was sold to the government, and the inflation-
ary influence of the rest was offset by a net increase in Treas-
ury deposits due to a continued failure of the floating debt to
decline. The inflationary dangers to which France was sub-
jected by the accumulation of foreign exchange by the
of France were thus in the main obviated by the peculfar
working out of the problems of the public debt in France,
but they were at no time nearly as serious as they would have
been had the French banking system been vested with the
vast powers of expansion possessed, for example, by the Fed-
eral Reserve system. It was the characteristic reliance upon
notes that produced this result while 'France was on the
Ch. 15,TheDe Facto Adherence to the Gold Exchange Standard, Au-
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exchange standard de facto, and that after 1929 enabled her
to absorb great quantities of gold without serious inflationary
consequences.
Germany provides perhaps the best illustration of the
accumulation and use of large foreign exchange holdings by
a central bank outside the legal reserve. The support of the
reichsmark in the first half of 1927 by sales of foreign ex-
change by the Reichsbank, one-half of which were taken
from holdings not considered legal reserve, certainly reduced
the deflationary pressure that would have followed in Ger-
many had the whole drain been either in gold or in foreign
exchange legally counted as reserves.1° This was in fact one
of the considerations that weighed heavily in the Reichsbank's
decision to move gradually away from the use of devisen as
a primary means of meeting adverse foreign exchange situa-
tions.
Germany also provided the best illustration of the differ-
ence in motive leading to the sale of gold and of foreign
exchange to a central bank by commercial banks. In our
account of the consolidation of the gold standard in Ger-
many we pointed out that the Reichsbank was brought into
possession of a fund of foreign exchange whose size was a
function, first, of the amount of foreign exchange accumu-
lating in the hands of German banks as a whole (i.e., of the
German balance of payments), and second, of the decision
of these banks as to what proportion of the total they wished
to hold as working balances abroad. This decision was greatly
influenced by the fact that the German banks were deeply
indebted to foreign banks and needed to keep certain assets
in the form of foreign reserves against this liability. It was
simpler and easier to make and execute when the Reichsbank
stood ready to buy and sell exchange than it would have
been had remittance home depended solely upon driving the
exchange to gold import point and then relying upon the gold
arbitrageur.
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Thebest illustration of the use of the gold exchange
standard by commercial banks to offset central banking
policy is also found in Germany. In his Annual Report
December 22, 1928 (p. 104), the Agent General for Repara
tion Payments said that if the Reichsbank discount rate was
higher than rates in other markets by an amount sufficient
to compensate for fluctuations in the exchange, Germans
customarily borrowed abroad and sold the foreign exchange
to the Reichsbank. This was also done at other times by
Germans who were not in possession of sufficient eligible
assets to borrow from the Reichsbank. Conversely, when the
Reichsbank rate was low, Germans borrowed at home in
order to obtain the foreign exchange to repay short term
foreign loans or for other purposes. The problems of the
Reichsbank resulting from this situation have been described
in our account of the conflict between control of the home
market and control of the foreign exchange. This whole situa-
tion was a manifestation under a peculiar set of circumstances
of a phenomenon already common before the war—the re-
liance of countries with less fully developed money market
institutions and techniques upon London for elasticity in
their banking systems. London was used in this way by the
United States in 1906 in a spectacular manner. The reliance
of French banks upon their London balances as a sort of
secondary reserve was traditional. It was made manifest dur-
ing the Experimentation period by a new seasonal weakness
of sterling in Paris just before the annual payment of the
French income tax in July. As long as France was on a de
facto gold exchange standard and was experiencing a general
return of capital, her use of London as a banking reserve was
absorbed in the major movements of the foreign exchange
holdings of the Bank of France and could not be statistically
measured. But after the changes of 1928 it can be identified
in the figures of French gold purchases abroad.
The use of balances in the central money markets by the
commercial banks in other Countries in order to replenish762 EXPERIMENTATION
reserves at home was, as these examples show, by no means
peculiar to the gold exchange standard. It was in fact a per-
manent feature of the system described in Chapter 7 as the
hierarchy of financial centers. The gold exchange standard
merely made it simpler and easier.
Every country using the gold exchange standard was faced,
in some degree, with the problem of harmonizing it with its
own domestic credit policy. In Italy, for example, the large
increase in foreign exchange holdings of the central bank in
1926 and 1927 was not accompanied by an expansion of Ital-
ian credit. On the contrary these were years of deflationary
pressure in Italy. In Japan the support of the yen over a
period of years by the sale of foreign exchange under the.
direction of the central bank was accomplished without de-
flationary pressure on the domestic credit situation because
the bulk of the foreign exchange sold, though centrally con-
trolled, was not actually held by the central bank (cf. Ch.
14).InGermany credit rationing was resorted to in 1924.
1925,and1927tocounteract the inflationary effects of the
inflow of foreign exchange. In May 1929, after Germany had
been subjected to intense pressure during the negotiation of
the Young Plan, this device was again used to prevent bor-
rowing at the Reichsbank for the purpose of getting the
means of buying foreign exchange. On the other hand, in
several countries the gold exchange standard continued to
be used very much on pre-war lines, though the position
varied from country to country. In Belgium, for example,
central bank foreign exchange holdings were used very largely
to smooth out fluctuations in the sterling-belga exchange,
whereas in Holland purchases and sales of devisen were more
largely used to influence domestic credit conditions. The.
administration of the gold exchange standard systems of the
Orient did not differ essentially from pre-war practice.
None of these uses of the gold exchange standard was of
a nature, in itself, to undermine the stability of the world's
credit structure and therefore to endanger the system ofA FINANCIAL SYSTEM
stable exchange rates achieved by the return to gold.
case was quite different with the steady accumulation
foreign balances as a byproduct of stabilization. A prolonged
inflow of foreign payments to any country, whether it results
in sustained gold imports, as under the gold standard, or
large accumulations of foreign exchange, as under the
exchange standard, is bound to increase the independence o
the commercial banks and weaken the power of
banks as a first consequence. Under such circumstances the
intervention of the central banks in the foreign exchange
market becomes something different in kind from the
war type of exchange control described by Dr. E
becomes a form of exchange pegging through the export
very short term capital, and as a secondary consequence
gives to the central bank the opportunity at some future
time of dominating the market. The latter circumstance is
of peculiar importance in countries subject to what we have
called a psychological gold export embargo.
It was this element in the situation which, during the
Experimentation period, so greatly swelled total gold ex-
change standard balances, made the struggle between contTol
of the home market and of the foreign exchanges formidable,
and left the dangerous inheritance to be described in the
next sections. Two strands were combining to bring about
this result. The first was the flow of American and British
foreign lending, supplemented by smaller advances from the
small group of continental creditor powers. This was the
basis for domestic credit expansion within the debtor coun-
tries, including South America, but particularly in Central
Europe. The second was the accumulation of foreign ex-
change by the Bank of France.
These two influences combined to make the credit struc-
tures of a whole series of debtor countries extremely de-
pendent upon the attitude of the London and New York
markets toward the investment and employment of funds
in these countries, and to give France a mighty influence in764 EXPERIMENTATION
both London and New York. These relationships formed the
essential link between the experiments of creating an inter-
national money market in New York, defending sterling, and
conducting the gold exchange standard without a focal point.
The Foreign Exchange Portfolio of the Bank of France in
1929
Inthe last six months of 1928 the foreign exchange portfolio
of the Bank of France rose about six milliard francs, but
during the first four months of 1929 this increase was entirely
disposed of. By no means a simple operation, it was composed
of three elements:(i) a reduction of about 11/2 milliard as
part of the domestic credit administration of the Bank of
France;(2)a conversion of about 41/2 milliard into gold
held abroad; thephysical import of a large part of this
gold into France.
From December 28, 1928 to May 3, 1929 commercial dis-
counts and advances at the Bank of France rose 851 million
francs and public deposits fell 927 million francs. These two
operations added to the note issue 1,778 million francs, but
at the same time the Bank of France sold 6,132 million francs
of foreign exchange and bought 4,485 million francs of gold
—indicating a sale of foreign exchange to the market of i ,647
million francs. This canceled the addition to the note cir-
culation from the other two sources combined. As no other
important changes took place in the Bank's balance sheet,
the note issue remained stationary.'1 The bare figures do not
indicate which of these three items was cause and which
effect, but they do indicate that the Bank of France either
extended enough credit to the market to prevent its support
of the exchanges from having a deflationary effect in France
or sold foreign exchange to counteract a tendency toward
domestic credit expansion. It need not have done so, and the
position illustrates the power its large foreign exchange
holdings gave to the Bank in its home market. Indeed, from
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1928 to 1931 the principal instrument of domestic credit
control in France was the Bank's domination of the ex-
changes.
In December 1928 and January 1929 the Bank of France
increased its gold holdings about 2 milliard by selling foreign
exchange in New York. Most of this gold was placed under
earmark at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.12 In April
and May this operation was repeated and Bank of France
gold holdings increased a further 21/2 milliard, with a cor-
responding reduction in its foreign exchange. This was fol-
lowed by a decrease in gold held under earmark in New York
because all the gold bought in April and May and some of
that bought in January was physically imported into France.
This was accomplished by means of a triangular arrange-
ment between the Bank of France, the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York, and the Reichsbank. The conflict over the
negotiation of the Young Plan had caused a drain of funds
from Germany which was aggravated by the activities of the
New York market where the speculative boom was at its
height. In April this drain reached the proportions of a flight
of capital from Germany. The way in which this situation
was met by the Reichsbank is described in its Annual Report
for 1929:
"During the critical weeks in the spring of 1929theReichsbank
surrendered altogether nearly 1,500,000,000reichsmarks
300,000) of gold and foreign exchange. Under the influence of
the withdrawals of foreign exchange by German and foreign hold-
ers the official quotation of the dollar dropped to the gold export
point. The necessary consignments of gold to foreign countries
were in every case effected by the Reichsbank itself, which sold
the gold principally in New York. In order to dispense with the
actual shipment of part of this gold to New York, agreements
were made on several occasions with foreign (European) banks
of issue, which placed the necessary amounts at the disposal of
12January gold under earmark at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
the bulk of which was for the Bank of France, increased $65 million.766 EXPERIMENTATION
the Reichsbank out of their stocks of earmarked gold on deposit
in America. The gold delivered by the Reichsbank in exchange,
amounting to about 700,000,000 reichsmarks ($166,740,000), was
shipped, not to America, but to the European centers concerned.
Altogether some 870,000,000 reichsmarks($207,234,000)were
sold in New York, 40,000,000 reichsmarks ($9,528,000) in Lon-
don, 17,000,000 reichsmarks ($4,049,400) lfl Paris, and 28,000,000
reichsmarks ($6,66g,6oo) in Holland and Switzerland." 18
Thetransaction was shared by other central banks, but the
bulk was with the Bank of France. The ultimate source of
the gold into which the Bank of France converted the pro-
ceeds of its forward exchange contracts was therefore the
Reichsbank, and the ultimate causes of this transfer were
first the repercussions of the reparation crisis, and second
the dependence of the German banking system on foreign
credits.
These transactions restored the foreign exchange holdings
of the Bank of France to the point at which they stood when
the law of June 1928 was passed. The interpretation of that
law under which the Bank was able to retain the exchange
acquired before that date fulfilled the dictum of Poincaré:
"... ourbank of issue intends to remain in a condition to
direct the exchange market, and direct it always." 14Because
it was not obliged to retain it the Bank enjoyed unprece-
dented power to draw gold from London and New York.
Even by remaining passive in the foreign exchange markets,
the Bank of France was in a strategic position to get gold
from abroad, because the franc was inherently strong as long
as France did not invest her currently accumulating inter-
i3FederalReserve Bulletin, May 1930,p.299. Earmarked gold in New York
fell during April $49 million and during May $i6 million, far less than the
amount shipped from Berlin to France. Hence the assumption that the Bank
of France was selling foreign exchange in New York and increasing its stock
of earmarked gold at the same time. During March, April, and May, the
United States imported $46,538,000 in gold from Germany.
14Speechof Poincaré before the French Parliament in February 1928, quoted
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national credits by making foreign investments, or leave
them abroad to be employed by others. Moreover the fact
that notes could no longer be issued against additions to
the Bank's foreign exchange portfolio meant a reversion to
the pre-war position in which drafts upon the gold reserve
of other countries gave elasticity to the French banking sys-
tem.
This was the position reached by France about June 1929.
By that time the adoption of the Young Plan had brought to
an end the flight of capital, and a new flow of short term
credits had again put Germany in a position to bid success-
fully for gold abroad, though it did not alter the fundamental
weakness of her position.
For these reasons both France and Germany were in the
market for gold in the summer of 1929, and under the system
of two gold distributing centers, their bids were effective in.
the one whose exchange was at the moment the weakest,
namely London. Consequently, the Reichsbank gold reserves,
which had been depleted by shipments to France, were re-
plenished in London, and there was also a general movement
of gold from London to Paris, the causes of which were de-
scribed by The Economist in August 31, 1929(p.391)
"PostStabilization policy has been to keep the note circulation
down to the lowest practical limit. To remedy the seasonal short-
age of currency the banks had three courses open:(i) to redis-
count part of their stock of commercial paper at the Bank of
France, (2) to borrow francs against securities, or todraw on
their foreign gold balances. The conservative policy of the Bank
of France has latterly rendered rediscounting unattractive, and
there is also the fact that the Bank has latterly proved
ally critical in accepting paper offered to it for either rediscount-
ing or as security for loans. There remained only the third source,
and it was obvious, in view of the fact that sterling had dropped
below gold import point, that the common sense policy to adopt
was to exchange pounds against gold at the Bank of England,
transfer the precious metal to Paris and sell it to the Bank of
France."768 EXPERIMENTATION
The Gold Exchange Standard and the Gold Centers
Five major consequences of the use of the gold exchange
standard as a gold economy measure and as a credit control
device were felt in the central money markets, London and
New York, all of which were important for the functioning
of the international gold standard system as a whole because
of the size of the balances involved.
In the first place, as stated by Walter Stewart in his evi-
dence before the Macmillan Committee, such funds being
held in short term employment by their very nature were not
free to move from short to long term employments in response
to interest rate differentials. They therefore constituted an
impediment to the mutual adjustment of long and short
term rates throughout the world and an obstacle to the ef-
fectiveness of bank rate in the central money markets.'5
Second, the existence of these large balances in a decen-
tralized world credit structure exposed both the New York
and London markets to the danger of sudden transfers of
such funds from one market to another. This danger, inherent
in a large scale extension of the experiment of a gold exchange
standard without a focal point, has been many times referred
to in these studies and has been admirably described by Dr.
Blessing (op. cit., p. 7):
"So far as can be gathered from occasional information, the ma-
jority by far of the exchange holdings of Central Banks were kept
before the War in London. This is not surprising when it is re-
membered that London was the clearing house and central re-
serve market of the world for short term money and that confi-
dence in the pound was so firmly rooted that sterling and gold
were looked upon as synonymous terms. This circumstance was
of considerable significance for the satisfactory functioning of
the gold exchange standard before the War. Foreign exchange
holdings were not converted into other currencies, and the post-
War practice of converting sterling balances into dollars or vice-
15Minutesof Evidence, II, 198, especially answers to questions 7793 and 7794.A DECENTRALIZED FINANCIAL SYSTEM 769
versawas unknown. The difficulties encountered since the War
by the Central Banks in whose markets the exchange constitutes
a claim were practically non-existent. In other words: there was
only one reserve centre for the gold exchange standard and none
of the difficulties resulting from the multiple reserve system of the
post-War period were extant."
This shifting of balances from one market to another
tuated the frequent shifts in the locus of the world demand
for gold that were inevitable in a gold standard system with
out a single dominating center.
Third, the competition between London and New York
for gold exchange standard balances led to continuous search
for profitable outlets for their employment and helped to
swell the flow of international credits to debtor countries.
Fourth, the growth of gold exchange standard balances in
fluenced the international distribution of the ownership of
foreign funds in the central money markets in such a way as
to make their short term indebtedness a greater factor of
instability than before the war. For example, after the return
to gold, New Zealand, Australia, and India, all debtors to
England, had no balances in London to speak of—Australia
in fact being known frequently to be employing overdraft
money obtained from one of the joint stock banks. France,
the Netherlands, and Switzerland were at the opposite ex-
treme—they had large balances in London, but did not owe
England anything. The Scandinavian countries, Egypt, and
Argentina were between the two. Such shifts of balances in
the central money markets from debtor to creditor countries
were accentuated during depressions.
Finally, the accumulation of very large holdings of foreign
exchange by central banks of creditor countries was a threat
to the central money markets because in these countries in
particular, as well as in several of the stronger debtor coun-
tries, the gold exchange standard was regarded as a half-way
house.770 EXPERIMENTATION
The Gold Exchange Standard as a Half-Way House
A whole series of signposts along the path traversed by our
analysis has pointed to one conclusion—that those features
of the gold exchange standard which made it more than a
simple gold economy measure or an aid to credit control in
essentially gold standard countries could not be relied upon
as permanent arrangements. Among these signposts were the
concentration of foreign assets in the hands of the central
banks of creditor countries in 1928 and 1929, the activity of
the undisclosed buyer in the London bullion market, the
de facto abandonment of the gold exchange standard by Ger-
many and Japan, the legislation of Italy permitting the con-
version of the foreign exchange holdings of the Bank of Italy
into gold. Most important of all, French balances were re-
tained undiminished only as a matter of policy and largely
because of French appreciation of the international reper-
cussions certain to arise from the conversion of a large frac-
tion of them into gold. This introduced an element of great
uncertainty, amply confirmed by the words of the Annual
Report of the Bank of France for 1932: "Ever since 1928 the
Bank has wished to liquidate its foreign exchange."
That the gold exchange standard was regarded by the
countries whose central banks held the largest foreign bal-
ances not as a permanent arrangement but as a half-way
house was the most important single feature of the gold ex-
change standard in the international gold standard system
after 1924.